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ABSTRACT
Non-suicidal self-injury (NSI) represents a growing area of concern in a variety of
clinical settings, yet remains a poorly understood phenomenon. An influx of research on
the functions of NSI over the past decade has suggested a biopsychosocial emotional
regulation model of this behavior. This model proposes that self-injurers engage in NSI
to reduce negative emotions, and presupposes that self-injurers are characterized by
emotional dysregulation. The present study evaluated the biological component of this
model by assessing hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis (HPAA) functioning in a
group of self-injurers (n=26) and non-injuring healthy controls (n=28). HPAA
functioning was assessed via measuring salivary cortisol levels across 65 minutes
following exposure to an interpersonal rejection stressor or neutral comparison condition.
Results of the experiment did not support the biological facet of the proposed
biopsychosocial model. A complex time x condition x group x gender interaction effect
was found, which was counterintuitive to study hypotheses. However, self-reported
difficulties with emotional regulation were in the hypothesized direction, with selfinjurers reporting greater difficulties in most domains. Future research must seek other
potential lines of evidence in support of the biological aspects of emotional regulation in
self-injurers.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, non-suicidal self-injury (NSI) has received an
increased degree of attention in a number of mediums, including the mainstream media
(e.g., Marano, 2004) and popular culture (e.g., Reznor, 1994), psychopathology research
literature (e.g., Favazza, 1996, 1998; Gratz, 2001; Muehlenkamp, 2005; Nock & Prinstein,
2004; Ross & Heath, 2002; Ross & Heath, 2003), and disciplines outside of the mental
health field (Hafeez & Goodyear, 2003). More specifically, the study of NSI has grown
exponentially as an area of research focus in recent years, especially over the past decade.
Such recent research indicates that this behavior occurs in about 1-4% of general, nonclinical populations (Briere & Gil, 1996; Klonsky, Oltmanns, & Turheimer, 2003), with
higher rates in adolescents (10-15%; Hawton & Rodham, 2006; Muehlenkamp &
Gutierrez, 2004; Ross & Heath, 2002) and college students (17-35%; Gratz, 2001;
Whitlock, Eckenrode, & Silverman, 2006).
Evidence from anthropological findings suggests that self-mutilative practices
have been engaged in for much of human evolutionary history (Casteret, 1951; Janssens,
1957). In a more recent historical context, case studies of self-mutilation became more
prevalent in the medical literature near the close of the nineteenth century and the
beginning of the twentieth century. However, following Menninger’s (1938) early
review of the literature concerning self-mutilation, the gap in publications on this topic
suggests that interest in this phenomenon was largely dormant for some time. The
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attention of the psychiatric community was directed back to this topic about twenty years
later when “wrist slashing” among psychiatric inpatients gained notoriety (Favazza &
Simeon, 1995). It was unclear at that time what differentiated self-mutilating behavior
from suicidal behavior, besides the inevitable consequences of these behaviors. Although
it is difficult to ascertain the exact function of patients’ self-mutilation from accounts in
this early literature, the behaviors, and contexts in which they are described, seem
consistent with modem day accounts of NSI. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed
that this literature base represents the origin of the study of NSI in psychiatry and
psychology.
Kreitman (1977) was the first to devote an entire text to self-injury. His work
documented one of the first systematic epidemiological studies of NSI, which he termed
“parasuicide” (a term discussed in more depth in subsequent sections of this paper)
among United Kingdom residents in Edinburgh over a period of eight years beginning in
the mid-1960’s. It was at this time that interest in this phenomenon regained prominent
attention in the psychiatric literature. This area was further developed by subsequent
work of Ross and McKay (1979) and Pattison and Kahan (1983), which also served to
increase research and clinical interest in NSI. Since that time, the research literature on
NSI has expanded substantially, incorporating a variety of theories regarding potential
etiological and phenomenological models for this behavior.
Defining Non-Suicidal Self-Injury
As noted earlier, self-injury has historically been referred to by numerous other
labels (e.g., Gratz, 2001; Kreitman, 1977; Linehan, 1993a, 1993b; Simeon & Favazza,
2001). Indeed, the diversity of labels reflects a central difficulty in conceptualizing this
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behavior within this area of study. Moreover, it reflects the underlying divarication in the
extant literature regarding definitions of self-injury, in that each label has at times been
used to describe slightly different variations of this behavior. One primary point of
disconnect seems to be whether or not failed suicide attempts or self-injurious behavior
with an intent to die should be included in a definition of self-injury.
Kreitman (1977) coined the term “parasuicide,” defining it as “a non-fatal act in
which an individual deliberately causes self-injury or ingests a substance in excess of any
prescribed or generally recognized therapeutic dosage” (Kreitman, 1977, p. 3). Alcohol
consumption was excluded from the criteria of this definition because there is no standard
amount of alcohol that is commonly acknowledged as a regular, prescribed, or
therapeutic dosage. Linehan (1993a) posited that this definition also included failed
suicide attempts in which there was minimal intent of death, and she adopted the term in
her own seminal work. Most recently, Walsh (2006) forwarded a definition of self-injury
as “intentional, self-effected, low-lethality bodily harm of a socially unacceptable nature,
performed to reduce psychological distress” (Walsh, 2006, p.4). Walsh’s definition is
useful from a clinical perspective in that it portends a specific functional hypothesis of
self-injury, i.e., that this behavior serves an ameliorative function for psychiatric
symptomatology. However, a definition that is functionally specific may be limiting in
clinical research exploring the potential functions of this behavior.
Other definitions of self-injury have been forwarded in the literature. Like Walsh
(2006), some have also defined NSI from a functional perspective. For example, Miller
(1995) proposed that NSI in women (which she termed “Trauma Reenactment
Syndrome”) is a symbolic reenactment of childhood trauma, citing the wealth of
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literature connecting self-injury with early trauma (e.g., van der Kolk, Perry, & Hermann).
Favazza (1996) and others (e.g., Muehlenkamp, 2005) have submitted that NSI, with its
associated features and sequelae, represents a separate psychiatric disorder.
Favazza (1996) proposed what he termed “Repetitive Self-Mutilation Syndrome,”
and indicated that this disorder would best be classified as an impulse control disorder.
The proposed criteria for Repetitive Self-Mutilation Syndrome included “ (1)
preoccupation with harming oneself physically; (2) recurrent failure to resist impulses to
harm oneself physically, resulting in the destruction or alteration of body tissue; (3)
increasing sense of tension immediately before the act of self-harm; (4) gratification or a
sense of relief when committing the act of self-harm; and (5) the act is not associated
with conscious suicidal intent and is not in response to a delusion, hallucination,
transsexual fixed idea, or serious mental retardation” (Favazza, 1996, p.256). Although
there are some components of this suggested classification that necessitate refinement,
one may infer from these criteria that this definition of self-injury assumes that (1) NSI is
distinct from suicide, and (2) it facilitates the regulation of tension. Self-injury in the
present study is conceptualized in the context of non-suicidal self-injury. Specifically,
NSI is any form of self-directed behavior that causes or has the potential to cause
immediate physical (i.e., tissue) damage to the individual without intent to cause death.
Differentiating Non-Suicidal Self-Injury from Suicidal Behavior
Much confusion has arisen regarding the difference between NSI and suicidal
behavior. This confusion has been promulgated by previous usage of the term
“parasuicide,” which implies a suicidal component to the self-injury that may not have
been engaged in to terminate the individual’s life, as well as the use of the term
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“deliberate self-harm” in multiple definitional contexts (e.g., Haw, Houston, & Townsend,
2002). There is evidence that a correlation between suicidality and NSI exists. Empirical
research indicates that as much as approximately 40% of self-injurers may experience
suicidal ideations during episodes of NSI (Favazza, 1996; Pattison & Kahan, 1983), and
approximately 50-85% of these individuals have attempted suicide at least once in their
lifetime (Stanley, Winchel, Molcho, Simeon & Stanley, 1992). However, there is also
evidence to suggest that suicide attempters who self-injure are a unique sub-group
(Stanley, Gameroff, Michaelson, & Mann, 2001). On the other side of this conceptual
coin, there is also evidence that self-injurers who attempt suicide differ from their nonsuicidal counterparts by way of longer histories of NSI and a higher number of NSI
methods, thus making them a higher risk group in multiple ways (Nock, Joiner, Gordon,
Lloyd-Richardson, & Prinstein, 2006; Whitlock & Knox, 2007). Parallel to this, NSI has
been conceptualized as falling along a continuum of self-harm where severity of the
behavior ranges from low-lethal compulsive NSI (e.g., trichotillomania, onychophagia)
up to and including suicide (Linehan, 1986). Such a conceptualization suggests that
while NSI and suicide may be conceptually or categorically related, they are also
functionally distinct phenomena.
Walsh (2006) summarizes the differences between these two behaviors as being
primarily in the following areas: (1) intent; (2) level of physical damage and potential
lethality; (3) behavioral frequency; (4) multiplicity of methodology; (5) helplessness and
hopelessness; (6) psychological repercussions of a NSI episode. In the following sections,
the evidence supporting this contention is discussed.
Intent
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Behaviors are frequently defined in terms of their purpose (i.e., attainment of
reinforcement, reduction of punishment). The success or failure of a behavior in
fulfilling that purpose is often a primary contingency that maintains it. Shneidman (1985)
discussed how intent separates NSI from suicide. He contended that suicidality is
characterized by a desire to terminate psychological pain; the suicidal individual does not
typically wish to kill the body, but instead to end her or his painful experience of
consciousness. Conversely, those who engage in NSI may do so as a way of changing
their experience of consciousness; this may involve ameliorating an excess or paucity of
emotion (Brown, Comtois, & Linehan, 2002; Conterio and Lader, 1998; Favazza, 1987;
Linehan, 1993a; Muehlenkamp & Gutierrez, 2004). The intent of both groups is to
escape from psychological pain; however, the degree to which that pain is averted (i.e.,
temporarily or permanently) is the differentiating factor.
Level o f Physical Damage and Lethality
There is strong empirical evidence indicating that there are a limited number of
methods employed in completed suicides. Self-inflicted gunshots, hanging, overdose,
self-poisoning, and jumping from lethal heights are attributed to approximately 98.6% of
the deaths that result from suicide, whereas cutting accounts for only about 1.4% (Centers
for Disease Control, 2002). Because cutting has consistently been shown in both clinical
and non-clinical populations to be the most common form of NSI (e.g., Favazza &
Conterio, 1988; Suyemoto, 1998; Walsh & Frost, 2005), there is some indication that the
majority of those who self-injure tend to use a relatively low-lethal method to engage in
this behavior. Some authors (e.g., Muehlenkamp, 2005) contend that many
moderate/superficial self-inflicted injuries incurred by NSI individuals are able to be
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taken care of by the individual without medical attention. Thus, the physical damage
caused by NSI is likely to be less severe medically and less lethal than suicidal behavior,
although NSI can clearly become a more lethal behavior as the frequency and severity
increase (it is important to note that there may be other reasons for not seeking medical
attention even when such care may be warranted, such as prior experiences with
pejorative care providers, as argued by Shaw [2002]).
Behavioral Frequency
In light of the above discussion regarding level of physical damage incurred by
suicidal and NSI behavior, it follows logically that the frequency with which these
behaviors occur is a differentiating factor. While there are subsets of suicidal individuals
who remain suicidal for protracted periods of time due to chronic psychiatric disturbance
(e.g., Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent; Bipolar Disorder; Borderline Personality
Disorder), many suicidal behaviors or suicide attempts occur in singularity (Walsh, 2006).
However, it is important to note that some data suggests that up to 69% of suicide
attempters have previously engaged in suicidal behavior (Haw, Houston, Townsend &
Hawton, 2002). Moreover, Klonsky and Olino (2008) report that there may be one subset
of self-injurers that is characterized by substantially higher levels of suicidality.
Nevertheless, although suicidality or suicidal ideation may be chronic, suicidal behavior
is less likely to be so in these individuals. Conversely, Walsh (2006; Walsh & Rosen,
1988) reports that NSI tends to be chronic, with the typical self-injurer engaging in 20100 episodes over several years.
Multiplicity o f Methodology
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Research suggests that suicidal individuals to be single attempters if indeed they
do make a suicide attempt (Holden & Johns, 1997). Furthermore, those who do engage
in repeated suicide attempts tend to employ the same method each time. In the case of
repeat attempters, a number of things may prevent the behavior from resulting in death,
including both accidental and purposeful discovery (although categorizing pre-death
purposeful discovery as “suicide” versus NSI remains debatable). Conversely, research
indicates that many NSI individuals are likely to use more than one method of NSI
(Favazza, 1992; Favazza & Conterio, 1988; Osuch, Noll, & Putnam, 1999). This may be
due to circumstance, such as removal of access to preferred NSI method, habituation to
the sensation produced by each method, or due to personal preference. Alternatively, this
may reflect a subtypology of NSI, as suggested by latent class analyses forwarded by
Klonsky and Olino (2008), in which at least 11% of participants reported multiple
methods of NSI.
Helplessness and Hopelessness
Research suggests that feelings of hopelessness are substantially associated with
suicidality, and constitute a major risk factor for suicidal behavior in depressed
individuals (Beck, 1996; Gutierrez, Osman, Kopper, Barrios, & Bagge, 2000; Johns &
Holden, 1997). Beck and colleagues’ (1979) cognitive theory o f depressive illness posits
that depression is frequently characterized by perceived hopelessness. This hopelessness
may extend to one’s view of the potential for their suffering to end. As a provenience for
suicidality, hopelessness reflects a maladaptive or perseverative problem-solving process.
In this problem-solving process the depressed individual is unable to reframe, revise, or
restructure their self- and world-schemas to incorporate evidence contradicting their
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perceived hopelessness. In this same vein, helplessness, specifically learned helplessness,
is a well-established contributing factor for depression and suicidality (see Seligman,
1975, for a review). Suicidally depressed individuals commonly feel as if they are
beyond being helped (Beck, 1996). Such a perception then further contributes to a view
of their situation as hopeless, thus further supporting the notion that suicide is the only
effective solution for ending their suffering. These two facets of suicidality are clearly
complimentary to each other. Walsh (2006) proposes that self-injurers do not experience
the same hopelessness that suicidal individuals do because they are engaging in a
behavior that relieves the distress contributing to hopelessness. It may be that suicidal
individuals feel little control over their circumstances and their pain, and self-injurers
may feel some sense of control via their NSI. Walsh (2006) further contends that,
although self-injurers are clearly not precluded from experiencing depressive cognitions,
they may be less likely to see the future as completely bleak because the NSI they engage
in may function to acutely reduce distress.
Psychological Repercussions o f a Self-Injury Episode
Suicide attempts not resulting in death are frequently followed by a continuation
or exacerbation of depressive symptomatology (Walsh, 2006). This effect may result
from the individual’s perception of the attempt as another failure, buttressing their view
of themselves as inept. Furthermore, the fact that suicide is viewed as the key strategy
that will eliminate the attempter’s pain suggests that survival of an attempt will not
reduce the tension leading up to the act. Conversely, NSI is frequently reported to have a
distress reducing effect (Linehan, 1993a; Nock & Prinstein, 2004, 2005). Although there
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is also shame and guilt that may go along with NSI, there is also a tendency for tension
and stress to decrease following an act.
Etiology of Non-Suicidal Self-Injury
Much attention in the research literature has been devoted to developing an
accurate model to explain how NSI develops and is maintained. Early hypotheses
explaining NSI were based on psychodynamic theories (e.g., Menninger, 1935), but these
theories have lacked empirical support. More recent theories of NSI are empirically
grounded in developmental, behavioral, and neurobiological perspectives. Some of these
theories have recently been integrated by Linehan (1993a) and others (e.g., Chapman,
Gratz, & Brown, 2006; Brown, Comtois, & Linehan, 2002) into the biopsychosocial
model of BPD, which has also been used to explain NSI.
Biopsychosocial Model
Linehan’s (1993a) biosocial model remains the most comprehensive explanation
of NSI. In her reformulation of BPD, Linehan proposed that borderline features, which
commonly include NSI (Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, & Silk, 2003) are part of the
sequelae of dysregulation of fundamental emotional regulation processes. These
processes may include inhibition of inappropriate behavior related to strong negative or
positive affect, self-regulation of physiological arousal related to affect, refocus attention
while experiencing intense affect, and the coordination of action for accomplishment of a
non-mood-based objective via self-organization (Gottman & Katz, 1990). The
biopsychosocial model posits that such emotional dysregulation originates from a
transactional relationship between inherent biological characteristics and specific types of
developmental environments that are invalidating (i.e., the invalidating environment).
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Invalidating environments are typically characterized by people and other factors that
question, discount, or disregard current and long-term needs, as well as feelings and
subjective experience of the individual. Continuous invalidation frequently results in the
individual doing the same to her/himself. The concept of biosocial transactions is
consistent with a comprehensive model of BPD, and provides a systemic context in
which to discuss features of this disorder, such as NSI.
This model, which is nicely summarized in a recent review of the NSI literature
by Klonsky (2007), also suggests that there are secondary effects of dysregulated
emotions. It is proposed that emotional dysregulation contributes to further dysregulation
of emotions through dysregulation of environmental factors, which is also supported by
recent work in an adolescent population by Lloyd-Richardson and colleagues (2007)
indicating that adolescents who report engaging in this behavior report doing so not only
to help regulate either affect or an emotional state (i.e. “to stop bad feelings” was one of
the most frequently endorsed reasons for NSI), but also commonly endorsed motivations
for NSI that involved a social context that may be related to the initial internal
dysregulation (e.g., “to get control of a situation,” to get a reaction from someone”). Hilt,
Cha, & Nolen-Hoeksema (2008) also reported a contextually contingent functional model
of NSI among adolescent girls consistent with the secondary effects model above. In this
model, NSI engaged in as a response to internal distress was performed in an attempt to
regulate em otions via an autom atic negative reinforcem ent m echanism (see N ock and

Prinstein, 2004), whereas, NSI in response to stress in interpersonal relationships was
aimed at achieving social positive or social negative reinforcement. In sum, research and
theoretical models proposing a secondary effects process suggest that frequently extreme
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or atypical behaviors may contribute to unstable or tentative relationships with others,
withdrawal of affection from others, or loss of opportunities for personal gain or
accomplishment. Vulnerability toward invalidating environments may thereby be created
through this secondary pathway, thus exacerbating the effects of emotional dysregulation
and perpetuating the potential for future dysregulation.
There are other factors that may contribute to exacerbation of emotion
dysregulation symptoms. According to the biosocial model, features of emotional
dysregulation in an individual with a biological predisposition for difficulties with
emotional regulation may be amplified when the individual is in an environment that is
perceived as negative (e.g., unsupportive, unstable, or excessively demanding).
Furthermore, Linehan (1993a) contends that, due to a “higher sensitivity” (Linehan,
1993a, p. 44) to emotional stimuli, such individuals may evaluate their environments, or
experiences, as being negative more readily than others who do not have such difficulties
in regulating their emotions. Early research in emotion and emotional expressive and
attention processes supports the notion that higher emotional arousal is associated with
greater focus on emotionally relevant aspects of a situation or environment (Bahrick, Fitts,
& Rankin, 1952; Bursill, 1958; Callaway & Stone, 1964; Comsweet, 1969; Easterbrook,
1959; Mcnamara & Fisch, 1964). According to Linehan’s (1993a) model of BPD, this
may be a component of or related to borderline individuals’ quick emotional escalation
and subsequent slow return to baseline emotional functioning. In short, the biosocial
model suggests that the myriad BPD behaviors develop as a result of a transaction
between biological, social, and environmental factors.
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Although NSI is only one of the features of BPD, it is the feature that is of most
relevance to this discussion of the biosocial model. The biosocial model of BPD
conceptualizes BPD behaviors as maladaptive attempts by the individual to regulate their
emotional experience. This conceptualization thus suggests that these behaviors are
somehow effective in intervening in the present dysregulation, and either result in the
restoration of homeostasis, or initiate a process that does so. As an emotional regulation
strategy, NSI appears to meet this criterion. Although the exact mechanism is not clear,
self-injuring borderlines and other self-injuring individuals report a reduction in anxiety
and other aversive emotions (e.g., hostility) after engaging in NSI (Liebenluft, Gardner,
& Cowdry, 1987; Ross & Heath, 2003). Others, such as Walsh (2006) cite clinical
anecdotal evidence based on self-reports from patients that indicate this as well. Thus,
NSI seems to be effective in providing some intervention in dysregulated affective states
by either directly or indirectly terminating the dysregulation or the affective state itself.
It is likely that the directness or indirectness of this effect is not ubiquitous and varies
from person to person.
The biosocial model provides a comprehensive and useful template for explaining
NSI. As applied to NSI, this model is an important advent for research on this
phenomenon in that it delineates the conditions and factors through which this behavior
may develop. The present study approaches the study of NSI from the perspective that it
serves an emotional regulatory function, a perspective which has been forwarded in the
biosocial model. Therefore, understanding how the various factors of the biosocial model
transact and result in this behavior is of paramount importance in understanding the
premise of the research proposed in this manuscript. In his review and expansion of
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Linehan’s (1993a) model, Walsh (2006) has proposed that the biopsychosocial theory
may be segmented into five primary components. These include environmental,
biological, cognitive, affective, and behavioral. In the following sections, these proposed
components are reviewed to provide the reader with an overview of how each contributes
to the biosocial model, and to NSI.
Environmental Components
The environmental factors affecting NSI behavior include elements of the selfinjurer’s personal and familial history, and components of the current environment. The
family of origin provides an environment for ongoing learning and development of
behavioral repertoires for children. NSI is associated with disturbance within the family
of origin, including familial psychiatric illness and substance abuse (Walsh & Rosen,
1988), abusive and violent family member interactions (Shapiro & Dominiak, 1992), as
well as suicide and NSI among family members (Favazza, 1996, 1998). Because
parental/caretaker and peer modeling and socialization of emotion-related coping
behaviors contributes substantially to children’s acquisition of behaviors (Bandura, 1986;
Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998), observation of self-destructive behavior,
where there is the potential for modeling of maladaptive coping behaviors, may be
particularly detrimental. Children who are repeatedly exposed to maladaptive coping
strategies such as NSI or substance abuse by their caretakers are thus at an increased risk
for development of these maladaptive coping strategies themselves.
Other life-experiences of NSI individuals also may play a role in the onset of the
behavior. For example, a wealth of research suggests that there are higher prevalence
rates of NSI in clinical and non-clinical adults who experience childhood sexual and
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physical abuse than those who do not (Briere & Gil, 1998; Gratz, Conrad, & Roemer,
2002; van der Kolk, Perry, & Herman, 1991). Separation from, or death of, a primary
caretaker during childhood also appears to be associated with NSI (Briere & Gil, 1998;
Gratz et al., 2002; Walsh & Rosen, 1988). Recent work by Gratz et al. (2002) has
demonstrated that males and females who self-injure are affected differently by familial
and developmental environments. Gratz and her colleagues reported significant gender
differences in the way that familial and developmental experiences affect and predict NSI.
Sexual and physical abuse, maternal emotional neglect, and insecure maternal and
paternal attachment were significant risk factors for females, while paternal separation
and physical abuse were highly predictive of NSI in males. This data is consistent with
Linehan’s (1993a) concept of the “invalidating environment” in which a child’s physical
and/or emotional needs are discounted, unacknowledged, and/or not attended to. Such an
environment may elicit progressively stronger expressions of need up to a point of
extremity at which point those needs still may or may not be responded to. The
intermittent response to such expressions of need serves to reinforce extreme expressions
of emotion as a way of getting one’s needs met (Linehan, 1993a). Gratz et al.’s (2002)
data support this by suggesting that elements frequently present in chaotic family systems,
especially loss or threat of loss of a parent or other caretaker, significantly predict NSI.
Components of one’s developmental environment also contribute to NSI,
especially for those who may have experienced chaotic and abusive developmental
environments (Walsh, 2006). Those who have experienced parental/caretaker separation
via death or removal from the home during childhood may be more sensitive to loss, or
the potential for loss, of other relationships later in life. This may be particularly true for
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those who engage in NSI as Gratz 2002 demonstrated. Here, a risk for NSI is present
especially if the childhood loss impeded their development of healthy and adaptive
coping skills.
While developmental environments may be important antecedents to the onset of
NSI, aspects of the current environment may be a key factor in the perpetuation of this
behavior. Any number of events may serve as a “trigger” for NSI and it is likely that a
combination of factors (e.g., psychological state, pre-existing stress level, access to
alternative self-soothing methods, circumstances) is the final determining factor (Favazza
& Rosenthal, 1990). Psychological states may also be precipitants of NSI. Indeed,
research indicates that circumstances precipitating NSI typically include aversive levels
of stress and aversive affective states (Simeon & Favazza, 2001). Difficulties in
occupational or educational performance, conflict in one’s relationship with an intimate
partner or close friend, interactions with the legal system, and financial difficulties are
examples of common stressors that may precipitate an episode of NSI. Any o f these may
include themes of being rejected or abandoned, which are also commonly reported
themes in the precipitating factors reported by self-injurers (Favazza & Rosenthal, 1990).
Additionally, Walsh (2006) contends that individuals may be more sensitive to current
aversive experiences, or, moreover, the threat of current aversive experiences, that are
similar to those experiences that have historically been aversive for the individual.
Therefore, someone who experienced physical or sexual abuse as a child may react more
quickly to the perceived threat of similar abuse as an adult than someone who did not
experience such abuse, even in normal interpersonal interaction. From this discussion, it
may be concluded that both the historical/developmental and current environment of an
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individual, as well as the transactional relationship of these factors, may play an
important role in the onset and course of NS1.
Biological Components
As noted by Linehan (1993a), the biological underpinnings of NSI are likely to be
heterogeneous. Data in the extant literature implicates the limbic system in the
pathogenesis NSI. The limbic system, which mediates affective feeling, along with
memory, learning, and perception, is one of the primary biological subsystems regulating
emotional processes. Others include the brain stem, which meditates activation of
purposeful behavior and general arousal, and the cerebral cortex, which functions as a
mediator of attentional processes, working memory, perception, and volitional control
(Lewis & Stieben, 2004). Individuals who engage in NSI are believed to have significant
difficulties regulating their emotional experiences. However, the evidence for these
problems with emotional regulation has been inferential, derived mostly from data based
on the self-reported reduction of intense affective states following NSI. It is important to
incorporate evidence from related literature bases in examining the evidence for
biological mechanisms of emotional regulation.
There is some peripheral supporting evidence for such biological processes
suggesting that some NSI individuals respond to treatment with anticonvulsants, which
are now commonly used as mood stabilizers in Bipolar affective disorders (Chengappa et
al., 1999; Hirdes et al., 2002). Recent small-sample and case studies have shown an
association between administration of medications from this class of pharmacological
agents and decreases in self-injury in Bipolar Disorder and BPD patients (Cassano,
Latanzi, Pini, Osso, Battistini, & Cassano, 2001; Chengappa et al., 1999). Research in
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bipolar patients indicates that anticonvulsants reduce the reactivity of the amygdala (a
central component of the limbic system) to emotional stimuli (Drevets et al., 2002;
Krystal et al., 2002). In short, studies suggest that anticonvulsants exert their effects
through their potentiation of gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA; an inhibitory
neurotransmitter), limitation of electrical activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (a
component of the limbic system) which is associated with emotional lability, and
stabilization of the neuronal membrane at the sodium ion channel by inhibition of the
release of aspartate and glutamate (Blumberg et al., 2000; Chengappa et al., 1999;
Krystal et al., 2002; Theoharides, Dessain, & Shuster, 1992).
This research suggests, first, that commencement of anticonvulsant therapy is
associated with reduction of NSI in some cases, and second, that there are observable
reductions in other indices of emotional responsivity (outside the context of NSI) that are
associated with commencement of anticonvulsant therapy. Furthermore, this research
suggests that anticonvulsant medications act on those areas of the brain known to be
involved in emotion and emotion regulation processes. Thus, it may be concluded that
there is preliminary evidence to support an association between emotional regulatory
processes at the biological level and NSI. Specifically, when stabilization of biological
emotional regulation functions is achieved pharmacologically, individuals who engage in
NSI do so less frequently. Research evaluating the biological mechanisms of emotional
regulation (and dysregulation), while promising, is still in a relatively nascent stage, and
some empirical findings suggest that only a subset of self-injurers may respond to
anticonvulsant treatment (Favazza, 1996). Any conclusions from this data must,
therefore, be made judiciously. Additional research is presently needed to further
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elucidate the exact relationship between the biological substrates underlying emotional
regulation and the NSI.
Studies of the biological components of NSI have often also conceptualized this
behavior as a form of aggression, thus research on aggressive behavior is also of
relevance to this discussion. Much effort has been focused on identifying significant
differences in the prevalence of specific neurotransmitters as well as abnormalities of
neuroanatomical structures that mitigate aggressive behaviors. In this vein, a number of
neurotransmitters and neurotransmitter substrates have been implicated in the mitigation
of aggressive behavior. Of these, the serotonergic, noradrenergic, and endogenous opioid
systems are among the most frequently discussed as possible mitigating substrates.
There are some empirical findings from studies of serotonin levels in self-injurers
that provide some evidence of reduced serotonergic functioning (see Grossman & Siever,
2001 for a review). Simeon, Stanley, Frances, Mann, Winchel, & Stanley (1992)
reported that cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) levels of 5-HIAA were 44% lower in non-suicidal
self-injurers than controls. This study also found that imipramine platelet binding
(considered to be an analogue of serotonergic functioning) was significantly lower in
self-injurers than controls. Similarly, Markowitz (1995) also concluded that NSI was
associated with lower levels of serotonin in self-injurers. Inferential support for the role
of serotonin has also come from evidence that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRI) are sometimes effective in reducing self-injury (Grossman & Siever, 2001),
although evidence of the iatrogenic effects of SSRIs, such as increases in suicidal
ideation, have also been well-documented (e.g., Donovan et al., 2000; Grounds et ah,
1995; King etal., 1991).
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Although different from NSI in some important ways, studies of suicidal behavior
also bare some relevance to this discussion. Research has shown a relationship, between
reduced levels of 5-HIAA and suicidal behavior in suicide attempters. Specifically,
findings from post-mortem studies of brainstem concentrations o f serotonin and
completed suicides have been relatively consistent in demonstrating a relationship
between low 5-HIAA levels and suicide (Russ, 1992). Additionally, Mann and Malone
(1997) documented lower levels of 5-HIAA in cerebrospinal fluid of depressed
individuals who attempt suicide compared with controls from a psychiatric population.
More recently, Arango et al. (2001) reported a 40% smaller concentration of 5-HT ia
(serotonergic receptor sites) in the dorsal aspect of the raphe nucleus of depressed suicide
completers when compared to nonsuicidal, nonclinical controls. Furthermore, in related
research van Heerigen and colleagues (2001) found significantly lower binding potentials
in frontal 5-Hydroxytryptophan2A (5HT2a) receptors (an index of serotonergic activity) in
suicide attempters compared to non-clinical controls. Conversely, Mann, Stanley, &
Malone (1996) reported finding no differences between suicide attempters and non
clinical controls in serotonin levels; however, this study did find a significant correlation
between 5-HIAA and both planning of suicide attempts and extent of medical damage
incurred by suicide attempts. Thus, there is some empirical support for an inverse
relationship between serotonergic activity and features associated with self-harm
behaviors, implying that NSI may also be related to low serotonergic functioning.
Evidence of relationships between aggressive behavior and other
neurotransmitters has also been reported. Research on norepinephrine in animals
(Eichelman, 1987) has indicated that levels of this neurotransmitter are negatively
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correlated with aggressive behavior. Further evidence of this relationship derives from
findings that noradrenergic agents that block or reduce the activity of norepinephrine are
associated with a decrease in aggressive behavior. Similar results have been found in
human studies, which have used CSF levels of a norepinephrine metabolite (3-methoxy4-hydroxphenylglycol; MHPG) as a reference index, demonstrating that CSF levels of
MHPG are associated with aggression. Brown, Goodwin, Ballenger, Goyer and Major
(1979) reported a significant correlation between MHPG levels in CSF and a history of
aggressive behavior in soldiers with “personality pathology.” However, Traskman,
Asberg, Bertilsson, & Sjostrand (1981) reported contradictive findings in their sample of
suicide attempters, where CSF levels of MHPG were not significantly different in their
sample of depressed and non-depressed controls. It is conceivable that the unique
attributes of the specific group being examined in this latter study may have contributed
to their lack of significant findings. Overall, the literature appears to suggest that
elevations in norepinephrine levels is associated with increases in aggression, however,
this relationship may be moderated by factors such as individual psychopathology.
The endogenous opioid system (EOS) has also been implicated as a mitigating
biological factor in NSI (Oquendo & Mann, 2000; Russ, 1992; Winchel & Stanley,
1991). The EOS has been discussed at length as potentially playing a role in the onset
and maintenance of NSI since many self-injurers report analgesia when they self-injure.
The role of the EOS in NSI can be explained in terms of operant behaviorism. It has
been posited that some individuals who engage in NSI may have inherently low levels of
opiate activity (Oquendo & Mann, 2000; Winchel & Stanley, 1991), and that NSI serves
as a mechanism for the release of additional opioids into the regions that are deficient.
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This restores the opiatergic “tone” (i.e., a standard level of endogenous opiate activity,
presumed to be inadequate in such individuals) to an adequate level (Winchel & Stanley,
1991). Consequently, the NSI is reinforced by the pleasant physiological changes
produced by the release of endorphins and enkephalins. In line with this model, research
has demonstrated a significant correlation between severity of NSI and the plasma levels
of metenkephalins in self-injuring individuals (Winchel & Stanley, 1991). Thus there is
evidence that the EOS is indeed involved in NSI at some level, although its specific
contribution to this behavior has yet to be fully elucidated.
Research on pain-sensitivity in self-injurers, an area of biological research
encompassing multiple neurobiological systems, has expanded beyond specific biological
substrates to incorporate multi-systemic symptomatology. Specifically, diminished
sensitivity to pain has also been examined as a potential explanation for chronic NSI
(Walsh, 2006). When considering both adults and adolescents, approximately 47 to 60%
of individuals who engage in NSI report analgesia when engaging in this behavior
(Bohus et al., 2000; Nock & Prinstein, 2005).
Psychophysiological research on pain perception in self-injurers is an emerging
line of inquiry. Thus far, both Russ and his colleagues (1992, 1994) and Bohus and his
colleagues (2000) have found lower perception of aversive stimuli in self-injurers. Russ
et al.’s (1992, 1994) studies examined perception of induced pain in NSI individuals who
reported no pain during NSI. These researchers found that participants who reported no
pain during NSI also reported substantially lower levels of pain than both pain-perceptive
self-injurers and non-self-injuring controls. Additionally, Bohus et al. (2000) studied
pain perception in self-injurers diagnosed with BPD versus non-clinical controls and
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found markedly diminished perception of pain during both distress and non-distress
conditions in the BPD group compared to controls. When distressed, borderline
participants’ pain threshold was even higher than in the non-distress condition (Bohus et
al., 2000). While such biological studies of self-injurers are promising, and highlight the
importance of psychobiological processes to NSI, further research is necessary before
more firm conclusions can be drawn.
Cognitive Components
Walsh (2006) divides the cognitive dimensions of NSI into two categories: (1)
cognitive interpretations of environmental events; and (2) self-generated cognitions.
According to cognitive theory, an individual may experience environmental events as
problematic when they perceived those events to be aversive (i.e., painful,
overwhelming). This theoretical model further contends that the rationality of one’s
cognitions also influences one’s perception of environmental events. For example, if one
believes that they should have had control over an aversive or painful situation that they
could not have realistically terminated or mitigated, then the already negative perception
of the situation is likely to be exacerbated. Such cognitive appraisals, especially of
oneself, can be a trigger for NSI. Self-generated cognitions occur without an identifiable
external cue, and are presumed to be part of the reservoir o f cognitions related to self and
world. In self-injurers, these cognitions may frequently be derisive (e.g., “Today is going
to be the worst day I’ve ever had, and tomorrow will be even worse.”). Cognitive theory
suggests that these cognitions may then become part of one’s self-schema (i.e., the
meaning-making ‘structure’ one uses to understand oneself), and as such may contribute
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to further vulnerability toward potential misinterpretation of environmental events, and
thereby also NSI.
Over time, such thoughts can also become a discriminant stimulus for NSI
through repeated pairing of specific thoughts, or thoughts related to a specific fear (e.g.,
failure, rejection, abandonment) with acts of NSI (Walsh, 2006). If the self-injurer
responds to a specific cognition invariably by engaging in NSI, then that cognition itself
may become a cue for self-destructive behavior by creating a strong association between
the thought and the consequences of the behavior (e.g., relief of negative affect, help
from others). This associative process may be explained by the following logic-path
statement: i f a, then b, and ifb then c; then also, i f a, then c. Therefore, an association
may be made such that the self-injurer believes that when they experience the specific
cognition (a), NSI is the only viable response (b), and that when they self-injure (b) there
will be some sort of positive change (c) in the environment (e.g., through caring
behaviors of others or reduction of aversive circumstances). The connection between (a)
and (b) is made to achieve (c), which in turn reinforces (a). Such a cycle may explain the
seemingly self-perpetuating cycle of aversive thoughts precipitating NSI frequently seen
in self-injurers (Favazza, 1996; Walsh, 2006).
Affective Components
Negative affective states are believed to precipitate NSI because these states are
perceived as overwhelming or intolerable. As noted earlier, it is also believed that NSI
functions to ameliorate the distress caused by these affective experiences through a
mechanism that is not yet clear. A variety of emotions may precipitate NSI episodes. It
is reasonable to posit that all of these are negative in some way (e.g., depression, shame,
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guilt, anxiety/panic, anger). Many self-injurers report that their NSI functions to
diminish feelings of distress related to negative affect (e.g., Liebenluft, Gardner, &
Cowdry, 1987). This has been supported in more recent empirical research by Nock &
Prinstein (2004, 2005) in samples of adolescents. Briefly, Nock & Prinstein (2004, 2005)
reported one of the primary and most frequently reported reasons for NSI reported by
self-injuring adolescent psychiatric inpatients was regulation of negative emotions. This
research provides important preliminary support for the long-held hypothesis that
regulation of emotional states is the underlying function of NSI. However, replication
and further extension of this line of research in other population subsets is needed.
Additionally, research examining the psychobiological correlates of this self-reported
reduction in negative affect will provide important data regarding the mechanism by
which such reductions take place.
Behavioral Components
The behavioral aspects of NSI, and moreover the functions of this behavior, are
critical in understanding its course and the reasons for its chronicity. These functional
aspects encompass each of the other components discussed above. Earlier literature
attempted to explain NSI in behavioral terms by placing it into the framework of operant
behaviorism. Carr (1977) proposed that, like any other behavioral pattern, NSI functions
as an operant. As such, it is maintained via systematic reinforcement or punishment from
the individual’s external or internal environment. Carr’s (1977) model specifically
distinguishes between two modes of contingent behavioral maintenance: positive
reinforcement and negative reinforcement. The positive reinforcement hypothesis
proposes that NSI is maintained through positive (typically social) reinforcement.
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Positive reinforcement is generally provided through an increase in contact with, or an

increase in the care exhibited by, others in the self-injurers life in response to the selfinjury. This level of care and concern, or contact, may not be achieved outside of the
context of episodes of self-injury, thus supporting a continuation and increase on the
frequency of the behavior. Conversely, the negative reinforcement hypothesis suggests
that the NSI is maintained though the termination or avoidance of a stimulus that the
individual perceives as being aversive (Bennun, 1984; Carr, 1977). The escape from the
aversive stimulus (e.g., an aversive emotional state or aversive life circumstances)
follows the onset or completion of NSI, and leads to an increase in the behavior because
of the escape that the behavior results in.
While the above model represents an early attempt to theoretically delineate the
behaviorally-based functionality of NSI, recent empirical work has provided support for
this contention. In their research on the functional dimensions of NSI in adolescent
inpatients, Nock and Prinstein (2004, 2005) proposed a functional model of NSI, which
posits that these behaviors may serve four functions: automatic-negative reinforcement
(NSI functions to reduce the discomfort associated with a negative affect state);
automatic-positive reinforcement (when NSI functions to induce some form of appetitive
physiological state); social-negative reinforcement (when NSI functions to facilitate an
individuals avoidance or escape from the demands of interpersonal interactions and
relationships; and social-positive reinforcement (when NSI functions to facilitate contact
between the self-injurer and others). These researchers found that the self-injurers in
their sample were more likely to engage in self-mutilating behaviors when automatic
and/or social reinforcement were available or provided, thus providing evidence
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consistent with the proposed functional model. Additionally, as noted by Walsh (2006), a
multitude of events may precipitate an episode of NSI, including interpersonal conflict
with peers or family, or substance use. Behavioral components of NSI may also include
preparatory behaviors associated with NSI, such as deciding on the place, time, and
method of NSI. All of these components may become strongly associated with acts of
NSI, and thus precipitate a cascade of both internal and external events leading up to an
NSI episode (Walsh, 2006). The findings of Nock and Prinstein (2004, 2005) therefore
support the contention that environmental contingencies play a central role in NSI.
NSI tends to elicit rapid, and in some cases intense, reactions from others
(Barstow, 1995; Clarke & Whitaker, 1998; Conterio & Lader, 1998; Favazza, 1998;
Gallop, 2002). In the context of BPD, episodes of NSI may be associated with frequent
and dramatic fluctuations between emotional polarities (Linehan, 1993 a). These
fluctuations can engender an understandable desire for help of some kind, and NSI can
elicit attention that may result in obtaining such assistance. Linehan (1993a) notes that
the extreme behaviors exhibited by individuals with BPD are commonly engaged in as a
way to “alert the environment to take better care of them” (Linehan, 1993a, p. 69). Here,
“care” can be operationalized in behavioral terms as reinforcement. Therefore, the
relationship between the individual and their environment in this context is
simultaneously discordant and operantly reciprocal. In this respect, the paucity of
reinforcement that the individual receives from their environment (the antecedent)
precedes the NSI (the behavior), which in turn precipitates the desired attention
(consequences), or social reinforcement. Outside of the context of BPD, this process may
also be observed. If an individual who chronically engages in NSI perceives that
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reinforcement (i.e., attention) is generated primarily through self-injuring acts, then this

sets the stage for a potentially long-standing learning paradigm. It should be noted that
use of the word attention in this discussion is in the context of caretaking attention to
neglected or abused emotional, psychological, or physical needs, and not in the context of
manipulative attention-seeking behavior.
The preceding behavioral components of NSI only address the way in which the
behavior is maintained, and not its onset. This component of the model may be explained
by social learning theory (Bandura, 1977). Based on the operant behavioral principles
discussed earlier, for any behavior to be acquired by an organism there must be an initial
reinforcement of some form. Social learning theory, as applied to humans, maintains that
children acquire their initial behavioral repertoire through observation of the behavior of
primary caretakers (e.g., parents or others) early in the child’s life. These caretakers
essentially function as behavioral models for a full range of behaviors, ranging from
coping skills and strategies to interpersonal behaviors and emotional expression function
as models for behavior the child. Research suggests that the forum for this initial
schedule of reinforcement or punishment is quite often the childhood home environment
of the individual (Birt et al., 1997; Linehan, 1993a; Green, 1978; Wolfe & Birt, 1997; &
Wolfe & McEachran, 1997).
Consistent with Bandura’s (1977) model of social learning, Suyemoto (1998)
contended in her review of the NSI literature that social learning leads to the acquisition
of the behavior in one of two ways. One way is via the experience of abuse by a parent
or primary caretaker during the individual’s childhood years. This abusive behavior
provides a salient example of interpersonal interaction, which consists of caustic and
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maladaptive behaviors. The abused individual is then likely to interpret these behaviors
as appropriate via social referencing, and will consequently replicate them. Second,
through a classical conditioning paradigm, the individual’s model of care and nurturance
is paired with aversive physical experiences such as pain and hostility, and aversive
emotional experiences such as shame, guilt, and anger (Suyemoto, 1998). These two
paradigms seem to work in concert to initially generate NSI via imitation of parental or
caretaker behaviors, and then by reinforcing the behavior via regulatory effects (e.g.,
termination of dissociative states, reduced anxiety, attention to needs). This hypothesis is
supported empirically by research that has demonstrated a positive linear relationship
between child abuse and neglect and onset of NSI (Green, 1978; Wolfe & McEachran,
1997).
It seems clear from the research discussed above that there is probably not one
unitary factor to which the pathogenesis of NSI may be traced. One common thread
among all etiological models for NSI, however, is that they acknowledge the contribution
of emotions and emotional experiences to this behavior. Emotions have a clearly
established role in the course of psychopathology. More specifically, research suggests
that the regulation or dysregulation of emotions may be a prolific factor in the
pathogenesis of multiple dysfunctional behaviors (e.g., Gross, 1998; Mennin, Heimberg,
Turk, & Fresco, 2002). Furthermore, although NSI is more prevalent in some specific
disorders, this behavior has been observed in a wide variety of psychopathologies. Given
the commonality among etiological models of NSI (i.e., that NSI may function to regulate
emotional states or drives) and the diversity of comorbid clinical presentations observed
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in NSI individuals, it may be reasonable to conclude that that NSI does indeed serve an
emotional regulatory function.
Nonetheless, the available research suggesting a relationship between emotion
regulation and NSI has been correlational. A review of the extant literature reveals no
empirical studies that have attempted to establish causality in this posited relationship.
One method of establishing a causal relationship is through examination of objective and
observable markers of emotional regulation in self-injurers. Although emotion regulation
is a multifaceted construct, there are psychobiological indices and analogues that may
provide valuable information about individual emotion-regulatory capacities. The
present study was predicated on the assumption that examination of these indices of
emotion regulation in self-injurers would further our understanding of its role in NSI. In
the following sections, research pertaining to emotion-regulation and psychobiological
indices of emotion-regulation is reviewed.
Emotion and Emotion Regulation
Emotion
Defining Emotion
Although earlier researchers propagated a view of emotions as states of neural
activation that were situationally disruptive, and not specific to the situation (Hebb, 1949,
Young, 1943), it seems clear now that emotional behaviors have developed as a function
of evolutionary necessity. William James (1894) viewed emotions as behavioral and
physiological response tendencies that functioned to allow a species to adapt to
significant events across, and as part of, the evolutionary process. The behaviors
associated with anxiety, anger, sadness, disgust, and happiness help to maintain the safety

30

and integrity of the organism, and the survival of the species through their physiological
and behavioral correlates (Gross, 1998).
More recent empirical and theoretical work is also indicative of the adaptive
functions that emotions serve. Schwarz and Clore (1983) posited that emotions convey
data to the organism regarding the current or ongoing fit between the organism and the
environment. Ekman (1992) noted that emotions appear to address adaptive problems by
conveying information to the organism regarding their current biological needs. Oatley
& Johnson-Laird (1987) reported that emotions assist with the decision-making process,
and Frijda (1986), citing decades of psychophysiological research, concluded that
emotions facilitate the preparation of an individual for a quick motor response by
activating the autonomic nervous system. In aggregate, empirical research supporting
this adaptive activation process has found that emotional responses in humans include
shifts in behavioral, experiential, autonomic, and neuroendocrine systems (see Lang,
1995 for a review).
Emotions may also be viewed as systemic processes, as suggested by Scherer
(1994) in his discourse on “modal emotions.” Scherer’s model proposes that an emotion
is a progressive series of interconnected and coordinated shifts in the states of an
organism’s physiological systems and subsystems, which may include neural circuits,
respiratory and circulatory systems, and digestive processes and systems as well. Such a
shift occurs as a reaction to the organism’s assessment of internal or external stimulus
events that bare direct relevance to the primary needs of the organism (Scherer, 1994,
2000). For example, when an organism’s interface with its environment results in the
organism being prevented from achieving a goal that is needed for survival (e.g., food),
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the biological systems of the organism that require the goal’s attainment will serve a
motivational function. In the case of food as the organismic need, the caloric and
nutritional needs of the organism are biologically and genetically determined based on
the functionality of those needs. Evaluation of whether a particular need is satiated is
made by the organism’s biological systems through determining if the availability of the
resource (e.g., calories) is sufficient to perform the necessary function (e.g., mobility,
cognition). If the resources are not available or sufficient for the function of the system,
the physiological systems and subsystems of the organism will work together to alter the
organism’s behavior as needed to achieve the goal and satiate the need (e.g., directing
attention to food-related stimuli; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Although hunger is not
considered an emotion (Wierzbicka, 1999), there may be labels given to the behaviors
that accompany hunger (or other aversive drive states, such as pain) in some humans (e.g.,
irritability, anxiety, hostility, sadness), which in turn correspond to the changes in the
physiological systems that have taken place to motivate the acquisition of food. It is the
pattern of change that defines the emotion, and even minute variations may be indicative
of actual differences in the organism’s emotional state.
Across species, emotional behavior may also be viewed as motivated behavior,
especially in non-human animals and organisms. In this sense, motivation relates to
action of some form, where the organism seeks to achieve a goal. This may take the form
of the physiological reaction of an organism to a pleasant or aversive environmental
change (Bradley, 2001), such as a threat from a predatory organism or the availability of
a mating partner. In studies of animal behavior, motivated behavior is modulated by both
direction (i.e., approach or withdrawal) and intensity (i.e., speed or strength of the
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behavior), each of which vary as a function of the requirements of goal-attainment. In
this vein, some researchers (Carver & Scheier, 1990) have proposed a view of human
emotion as an index of the rate at which the current discrepancy between a particular goal
and the realistic appraisal of one’s proximity to attaining that goal is reduced. Here, a
positive emotion is indicative of more rapid reduction of the discrepancy, whereas
negative emotion is indicative of a slower reduction than would be expected. Emotion
regulation, discussed in subsequent sections, is essentially a derivative of one’s intention
or action to reduce the discrepancy, but is not seen as an end-product itself.
In humans, such motivated behavior is referred to as emotional behavior, or more
generally, emotion. While behavioral definitions of emotion facilitate theoretical
understandings of this construct, there are numerous definitions that have been
propagated throughout the history of emotion research. Although emotion may seem
intuitively comprehensible (Bradley, 2001), an agreed upon definition has yet to be
forwarded. Discussions of emotional behavior in humans are further complicated by the
need to differentiate between the various temporal, intensiveness, and purposive facets of
emotion. The differentiation typically required is between emotion, emotion episodes,
mood, and affect. These constructs are interrelated, and sometimes used interchangeably
(Gross, 1998); however, their separation may become important in describing the
phenomenological and subjective emotional experiences of the individual.
An understanding of emotions and emotional experiences is integral to
comprehending the full range of human behavior. Commonalities in human emotional
behavior exist across cultures, albeit with different manifestations. It is possible that such
manifestations are related to differences in cultural experience (Ekman, 1972), thus, the
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importance of taking into account cultural differences in emotion must be considered in
both research and clinical settings (APA, 2000). In humans there may be cultural
differences in the expression and elicitation of emotion, which have perhaps historically
served adaptive functions. Research on emotion has revealed both intercultural
commonalities and differences. While there appears to be general agreement between
cultures in identifying the type of emotion being expressed, there are cultural differences
in judgments about the intensity of the emotional or affective state (Ekman, 1987), as
well as rules for emotional expression, emotional terminology, and self-reported
emotional experiences (Matsumoto, 1990, 1993). Clear and consistent differences in
norms for affective and emotional expression have also been observed between
collectivistic and individualistic cultures (Eid & Diener, 2001). Moreover, the impact of
emotions and emotional regulation on health has been found to differ across cultures
(Consedine, Magai, & Horton, 2004), with higher levels of emotional expression and
inhibition affecting individual health either beneficially or adversely through a cultural lydependent contingency. In aggregate, this research supports a view of emotions as being
evolutionarily adaptive and universal. Viewed in the context of emotion regulation, the
adaptivity of emotions denotes the evolutionary necessity and adaptiveness of emotion
regulation. It is likely that a failure to upregulate or downregulate emotions when needed
would not be germane to survival of most animal species. From an evolutionary
perspective, emotion dysregulation may then be conceptualized as either a deregulation
of psychobiological processes or initiation of maladaptive psychobiological processes in
response to environmental demands. The characteristics, contributing factors, and
manifestations of such psychobiological deregulation have yet to be explored empirically
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in the literature, and research in this area will be necessary to further our understanding of
these processes.
Emotion, Mood, and Affect
Distinguishing the constructs of emotion, mood, and affect from one another is
most commonly oriented toward developing a more accurate understanding of emotion
through a more precise and comprehensive description of individual emotional
phenomenology. There is at present no clear concurrence in the psychological literature
on how to define an emotion, although many theories have been proposed (e.g., Mayer &
Salovey, 1988; Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004). Thus separating emotion from mood and
affect is challenging. Gross (1998) has differentiated these constructs in the following
way. Emotions transpire and develop during a relatively limited time-frame, whereas
emotional episodes extend across longer periods of time and sometimes across multiple
facets of a given situation. Emotion and affect are sometimes used synonymously;
however, affect is also sometimes used to describe the behavioral or experiential
manifestations of an emotion. One common practice-generated depiction of emotional
experience (e.g., APA, 2000) suggests that affect describes “emotional weather,” whereas
the term “mood” is used to describe the more persistent or consistent “emotional
climate.” Describing mood as the emotional climate (APA, 2000) portends a sustained
and/or persistent state of emotional experience for an individual, which not only includes
multiple aspects of a single situation, but is present across multiple situations. A further
clarification proposed by both Davidson (1994) and Fiedler (1988) is that cognitive
processes are more susceptible to the influence of moods than are actions.
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Earlier, Davidson (1994) differentiated between emotion and mood by stating that
(1) moods are considered to be brief, whereas emotions are longer lasting; (2) emotions
are thought to be accompanied by specific facial expressions, while moods are not; and (3)
emotion is preceded by a readily recognizable antecedent event, whereas the antecedent
precipitating a mood is not always apparent. Furthermore, emotions are thought to be
experienced in response to antecedent events that are rapid and unexpected in their acute
onset, whereas moods develop in response to longer-lasting, and slower progressing
events.
The foregoing definitions of these constructs are useful on multiple levels. First,
they help to unify the language by which researchers and clinicians alike describe the
same emotional phenomena. Additionally, they clarify the constructs in some important
ways. Most importantly perhaps, discussion of these constructs in terms of their temporal
parameters and levels of intensity seems to point toward a functionally-based
differentiation of these constructs. As noted above, a discussion of emotional processes
and behaviors must incorporate a discussion of the functions they serve.
The Function of Emotions and Affect
Davidson (1994) has proposed that emotion differs from mood in function.
Emotions occur during situations when some form of action is needed to facilitate the
organism’s adaptation to the circumstances, with concomitant autonomic activity (e.g.,
arousal or suppression/reduction). Conversely, mood functions to modulate information
processing and therefore also cognition; attention is directed more selectively to some
cognitive content and limited to others.
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As noted earlier, Frijda (1994) has proposed that emotion has two aspects, each of
which serves different functions. The first is the appraisal of events as relevant and either
pleasant or unpleasant. This cognitive appraisal answers the question of whether an event
needs to be attended to and acted upon to obtain a goal or protect the interests and
integrity of the organism. The second aspect of emotion is the elicitation of a behavioral,
physiological, and/or experiential response to the event, which is related to protective and
survival functions within the organism. It is the functionality of these facets of emotion
that highlights the important roles emotions serve.
Functionally, the appraisal of events as relevant/irrelevant, and pleasant/
unpleasant serves to alert the organism to the nature of an event relative to the organism’s
own interests (e.g., safety). The event-appraisal aspect of emotions can be considered a
relevance signaling mechanism, which proposes that an emotion is an index of
comparison between an end-goal and the current state. Concordance and discord
between an end-goal and current state is signaled to the action system by emotion. This
model presupposes that generalized, flexible action plans are formulated by a
combination of neural circuitry and learning history of the organism. This combination
may be conceptualized as the organism’s action system. This system prepares and
executes internal or external goal-oriented activity. The function of such preparatory and
executive behavior is the remuneration of any discord or facilitation of further
concordance.
The second aspect of emotion Frijda (1994) proposes is response elicitation. Here,
emotion is viewed as a source of stimulation for initiating the behavior required to
manage emotional events. Indeed, specific emotions directly relate to environmental
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events. Fear functions to initiate self-protection or to prevent the event from occurring or
recurring through minimizing exposure or reducing activity until a threat is no longer
imminent; anger functions to influence a threat or a threatening other to cease the
threatening behavior. In this way, emotions function to influence or modify the
interaction between individual and environment, but do not modify the environment itself.
The data and models discussed above are indicative of the importance of emotions
and emotional behavior across, species, culture, and individuals. The explanations of
emotional processes that have been forwarded in the literature thus far and their
supporting data are of relevance to more than just academic discourse. Empirically based
principles that govern emotional behavior, especially the regulation and dysregulation of
emotion, could be applied to the modification of maladaptive manifestations of such
behavior. NSI, which appears to be associated with states of emotional dysregulation
(Linehan, 1993a), may be one such detrimental manifestation. Although there does
appear to be an association between NSI and emotion dysregulation, the current literature
contains only correlational evidence of such a connection. Further understanding of
emotional regulatory processes is necessary. In the following section, models and
supporting research for emotion regulation are reviewed.
Emotion Regulation and Dysregulation
The study of emotion regulation was preceded by the study of the human coping
response to “stress.” The focus of this research was centered on the theory that
organisms exhibit similar physiological responses to different stress-inducing stimuli, or
“stressors” (Seyle, 1956). A stress response is viewed as an individual’s attempt to cope
with a challenge, be it physical, psychological, or both. Coping has generally been
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conceptualized as a process involving cognitive and behavioral attempts at the
modulation of both explicit exogenous and endogenous demands that are interpreted by
the individual as subjectively strenuous or as extending beyond the limits of the
individual’s available resources for handling the demands of the situation (Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984). Research has identified different types of coping, distinguishing
between “emotion-focused coping” and “problem focused coping” (Gross, 1998, p. 274).
The former is aimed at reducing the intensity of a negative emotion, and the latter is
aimed at solving a problem.
In conceptualizing coping as a stress response, and stress responses as attempts to
regulate emotions elicited by internal or external stimuli, coping itself may be thought of
as a form of emotion regulation. However, this description of emotion regulation is too
simplistic to accurately characterize the processes of emotion regulation as it is
understood today. It is important that a clear definition of emotion regulation and the
underlying components involved in this process are established.
Defining Emotion Regulation
Emotion regulation has been defined and described in a multitude of works by
various authors (e.g., Campos, Campos, & Barrett, 1989; Cicchetti, Ackerman, & Izard,
1995 Fielder, 1989; Fox, 1994; Linehan, 1993a; Mayer & Salovey, 1995). Most recently,
Cole and her colleagues (2004) forwarded an operational definition of emotion regulation
as the changes that are associated with an activated emotion (regardless of what the
activated emotion is) such as alterations in physiological functioning and overt behavioral
changes. Such changes may also involve psychological mechanisms (e.g., cognitions) of
the emotion itself. This conceptualization of emotion regulation views the emotion either
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as a regulator or as being regulated. Emotion as regulating involves changes that are due
to the activated emotion (e.g., changes in the interpersonal environment resulting from
the expression of anger or sadness). Emotion as regulated involves changes in the
intensity, valence, and/or duration of the emotion that has been activated resulting from
behavioral efforts by the individual including interpersonal (e.g., an individual engages in
behavior that makes a sad friend smile), or intraindividual efforts (e.g., an individual
engages in self-soothing behavioral or cognitive strategies). The paucity of data
supporting this conceptualization of emotion regulation represents a gap in the extant
literature.
Emotion Dysregulation and Psychopathology
The idea that dysfunctional or maladaptive emotion regulatory processes are a
main component of psychopathology is a generally accepted and supported perspective
among researchers (Gross, 1998). This development is reflected in recent theoretical
work, which has adopted an emotion regulation framework for conceptualizing various
psychological disorders such as Generalized Anxiety Disorder.
Deficits in emotion regulation can be seen as falling into one of two categories
(Cicchetti, Ackerman, & Izard, 1995). One category is the inability to “downregulate”
intense emotional experiences, the second category is difficulty with “upregulating”
emotions. Difficulties with downregulating are characterized by a high frequency of
emotional behaviors (e.g., facial expressions, verbalizations, gross and fine psychomotor
behavior) related to the experience or expression of emotion that are disproportionate (i.e.,
in duration or intensity) to the eliciting stimulus. This problem is typically incurred due
to an inability to effectively utilize self-soothing strategies. Difficulty with
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“upregulating” emotions or emotional behavior, involves the problematic, chronic
suppression of emotional experience or expression. As discussed in subsequent sections,
these difficulties have been identified by other notable researchers (e.g., Linehan, 1993a)
as central to more severe forms of psychopathology relevant to the present study, such as
Borderline Personality Disorder.
However, emotion dysregulation is not limited to the etiology of severe
manifestations of psychopathology. Mennin, et al., (2002) propose an emotion regulation
conceptualization of Generalized Anxiety Disorder. They posit that individuals with
GAD experience emotions more intensely and more aversively than non-clinical
individuals and that these negative emotions may be associated with aversive
interpersonal consequences (e.g., rejection, isolation) that are difficult to understand or
identify. The worry experienced by those with GAD may be conceptualized as a form of
cognitive control, whereby the individual attempts to resolve the problematic experience
by moderating these intense and aversive emotions. This pattern of cognitive functioning
is typical in GAD, and is sometimes conceptualized as avoidance behavior.
The aforementioned cognitive pattern is common, though not endemic to GAD.
A similar pattern may be noted among individuals who engage in NSI. As an example, it
has been demonstrated that NSI often occurs in response to intense negative emotional
experiences, such as anger (Brown et al., 2002). It is plausible that NSI functions as a
form of control, much like the worry in GAD, to resolve the aversive emotional
experiences. However, in this strategy the individual attends to anxiogenic stimuli (i.e.,
the object of worry) rather than to the acute aversive emotional experience. This results
in perseveration to the ineffective, anxiety-inducing stimulus as the only problem solving
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approach, which in turn leads to perpetuation of the anxiogenic sequelae. Furthermore,
effective action-tendencies are blocked by avoidance of the aversive emotional
experience. Failure to attend to aversive emotions may consequently lead to
amplification of the emotional experience (i.e., the intensity and frequency with which
neural impulses are transmitted) through an effort of the physiological protective
mechanisms of the organism to modify the organism’s exposure to the perceived
environmental threat. In short, failure to acknowledge the experience of a fear response
(1) does not make it dissipate; and (2) does not negate the presence of the anxiogenic
stimulus that engendered it. Consistent with this proposal, Mennin, et al. (2000) reported
that those in their study who met criteria for GAD reported more intense experiences of
emotions, as well as greater difficulties with acceptance, identification, and description of
their emotional experiences. Self-soothing of negative emotions was also impaired in
these individuals when compared to non-clinical controls, suggesting a further connection
with poor regulatory control of emotions.
Further evidence for Mennin et al.’s (2002) model has been published in the mood
induction literature. It has been demonstrated that individuals with GAD exhibit
increased worry and anxiety-related autonomic responses, and decreased acceptance of
current emotional states after exposure to anxiogenic auditory stimuli (e.g., music) than
nonanxious controls (Mennin, 2000); and such individuals develop catastrophic worry
more readily when negative mood is induced (Startup & Davey, 2001). Together, these
lines of research provide evidence that emotion dysregulation may play a role in multiple
forms of psychopathology beyond the context of BPD where it is most frequently
discussed.
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Much of the psychopathology research literature on both emotion dysregulation
and NSI has historically focused on Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Indeed,
BPD is the only DSM disorder that is characterized explicitly by patterns of emotional
dysregulation (APA, 2000), despite evidence for such dysregulation in other disorders
(e.g., Mennin et al., 2002). Because of the high incidence rates of NSI in BPD patients
(up to 80%, Zanarini et al., 2003), these two clinical phenomena are often portrayed as
being inextricably linked. Anecdotal evidence suggests that NSI is sometimes viewed as
a hallmark sign of BPD. Indeed, NSI has even been referred to as the “behavioral
specialty” of individuals with BPD (Gunderson & Ridolfi, 2001). Recent literature
(Zanarini et al., 2003), however, suggests that at least 20% of borderline individuals do
not engage in NSI, and, moreover, that this behavior is not a stable trait across time in
borderlines. Ergo, such stereotypical statements have not necessarily garnered empirical
support.
Linehan’s (1993a) continuing work on the treatment of chronically suicidal and
self-injuring borderline patients understands both BPD and NSI as a disorder of emotion
regulation, with the NSI acting as an emotion regulation strategy. Linehan’s biosocial
model presupposes that borderlines “are emotionally vulnerable” (Linehan, 1993a, p.43),
that they lack the requisite skills to regulate their emotions, and that there are
environmental factors that amplify this deficit and its manifestations. Based on this
model, NSI may function as a method of changing subjective internal factors or
environmental factors that are threatening to the individual’s emotional or physical
integrity. Because many borderline individuals experience even low levels of emotional
arousal as overwhelming, NSI may function as an acute, albeit maladaptive, intervention
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to reduce emotional arousal by disrupting physiological processes related to the
generation of emotion. The sensations induced by NSI (whether aversive or merely novel)
may direct attentional resources away from the acute stressor and toward a more pressing
stimulus.
Borderline individuals also frequently report experiencing dissociation before,
after, or during NSI episodes (Linehan, 1993a). Himber’s (1994) qualitative study of
self-injuring female inpatients has provided one of the most detailed qualitative accounts
of the subjective phenomenology of NSI in this respect. Specifically, 100% (n=8) of
participants in this study reported experiencing dissociation in conjunction with NSI
episodes. These experiences included “altered sensations, the sense of separateness from
their bodies, memory disturbances and distortions in their agency” (Himber, 1994; p.
622). Dissociation may be reinforced by the amelioration of an acutely stressful stimulus
through reduction of emotion-related neurotransmission below the perceptual threshold.
Consequently, dissociation may be conceptualized as a method of downregulating an
aversive emotional experience, although this phenomenon is sometimes reported to be
aversive itself (e.g., Himber, 1994). The exact relationship between NSI and dissociative
experiences has yet to be fully elucidated. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is a
relationship between these two phenomena in at least a subset of self-injurers. Further
research on this relationship may help to extend our understanding of NSI and its
functions.
Altering the acute environmental stimuli that precipitate or perpetuate an aversive
emotional experience is another function sometimes subserved by NSI. Environmental
changes such as reduced acute demands of others or of situations may occur as a result of
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NSI through common consequences of this behavior, such as the seeking of requisite
medical care for or by the self-injuring individual. In this way, the individual may reduce
his or her exposure to an aversive stimulus (e.g., abdicating or transferring responsibility
for self-care; removing oneself from responsibility of the activities of daily living) via
admission to a hospital or other medical treatment facility. Furthermore, the individual
may modify their emotional environment. In the case of BPD patients especially, NSI
may function to elicit previously perceived unexpressed concern or care from relatives,
friends, or partners. Similar to increasing tolerance in chemical dependency, increasingly
extreme behaviors may be required to elicit the same responses from others that were
initially educed by less severe actions. It is also this pattern of functioning that may
contribute to self-injurers being erroneously viewed or categorized as borderline patients,
with insufficient regard given to the actual idiographic clinical presentation.
Psychobiological Aspects o f Emotion Regulation
The role of the central nervous system (CNS) in emotion regulation can be
viewed as transpiring at multiple, sequential levels (i.e., the top-down processing model).
The top-down processing model may be considered a transactional model in that the
neural circuits and cortical pathways responsible for the regulation of emotional
experiences interact with each other through perpetual bidirectional inhibitory and
excitatory processes and responses. This top-down view also makes clear the
simultaneously independent and interdependent nature of these central neural pathways.
Different subsystems within the CNS may receive and process different incoming data
(e.g., from the environment) or different parts of that data, or a singular set of incoming
information may elicit diverse responses across different subsystems (Gross, 1998). The
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specific neural circuitry involved in emotion regulation remains unclear. However, Mega
and Cummings’ (1994) model of subcortical activity regulation suggests that substrates
found between the limbic structures and the prefrontal cortex imbue incoming
information with “emotional meaning,” as well as serving a modulating function.
Neuroscience has advanced our understanding of emotion regulation to a great
extent. From a strictly neurobiological perspective, emotion regulation takes place at the
systemic level through reciprocal afferent/efferent projections across neural circuits.
These cross-circuit projections facilitate reciprocal regulation of each system by the
others. As discussed in subsequent sections, the hypothalamus is an integral structure in
the neurobiology o f emotion regulation. The hypothalamus, along with the brain stem
exert regulatory influence on the cortex through specific neurotransmitter substrates (e.g.,
serotonergic, noradrenergic, and dopaminergic) and dispersion of neuropeptides (Tucker,
Derryberry, & Luu, 2000). The actions of the brain stem are moderated by the limbic
system, which simultaneously directs cortical resources (i.e., receptors in the cortex and
prefrontal cortex) toward incoming stimulation from the environment (Lewis & Steiben,
2004). Peripheral supportive evidence for this has also come from brain imaging studies
of individuals with unipolar and bipolar depressive illnesses, who are thought to
experience difficulties with emotion regulation in various forms.
The foregoing research indicates that mood disordered individuals exhibit
irregular glucose metabolism and regional cerebral blood flow in the limbic system and
prefrontal cortex (Baxter, Phelps, Mazziotta, Schwartz, Gemer, & Selin, 1985; Drevets et
al., 1997; Mayberg, Lewis, Regenold & Wagner, 1994; Nobler et al., 1994; Soares &
Mann, 1997), suggesting evidence of an association between pathophysiology in these
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regions and overt indices of emotion dysregulation. These systems work in concert to
provide a continuous feedback loop through which evaluative decisions about emotional
behavior are made rapidly and adjusted according to incoming sensory information and
environmental demands. When a disruption in these systems is encountered, research
indicates that typical regulatory functions cannot take place in the same efficient manner.
The prefrontal cortex has also been implicated in emotion regulation. The
prefrontal cortex is responsible for regulating subsystems lower on the neural hierarchy
by exerting an inhibitory influence on instinctive, or stereotypical, behavioral response
repertoires. This inhibition allows for processing of current or new incoming stimulus
information that is then used to formulate conscious and purposeful action (Tucker et al.,
2000). Some support for this proposed model of involvement of the prefrontal cortex has
derived from lesion studies (Gross, 1998). Studies in which part of the prefrontal cortex
is incised or ablated have found physical disruptions or ruptures in this structure in adult
brains are associated with behavioral impulsivity and dysregulation of affect (Kolb &
Taylor, 1990; Rolls, Homak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994; Stuss & Benson, 1986; Tucker,
Luu, & Pribram, 1995). There is also research in the developmental literature (e.g.,
Dawson, Panagiotides, Klinger, & Hill, 1992; Diamond, 1991) suggesting that changes in
the structure of the prefrontal cortex during infancy are associated with the appearance of
signs of emotion regulation (e.g., self-soothing techniques). The prefrontal cortex, it
seems, is integrally related to the capacity of an individual to upregulate or downregulate
their emotional behavior.
A corpus of research has been conducted regarding the neurobiology of emotion
regulation and dysregulation in mood disorders. Studies of psychological factors
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associated with emotional lability, such as impulsivity and aggression, which are partially
attributable to serotonergic metabolites, specifically 5-hydroyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA),
further support the proposed biological underpinnings of these aspects of BPD (Skodol,
Siever, Livesly, Gunderson, Pfohl, Widiger, 2002a). Additionally, research on moodcongruent learning, recall, retrieval, and judgment (cf. Mayer & Salovey, 1988 for a
thorough review of this literature) provides further theoretical support for a role of
emotion dysregulation in identity disturbance. If borderline individuals are unable to
determine and label their mood or emotional experience due to lability or behavioral
inconsistency, then retention, recall, and retrieval of items such as personal preferences
may also prove difficult, and may influence their perception o f experiences. Moreover,
chronic negative affect and emotionality may leave the borderline individual more
vulnerable to recall and cognitive magnification of the aversive aspects of personal
experiences, thus perpetuating the cycle of negative emotions. It is logical to presume
that such disruptions, if chronic, may contribute to oscillations between emotional
extremes in an effort to attain emotional homeostasis. Whether that emotional stability is
attained through healthy strategies such as mindfulness-based skills (Linehan, 1993b;
Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), or through maladaptive means such as NSI, varies
from person to person. However, it is clear that underlying psychopathology is likely to
complicate emotional-behavioral response tendencies.
In sum, emotion regulation seems to play a vital part in organismic survival
through its role in the stress response. As research has documented, emotion
dysregulation is associated with functional impairments that can impede survival. In
humans, emotion dysregulation has been implicated as a key contributing factor for the
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development of a variety of forms of psychopathology, many of which are associated
with NSI. Explanations for the role of emotion dysregulation have come from a variety
of extant bodies of research, most recently the neuroscience literature base. The neural
pathways of emotional regulation lie in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis,
which is responsible for activating an organism’s biological response to environmental
threats and stressors (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessel, 2000; Lovallo & Thomas, 2000).
Appropriate activation of these responses is adaptive and necessary; however, abnormal,
or dysregulated, patterns of psychobiological response to stress (e.g., exaggerated or
protracted stress responses) may be detrimental to the physical and psychological
integrity of the individual in a number of ways as discussed earlier. It is unclear what the
relationship of NSI is to emotion dysregulation. One method of examining this is
through observation of the psychobiological stress response system in self-injurers. A
review of this neural system is provided in the following sections.
Summary of Cortisol and Hypothalamic Pituitary Adrenocortical Axis Functions
The Adrenocortical System
Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenocortical Axis
At its most basic level, the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis is a
neuroendocrine circuit (Zeigler & Herman, 2002). The relationship of this circuit to
organismic functioning, however, is complex affecting psychological, physiological, and
immunological processes. The HPA axis encompasses the adrenal gland, hypothalamus,
and pituitary gland. Excitatory afferent nerve projections converge on this circuit from
the hippocampus and the hypothalamic parvocellular paraventricular nucleus (PVN).
This circuit is responsible for regulating the secretion of glucocorticoids into the blood
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stream as a component of an organismic stress response. As part of this stress response,
cortisol secretion increases in preparation for management of the stressor or threat. This
stress response has been observed to be nearly identical, neuroanatomically and
neurochemically, in both animals and humans (McGaugh & Cahill, 1997).
Biosynthesis and Functionality o f Cortisol
Cortisol is one of two known glucocorticoids, but is the only glucocorticoid
produced in humans (Lovallo & Thomas, 2000). Cortisol is considered a lipophilic
adrenal steroid, and has a low molecular weight (Kirschbaum, n.d.). Like other adrenal
steroids, cortisol is biosynthesized from low-density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol. It is
secreted in pulses that are modulated by the frequency and amplitude of pituitary-based
secretions of adrenocorticotropin hormone (ACTH). The center of secretory modulation
of cortisol lies in the neural triad of the hypothalamus, pituitary gland, and hippocampus.
The impulse for secretion originates in the hypothalamic PVN, which houses a large
number of neuronal cells specialized for the production of corticotropin releasing factor
(CRF). CRF, an orexigenic neuropeptide, is transported to the anterior pituitary gland via
the pituitary stalk (Vale, Spiess, Rivier, & Rivier, 1981). Pro-opiomelanocortin, a
complex protein produced by corticotrophic cells in the anterior pituitary where CRF
conjuncts, is subsequently broken down by the transported CRF into both beta-endorphin
(an opioid agonist) and ACTH. These substances are then released into the bloodstream
and commence circulation through the body. Circulation of ACTH permits its
transportation to the adrenal cortex, at which point it stimulates cortisol synthesis;
cortisol is consequently secreted into the bloodstream. This process occurs both in
spontaneity and via stimulus-response paradigms (i.e., as a biological reaction to
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biochemicals or environmental stimuli; Kirschbaum & Helhammer, 1989; Van Cauter,
1988).
The present study seeks to examine changes in salivary cortisol levels as an index
of emotion regulation via its specificity as a biomarker of HPA axis functioning. A
description of the molecular binding processes involved in the production and
metabolism of cortisol is conducive to understanding the components of its distribution
throughout the body. Understanding this binding process also elucidates the
physiological mechanism by which cortisol is transported to saliva and is able to be
measured therein. Cortisol shares a binding receptor with aldosterone (another adrenal
steroid known as a mineralocorticoid). As noted by Arriza et al. (1997), this sharedreceptor contributes substantially to the multifarious functions of cortisol in the human
central nervous system (CNS). As described above, blood serves as the vehicle for the
transportation and distribution of secreted cortisol, allowing it to penetrate all biological
tissues. Upon secretion, most (approximately 90%) of the cortisol released binds to
transcortin (also referred to as cortiocosteroid-binding globulin; CBG), albumin
(Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1989), or to erythrocyte (red blood cell) membranes
(Hiramatsu & Nisula, 1988). The majority of glucocorticoid receptors are located in the
hippocampus, which is a primary point of corticoid regulation as well as the structure
primarily responsible for the negative feedback component of glucocorticoid regulation
(Jacobson & Sapolsky, 1991). This secreting-binding process leaves approximately 510% of cortisol unbound, or “free,” in circulation. Unbound cortisol is transported via
the kidneys to the urinary tract and subsequently into urine. This unbound portion is also
transported into saliva via the parotid gland (Lovallo & Thomas, 2000).
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There is consensus in the literature that effective adrenocortical system, or HPA
axis, functioning is a prerequisite for healthy and adaptive responses to stress. This
system responds to stressors through a tri-faceted pathway (de Kloet, 1991). This
pathway begins with the pituitary gland and hypothalamus, which receive biochemical
stimulation via neurotransmitters and neuropeptides. The limbic system conducts
afferent and efferent neural messages between the hypothalamus and the cerebral cortex.
Finally, the brain stem conducts internal and external (i.e., sensory) stimulation to the
hypothalamus. Effective HPA axis functioning includes an ability to generate an
elevation in cortisol at the onset of a threat or stressor (i.e., upregulation), as well as to
initiate a decrease in cortisol production to facilitate a return to baseline levels at the
termination of the threat or stressor (i.e., downregulation). Such functions are a necessity
for adaptation to everyday life events through preparing the organism to negotiate the
demands of the external or internal environment.
In this vein, Stansbury and Gunnar (1994) have noted that cortisol in the HPA
axis acts in conjunction with other physiological systems to extract the energetic
resources necessary for a response to environmental challenges. Cortisol also regulates
the immunological system, the endogenous opioid system, and central and peripheral
catecholamine systems (Kandel et al., 1991; Lovallo & Thomas, 2000) thereby
facilitating the maintenance of poly-systemic homeostasis. Furthermore, the presence of
both glucocorticoid and mineralocorticoid receptors in the amygdala, hippocampus, and
hypothalamus suggests that, in addition to ACTH and CRF, cortisol’s neural-hormonal
activity also influences emotional functioning, memory, and learning processes (Lovallo
& Thomas, 2000; Stansbury & Gunnar, 1994).
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The preceding description contributes to the conceptual basis the present study in
that receptor location is related to receptor activity, that is, a receptor’s activity will affect
(i.e., facilitate or impede) the functioning o f the area of the brain in which it is located
(Kandel et al., 1991). The cortisol and mineralocorticoid receptors in the amygdala are
likely to affect emotional functioning and emotional behavior. Researchers have posited
that the effects of glucocorticoids are facilitated by the actions of glucocorticoids on
steroid receptors in the reticular formation of the brain stem (Stansbury & Gunnar, 1994).
Moreover, research suggests that when glucocorticoids are elevated in stress-response
quantities, there are definitive effects on hippocampal functioning, such as delayed and
immediate recall (Lupien et al., 1998). There are transitory decreases in long-term
neuronal potentiation, which may be connected with variability in working memory
functioning (e.g., variability observed diumally and at post-stress intervals). Additionally,
there is evidence that hippocampal neurogenesis is inhibited, and that dendritic
degeneration may occur (Lovallo & Thomas, 2000; Lupien et al., 1998; McEwen, 1997).
The degradation of neural pathways through dendritic degeneration may impede the
process of regulating the functions served by those pathways.
Factors Affecting Cortisol Secretion
Research has established that cortisol is secreted in a diurnal cycle (i.e., circadian
rhythm) regulated by the hypothalamic suprachiasmic nuclei, which is dependent on
ACTH secretion (Stansbury & Gunnar, 1994). Within the diurnal cycle, the peak in basal
cortisol secretion occurs during the last few hours of nocturnal somnolence until
approximately 30 minutes after awakening, exhibiting an increase from daytime baseline
of 50-100% (Schmidt-Reinwald et al., 1999; Wust et al., 2000). There is remarkable
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intra-individual consistency in this pattern of secretion, indicating that cortisol may be a
preferred index of HP A axis functioning (Pruessner et al., 1997; Schmidt-Reinwald et al.,
1999). Research has revealed that this rhythm emerges around three months of age in
humans, and is fully attained by approximately two years of age (Stansbury & Gunnar,
1994).
Despite the documented stability of cortisol secretory rhythm, there are some
additional physiological conditions which may alter the typical pattern of cortisol
secretion across the diurnal cycle. These include both pregnancy and ingestion of oral
contraceptives. Both of these conditions alter the synthesis of CBG in the liver, such that
higher levels of this substance are produced, thus making available a greater supply of
CBG for cortisol to bind to. Because the liver is unable to metabolize cortisol molecules
that are CBG-bound, cortisol levels in plasma are elevated. Nonetheless, the available
research on cortisol levels in pregnancy has historically been mixed at best.
Earlier researchers reported null findings in comparisons of cortisol assays for
pregnant versus non-pregnant women (Guechot et al., 1981, 1982; Landon et al., 1984;
Peters et al., 1984). However, more recent research (Nierop, Bratsikas, Klinkenberg,
Mater, Zimmerman, & Ehlert, in press) indicates that women in the third trimester of
pregnancy exhibit higher baseline levels of salivary cortisol and a greater degree of
cortisol reactivity compared to those in the second trimester and non-pregnant women.
Furthermore, this research suggests that cortisol recovery time (i.e., time required for
return to baseline levels) was significantly protracted for women in the second trimester
of pregnancy compared to non-pregnant women, although it did not differ significantly
from that observed in third trimester women. These findings partially buttress earlier
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reports in the literature (e.g., Bustamante & Crabbe, 1984; Stahl & Doemer, 1982; Vining
et al., 1983) of elevated cortisol levels during the third trimester. Kirschbaum and
Hellhammer (1989) contend that such elevations are the result of biomolecular supply
and demand principles. An increase in plasma progesterone levels occurs during both
pregnancy and oral contraceptive intake, leading to an increase in the number of
molecules (of cortisol and progesterone) competing for the same CBG and target cell
binding sites. Hence, there is greater bio-demand, but unchanged bio-supply, creating a
circumstance in which some molecules are naturally excluded from the binding process
and remain unbound.
In addition to physiological factors, psychosocial factors such as socioeconomic
status, educational level, and ethnic origin also appear to influence the secretion of
cortisol. Bennet, Merritt, and Wolin (2004) examined waking cortisol peak (30 minutes
after awakening) and baseline levels in 63 non-Hispanic Caucasian and African
American males and females. These researchers also examined the independent
contribution of educational level on cortisol variation. After adjustment for education
and managerial status, results indicated that higher levels of cortisol secretion were found
in Caucasians. Additionally, those with higher levels of education had significantly
higher cortisol peak levels after adjustment for ethnicity and BMI. Bennet et al. (2004)
further reported no significant between-groups differences in overall cortisol secretion for
the Ethnicity x Education interaction. However, additional analyses revealed that African
Americans with lower educational levels had significantly lower cortisol levels at
awakening than any other group (i.e., lower educated Caucasian, higher educated
Caucasian, and higher educated African American). After 30 minutes, however, lower-
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educated African Americans were only significantly different from higher-educated
Caucasians; whereas lower-educated Caucasians were now significantly different from
higher-educated Caucasians. All significant interactions and non-significant differences
remained after controlling for perceived level of stress. The source of these differences is
not clear, and these findings must be replicated before any conclusions may be drawn.
However, these findings are of relevance to present research in that the population from
which the sample was drawn was comprised of generally homogenous ethnic origins (i.e.,
European).
Cortisol and Psychological Stress
Inconsistent and contradictive findings within the literature have made the utility
of cortisol as a biomarker for psychological stress somewhat unclear. Some researchers
(e.g., Hjortskov, Garde, Orback, & Hansen, 2004) have suggested that such
inconsistencies may be the result of substantial variability in (1) types of psychometric
instruments used to assess mental stress; (2) study design, or design-related issues (e.g.,
controlling for extraneous variables such as oral contraceptive use); or (3) choice of
cortisol derivative used in statistical analyses.
In their brief review of the literature, Hjortskov et al. (2004) examined studies that
included both cortisol and measures of self-reported psychological stress. The authors
identified 73 studies, of which 14 met stringent criteria for inclusion in their review.
Hjortskov et al. (2004) set an a priori criterion of 75% agreement between all studies as
being indicative of consistency of evidence for or against a relationship between cortisol
and self-reported psychological stress, with anything less than 75% being indicative of
ambiguity. Four studies (27%; i.e., Ockenfels et al., 1995; Schulz et al., 1998; Steptoe,
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Cropley, Griffith, & Kirschbaum, 2000; Zeier, 1994) reported a positive relationship, and
two studies (13%; i.e., Steptoe et al., 1998; Yang et al., 2002) reported a negative
relationship. Eight studies (60%), however, (i.e., Burton et al.,1996; Evans & Steptoe,
2001; Fischer et al., 2000; Fischer et al., 2002; Fox, Dwyer, & Ganster, 1993; Hanson,
Maas, Meijman, & Godaert, 2000; Pruessner et al., 1999; van Eck et al., 1996) reported
no relationship. The authors concluded that there are several reasons why a clear
relationship between cortisol and self-reported stress may not be discernible at present.
For example, in addition to design and procedural explanations, many studies of stress
and cortisol relationships have examined work-related stress and/or stressors, or have
examined cortisol response to on-demand performance of mental tasks (e.g., mental
arithmetic). Some researchers (cf. Adam & Gunnar, 2001; Frankenhauser et al., 1986)
have posited that there is a prerequisite level of stress required for activation of the HPA
axis, which would likely not be met by common work-related stress. Operating from this
theory base, the low to moderate mean levels of stress reported in many of the studies
evaluated by these authors would have been insufficient for HPA axis activation
(Hjortskov et al., 2004).
It is clear that a basic question must be asked regarding whether or not cortisol is
a valid index of stress. Based on the research described above, it may be reasonably
postulated that there is a relationship between psychological stress and cortisol levels.
However, this research does suggest that there is potentially a threshold at which cortisol
secretion is activated and/or elevated. It is possible that individuals who experience
chronic emotional or psychological stress develop a lower threshold for cortisol
activation over time in response to that stress. It is also possible that individuals who

57

utilize maladaptive coping strategies for handling stress, such as NSI, have an inherently
lower threshold for cortisol activation, thus leading to a cortisol response that is
exaggerated in either intensity, duration, or both.
Cortisol and Psychopathology
Research over the past two decades has provided consistent evidence of a
relationship between various clinical disorders and cortisol. It is important to note that
the relationship between cortisol and psychopathology is not exclusive, but rather is a
function mediated by HPA axis disruption or functionality (e.g., Davidson et al., 2002).
Cortisol is not considered a precipitant of psychopathology, but is an index of systemic
dysfunction that may be associated with, or manifested in, various forms o f psychological
disturbance. However, chronic elevation and inhibition of cortisol may be a perpetuating
factor for psychopathology in that these endocrinological states have the potential to
produce adverse immunological and physiological effects (e.g., immunodeficiency,
parasomnia, anxiety, and other stress-related health problems). Such effects have clear
implications for psychological functioning as well.
There is a relatively strong literature base that links cortisol levels with some
forms of psychopathology, particularly among individuals with depression or anxiety
disorders. Clinical research on the relationship between cortisol and psychological
functioning first centered on depressed patients (Stansbury & Gunnar, 1994).
Aggregated research of the relationship between cortisol and depression has indicated
that, when compared with non-clinical individuals, depressed individuals exhibit inflated
cortisol responses to stimulation of ACTH and higher plasma and urinary levels of free
cortisol secretion during diurnal rhythmic secretion periods (Davidson, Lewis, & Alloy,
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2002; Drevets, Price, Bardgett, Reich, Todd, & Raichle, 2002; Garlow, Musselman, &
Nemeroff, 1999). With few exceptions (Birmaher et al., 1996), it is now well-established
that there is a disruption of HPA axis functioning in mood disorders. This is perhaps
most prolific in Bipolar Disorder (Young, 2004), as evidenced by higher basal levels of
cortisol, and suppression failure in dexamethasone suppression tests (Carroll, 1981). It is
posited that HPA axis disruption is the result of a dysregulation in the reciprocal
connective mechanisms of the HPA axis, where depressed individuals do not exhibit
suppression of precursor hormones when administered cortisol exogenously (Young et al.,
1991). Several studies also suggest that a pattern of HPA axis hyperactivity may
precipitate disruption of the feedback mechanism in depressed patients (Davidson et al.,
2002; Soares & Mann, 1997; Young, 2004), such that hypercortisolemia develops,
creating a psychoneuroimmunological vulnerability in these individuals. Similar
adrenocortical disruptions may also be associated with other related and frequently
comorbid disorders, such as Anorexia Nervosa (Stansbury & Gunnar, 1994). Thus, there
is evidence that disorders in which dysregulation of emotional and emotion-related
behavior are present may be characterized by a common theme of abnormal
psychobiological stress responses.
While the literature pertaining to mood disorders is relatively clear, that pertaining
to other forms of psychopathology is mixed (Heim & Nemeroff, 2001). For example,
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) patients have been shown to exhibit basal
hypercotisolemia. However, Panic Disorder patients tend to exhibit normal basal levels
of cortisol (Heim & Nemeroff, 1999), whereas those diagnosed with Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) have been shown to exhibit hypocortisolemia (Yehuda, 2000). There
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has been a failure to replicate this latter finding in earlier studies by other researchers
(Lemieux & Coe, 1995; Maes et al., 1998), despite recent supporting evidence from
Neylan et al. (2005), who found that PTSD symptom severity significantly predicted
lower pre-dexamethasone awakening cortisol levels in traumatized police officers.
Furthermore, Gerra et al. (2000) reported increases in ACTH levels but not cortisol levels
in children diagnosed with GAD who were exposed to an anticipated laboratory stressor,
thus contributing further ambiguity to an already equivocal literature.
Perhaps of greatest relevance to the present study is a nascent line of research
(currently consisting of a single case study) examining salivary cortisol in NS1 among
individuals with BPD. In a brief report presented as a letter-to-the-editor, Sachsse, von
der Heyde, and Huether (2002) described the diurnal cycle of urinary cortisol secretion in
a female borderline patient. This case study revealed an atypical pattern of cortisol
excretion in this patient, characterized by substantial fluctuations in nocturnal excretion;
her mean nocturnal excretion was also lower than normative levels. Interestingly, a
pattern of excretion and correlated behavior emerged such that periods of consistently
low nocturnal secretions were followed by periods of consistent elevations in cortisol
excretion; excretion levels above 20 nanomolecules/liter were associated with NS1
episodes that involved “one or more acts of self-mutilation” (Sachsse et al., 2002, p. 672).
Immediately following the NSI episode, nocturnal urinary cortisol levels returned to the
lower end of her baseline measurements and remained at this level for “several days.”
This small case example represents the first attempt to investigate the relationship
between NSI and biological indices of stress regulation. Expansion of this line of inquiry
in much larger samples is necessary for this relationship to be elucidated.
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The research cited above provides important supporting data for the premise that
dysregulation of emotion is an integral component of psychopathology. Evidence from
neuroendocrinological studies has revealed consistent differences in HPA axis
functioning of individuals with mood disorders, which are commonly and frequently
characterized by disruption of typical emotional processes and behavior. NSI is a
characteristic that is found in many forms across the spectrum of clinical disorders.
There appears to be an association between dysregulated emotional behavior and the
occurrence of NSI, however to date only correlational evidence exists. More empirical
approaches to examining the relationship between NSI and emotion dysregulation are
needed. One such approach is observation of psychobiological correlates of the human
stress response (e.g., cortisol) after initiation of the stress response system. Stress
induction has been conducted in laboratory procedures for over five decades in stressrelated research, and has evolved in effectiveness over that time. The following section
reviews the research documenting the development of various stress-induction
procedures, as well as the evidence for their effectiveness with various populations.
Salivary Cortisol and Stress Induction
Research using animal models lends support to the hypothesis that there could be
stressor specific paths to cortisol secretion (see Weiner, 1992). In their recent meta
analysis, Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) proposed a theory of cortisol response that is
rooted in a social self-preservation system. The function of this system is to continuously
monitor the individual’s environment for threats to their social esteem or social status.
This system coordinates psychological, physiological and behavioral responses to
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manage these threats through specific biological processes including activation of the
HPA axis.
In their proposal of the social self-preservation system, Dickerson and Kemeny (2004)
provided a thorough review of the stress-induction and cortisol secretion literature base.
Their review revealed that the type of stressor as well as the degree of control participants
had over the stressor were the factors with the greatest influence on cortisol secretion.
Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) compared the effects produced on cortisol secretion by
different types of laboratory stressors in different quantities (i.e., some studies included a
single stressor; some included two or more stressors). In aggregate, the data in this
literature base pertaining to stress induction and salivary cortisol suggests that conditions
that included social-evaluative threat, (i.e., where performance was captured on
permanent record, an evaluative audience was present, or a person offering negative
social comparisons was present) is associated with significantly higher effect sizes for
cortisol responses. Specifically, both conditions with and without social evaluative threat
(SET) elicited significant cortisol increases. However, conditions with SET produced
significantly greater cortisol increases than those without. Additionally, different
numbers of types of SET resulted in progressive increases in effect size for cortisol
responses. In an applied sense, larger effect sizes translate to a stronger cortisol response.
Studies with a single SET type (e.g., person offering negative social comparisons,
performance captured on videotape) produced an effect size of 0.23, while those with two
SET types produced and effect size of 0.86. These differences suggest a dose-dependent
relationship of sorts, with a higher number of SET stressors being associated with a more
substantial effect. Qualitatively, the presence of an evaluative audience and negative
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social comparison both yielded higher effect sizes than inclusion of a videotape
component; and the presence of an evaluative audience was equivalent to a negative
social comparison (p= 0 .2 0 ).
Furthermore, data from the Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) study indicated that
controllability was strongly related to cortisol responses. Cortisol responses for
uncontrollable tasks produced a larger effect size (d=0.52) than controllable tasks
(^=0.16; p< 0.01). However, there appears to be no progressive increase in effect size
with the inclusion of multiple uncontrollable elements, suggesting little if any advantage
of adding additional uncontrollable elements (p=0.18). SET was not significantly
different from uncontrollability (p >0.20) for predicting cortisol response, suggesting that
these are both significant independent predictors. SET combined with uncontrollability
accounted for 26% of variance in cortisol after time of day was controlled for, and
represented a significant increase beyond time of day alone (p<0.01).
Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) also reported that neither motivated performance tasks
(active performance tasks with the potential for evaluation along a self-relevant domain)
nor passive performance tasks alone without SET or uncontrollability elicited significant
cortisol responses. However, experiments that involved a motivated performance task
combined with both SET and uncontrollability yielded the largest effect size (d=0.92).
Moreover, motivated performance tasks combined with SET and uncontrollability
yielded a higher effect size than motivated performance tasks with ether of these
elements alone. Hence, the combined SET-uncontrollable condition resulted in the
highest effect size of any condition. Statistical analyses suggested that SET and
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uncontrollability mediated the relationship between stressor task category and cortisol
response.
Taken together, this examination of the relative importance of specific factors of
laboratory stressors (as related to cortisol secretion) revealed that both the perception of
the controllability of the stressor by the participant, as well as the type of stressor
administered, are crucial. Moreover, the analysis provided by Dickerson and Kemeny
(2004) strongly indicate that combining these factors in the right permutation, such that a
stressor is both perceived as uncontrollable and is socially evaluative will produce a
cortisol response that is nearly a full standard deviation above the mean resting level.
Congealed, these data permit the conclusion that there is evidence of the effectiveness of
laboratory stressors in producing strong cortisol responses. Finally, the results of
Dickerson and Kemeny’s (2004) analysis delineate a prudent route for future research
involving induced stress with salivary cortisol as an outcome measure.
In addition to cortisol response, Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) examined the pattern
of post-stressor cortisol responses. In aggregate, research indicates that cortisol levels are
two times higher during the period of 0-20 minutes post-stressor than 21 -40 minutes, and
continued to decline at 41 -60 minutes post-stressor. Across studies, cortisol responses
were significantly higher than baseline during the 0-20 minute and 21-40 minute periods,
but not at 41-60 minutes post-stressor.
During the 0-20 minute post-stressor period, performance tasks combined with SET
and uncontrollability elicited significant cortisol response (c/=0.85). Furthermore,
performance tasks combined with either SET or uncontrollability alone also elicited a
significant cortisol response (d=0.25). A significant elevation in cortisol was still present
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during the 21-40 minute post-stressor period for performance tasks combined with SET
and uncontrollability (rf=0.74; /?<0.01). However, performance tasks combined with
either SET or uncontrollability alone no longer elicited a significant cortisol response
(d=0.0S). Finally, a significant cortisol elevations remained significant during the 41-60
minute post-stressor period for performance tasks combined with SET and
uncontrollability (d=0.28; p<0.05); and performance tasks combined with either SET or
uncontrollability alone remained non-significant (t/=-0.21).
In sum, the duration of a laboratory stressor does not appear to predict effect sizes of
cortisol responses at any of the three intervals. The inclusion of a socially evaluative and
uncontrollable component seems to have an impact on the recovery process, as well as on
the magnitude of the initial cortisol response. However, the persistence of cortisol
elevations after a combination SET uncontrollable task is mostly the result of the greater
peak response they produce. In consideration of these data, it may be inferred that those
laboratory stressors that yield the most robust initial cortisol responses would include
both a social-evaluative component and an uncontrollability component. Furthermore, it
may be inferred that there is indeed a relationship between an initial cortisol response and
the duration of the cortisol response (i.e., the amount of time required for cortisol to
return to a level that is not significantly different from baseline).
There are a number of potential alternative explanations for these results that exist
and which must be considered before any firm conclusions may be drawn. As noted by a
number of researchers (e.g., Egger, Davey, & Smith; Field, 2003; Thompson & Pocock,
1991), such potential explanations relate to a number of concerns regarding the
trustworthiness of meta-analytic procedures. First, it is possible that artifacts of the
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studies, or the construct under investigation, contributed to the effects reported. In the
case of laboratory-induced stress and its effect on salivary cortisol, sources of artifact
may include the subjective distress experienced by the participants in the studies, the
reliability of the instrumentation and measurement Additionally, publication bias, in
which meta-analysts select only publications from peer-reviewed journals and exclude
dissertation research and studies presented at conferences, may exaggerate effects by
precluding the inclusion of research that revealed null results. This bias toward
publication of only significant results (i.e., the “file-drawer” problem) exhibited by both
researchers (Dickersin, Min, & Meinert, 1992; Rosenthal, 1979) and editors (Hedges,
1984) has been noted for over two decades. Omission of unpublished research may
indeed affect the results of aggregated data, as this data may produce effects that are
substantially lower than that of published research (Shadish, 1992). The methodology
employed for a meta-analysis is another factor that may influence effect sizes. A full
review of approaches to meta-analysis is beyond the scope of this critique; however,
research indicates that effects may be inflated due to varying control of Type I error rates
depending on the number of studies included in the analysis (Field, 2000). It is important
that meta-analytical researchers address these concerns statistically, and report them in
their results to allow evaluation of the procedural soundness.
These potential confounds were addressed by the authors in their description of the
methodology they employed. Additional analyses from the Dickerson and Kemeny
(2004) meta-analysis indicated that participants’ distress ratings were not a significant
predictor of cortisol response effect size, suggesting that these were independent of
social-evaluation, type of task, and controllability factors. Additionally, it is unlikely that
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publication bias contributed to these results, given that both peer-reviewed and
unpublished dissertations were included in the analyses; and publication status was not a
significant predictor of cortisol response effect size. Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) also
analyzed the contribution of authorship to the effects due to a large number of studies
deriving from a single laboratory. Results revealed that although Kirschbaum and
Hellhammer authored 9% of the studies in this meta-analysis, authorship did not predict
cortisol response effect size significantly when controlling for time of day and type of
stressor.
The authors’ description of their selection, instrumentation, and measurement
methodology indicates that there was substantial consistency in the sample and
methodological characteristics; all studies included in the analysis used “healthy”
participants, and all used salivary cortisol as an outcome measure. Studies in the meta
analysis were differentially coded for time of day to allow for ANCOVA to be conducted
with this factor as a covariate. Finally, the methodology employed for conducting this
meta-analysis has been demonstrated in statistical simulation research (Field, 2000) to be
equivalent in its control of the Type I error rate when large samples (100 or more) are
used; Dickenson & Kemeny (2004) report an n of 208 studies. Evaluation of the way in
which the authors addressed the factors that may mitigate the results of a meta-analysis
suggest a sound and empirically-supported scientific methodology was employed based
on the best statistical technology currently available. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude
that the results of the Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) meta-analysis are valid. The
soundness of the meta-analysis as determined by the present methodological evaluation
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also speaks to the applicability of these results to research paradigms involving the
investigation of salivary cortisol and laboratory stressors.
The Present Study
There is a substantial corpus of research comprising the NSI and emotion
regulation literatures. The emotion-regulation model of NSI is one of the most widely
accepted hypotheses; however, this model is supported primarily by self-report anecdotal
accounts of the phenomenology of self-injurers. While the nature of this evidence does
not discount its validity, a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying the
emotional dysregulation experienced and reported by self-injurers is necessary.
Elucidating the psychobiological stress response of self-injurers may provide
empirical support that is critically needed for the emotion regulation model of NSI.
Much of the phenomenology of NSI and self-injurers does appear to point toward the
validity of an emotion regulation hypothesis. Corroborating data from an alternative
source is necessary for progress to be made in the further development and refinement of
this approach to understanding NSI. Aggregated supportive data for the emotion
regulation model may prove to be invaluable to the development of new and more
specific psychobiologically-based treatment modalities. A better understanding of the
biological aspects of the emotional response system will contribute data that could
potentially be applied in both psychotherapeutic and psychopharmacological modalities.
To the knowledge of the primary investigator, there is no published research examining
the psychobiological effects of acute emotional distress in self-injurers.
An effective investigation of psychobiological factors involved in emotion
regulation necessitates that both the requisite theoretical foundation for such research has
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been developed based on empirical data, and that the requisite technology be available for

such scientific inquiry. The research summarized in the preceding sections has
established that both of these criteria have been met by the current body of literature.
First, research pertaining to NSI has progressed substantially over the past two decades.
A number of explanatory models have been forwarded, ranging form drive-based
psychodynamic, to behavioral contingency, and, of course, emotion regulation models of
this phenomenon. When considered together, a common theme of regulation, particularly
self-regulation, emerges from these models. This theme is echoed by clinical self-reports
of many self-injurers as well as empirical research using psychometric measurements
(Linehan, 1993a; Nock & Prinstein, 2004; Walsh, 2006).
The second component of the present thesis, emotion regulation, has also received
substantial attention in the past two decades (Gross, 1998). Models of emotion regulation
have also been developed during this time, and appear to have congealed into a
psychobiological information-processing model, which contends that physiological and
environmental stimuli inside of and external to the individual are evaluated on an
ongoing basis. This model submits that these stimuli and responses are incorporated into
a template for satiation of the needs of the individual. Emotional behavior, and its
physiological correlates, reflect the modification of the individual’s response to such
incoming information, and are thereby regulated via this evaluative process. Research
from the field of neuroscience, as well as emotion regulation in general, supports the
contention that there are psychobiological indices of emotion regulation that are
observable in the aforementioned correlates (Kandel et al., 1991; Lovallo & Thomas,
2000). The culmination of such research indicates that the HPA axis and its afferent and
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efferent projections are the core o f emotional functioning and stress responses in the

brain (Gross, 1998; Lovallo & Thomas, 2000).
Furthermore, a prolific quantity of research has amassed documenting the
correlation between levels of stress and secretion of glucocorticoids as part of a
physiological response to stress initiated by the HPA axis. Research has identified
cortisol as the primary glucocorticoid involved in this HPA axis response to stressors
(Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1989, 1994). This research has also established that the
level of unbound cortisol found in saliva is a valid estimate of plasma levels of cortisol
(Yao, Moss, & Kirillova, 1998). The data from these lines of research indicate that the
technology to evaluate HPA axis functioning via the cortisol response indeed exists and
is translatable into clinical research.
With regard to measurability of psychobiological markers of emotion regulation,
the stress-response and general psychophysiological research literatures support the
contention that effective technology exists. There is ample research suggesting that
saliva-based biological samples of multiple hormones (e.g., cortisol, progesterone,
testosterone) are accurate estimates of plasma levels of these biochemicals (Kirschbaum
& Hellhammer, 1989, 1994). Advances in biological sample assaying methodology have
also been developed aggressively over the past 10 years, permitting greater precision in
cortisol measurement particularly. The radioimmunoassay procedure has been the
dominant technique since the mid 1960s (Deuss, Allolio, Feltes, & Kaulen, 1984; Katz &
Shannon, 1964; Walker, Riad-Fahmy, & Llewelyn, 1978); however, newer methods
involving nonisotopic techniques (e.g., fluoroimmunoassay) have improved both the
sensitivity and convenience of measuring salivary cortisol (Yao et al., 1998). Thus, the
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technology for measurement of salivary cortisol has been demonstrated to be available,
reliable, and precise.
The present review has evaluated data from multiple related bodies of research.
When examined within the framework of a mutual context, these literature bases point
toward recent notable progress in developing our understanding of the factors associated
with NS1, especially the psychobiological facets of this phenomenon. The present review
presents a theoretical foundation for exploring the role of emotion regulation in NSI in a
novel way. Furthermore, this review provides ample empirical evidence from the
psychobiological research literature suggesting that there are valid, reliable, and
measurable biomarkers o f emotion regulation. Perhaps most importantly, in bringing
together these literatures, the present review has highlighted an overlooked gap in the
literature. Specifically, with the exception of one case study examining self-mutilation in
a borderline individual, no research has investigated the relationship between
psychobiological indices of emotion regulation and NSI. Moreover, although the
technological means exist to do so, there has been no experimental investigation of this
relationship. This gap represents an important missing component of support for the
emotion regulation model of NSI.
The primary purpose of the present study was to evaluate the validity of the
emotion regulation model of NSI using cortisol secretion following induced psychosocial
stress as an index of HPAA functioning in NSI individuals compared to non-NSI
individuals. The primary investigator proposed that this data would diminish the gap in
the literature on psychobiological functioning in self-injurers by evaluating hypothesized
differences in cortisol responses between these two groups. Aggregated stress-
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induction/cortisol research suggests that the most effective laboratory stressors with the
strongest effects on cortisol secretion are those that are both (1) perceived as
uncontrollable by the participant, and (2) evaluative in nature (Dickerson & Kemeny,
2004). Therefore, the present study employed a social rejection stressor paradigm that
has been employed successfully in several previous studies (Blackhart, Eckel, & Tice,
2007; Maner, Dewall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary, Blevins,
& Holgate, 1997; Twenge & Campbell, 2003), and is commonly used (Baumeister,
Brewer, Tice, & Twenge, 2007) in research, examining biological and psychological
stress responses. Furthermore, in the present study cortisol response was conceptualized
as the quantity of cortisol secreted at each post-stressor measurement interval.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
NSI group participants will exhibit significantly greater initial increases in
salivary cortisol from baseline measurement than Control group participants. This was
determined by the difference in the number of nanomolecules of cortisol per deciliter
(pg/dL) of saliva following the post-conversational task baseline versus subsequent, post
stressor measurement points.
Hypothesis 2
NSI group participants will exhibit significantly higher levels of self-reported
problems with emotional regulation than Control group participants, as determined by
significantly higher scores on all six subscales of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation
Scale (DERS).
Hypothesis 3
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DERS total scores will correlate significantly and convergently with salivary
cortisol quantum at measurement points at which the quantum is significantly different
from baseline.
Hypothesis 4
PANAS positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) scores for both groups will
correlate significantly at each measurement point with salivary cortisol level differences
from baseline, with PA scores correlating inversely, and NA scores will correlating
convergently.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS
Participants
A total of 55 participants completed this study, including 26 self-injuring
participants and 29 participants who reported having never engaged in any form of selfinjury. One control group participant was omitted from analyses because it was
discovered (after she had already participated in the study) that she had actually reported
a single episode of self-injury during adolescence. Thus, a total of 54 participants were
included in the analyses. Although recruitment strategies (as described below) were
designed to recruit a diverse sample that included non-student participants, all
participants in this study were inevitably derived from the student population at the
University of North Dakota.
The entire sample (n=54) was comprised of 61.1% (n=33) males and 38.9%
(n=21) females. Participants were predominantly Caucasian (94.4%; n=51), with 3.7%
(n=2) reporting their ethnicity as Asian, and 1.9% (n=l) reporting their ethnicity as
Native American. Participants’ ages ranged from 18-47 years old (M=20.69; SD=4.65).
Most (65.4%) participants in this study reported being in their first two years of college.
When analyzed individually by group, NS1 participants (n=26) were typically in
their early 20’s (M=20.85; 50=5.66) mostly female (57.7%), and mainly Caucasian
(96.2%), with 3.8% (n=l) reporting Asian ethnicity. Almost three-quarters (72%) were
in their first two years of college. Control group participants had a comparable mean age
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of 20.54 years (SD=3.57), which was not significantly different from NSI participants
(r(52)= .24; p =.81). Control participants were also typically in their first two years of
college (59.2%), predominantly male (78.6%) and Caucasian (92.9%), with 3.6% of
control participants reporting Native American (n=l) and Asian (n=l) ethnicities.
Pearson chi-square analyses were conducted for sex proportions in the full sample
and sample subgroups. Confidence intervals (0=99% ) were calculated using an online
statistics calculator (GraphPad®) that employs the Wald method, as recommended by
Agresti and Coull (1998) for smaller samples. These analyses revealed no significant
differences between or within groups for participants’ sex, with one exception: chi-square
analyses revealed a statistically significant difference in the proportion of males (78.6%;
C l 9 9 = 53.69 - 92.51) versus females (21.4% C/.9 9 = 7.49 - 46.31) in the Control group (y2
[1, 53] = 7.46; p=.006). It is likely that this disparity is related to the exclusion criteria
for this study (described below). In short, potential female participants had two
additional exclusion criteria that were not applicable to males, specifically pregnancy and
oral contraceptive use. It is possible that the restriction of oral contraceptive using
women from participating in this study disproportionately biased recruitment of
participants for this study, resulting in fewer women than men in the Control group.
Participants were asked to rate their family’s socioeconomic status on a scale
from l(“very poor”) to 7 (“extremely wealthy”). NSI group participants (M= 4.42;
SD= 1.03) were not significantly different than Control group participants (M= 4.36;
SD=J3) on this measure (/(52)= .27; p = 79). Additionally, participants were asked to
rate the quality of their current friendships on a scale from 1 (“no close friends”) to 5
(very strong/close friendships). An independent-samples t-test revealed no statistically
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significant difference between NSI (M= 4.08; SD=.7A) and Control participants (M= 4.43;
SD=.63) for this psychosocial measure (t(52)= -1.87; p =.067).
Procedures
Recruitment Procedure
Participants were recruited via three methods. First, at the beginning of each of
three academic semesters, students in undergraduate psychology courses were given the
opportunity to earn extra credit in one of their psychology courses by voluntarily
participating in a psychological screening procedure. Informed consent was obtained
from all participants prior to administration of assessment protocols. During this
screening procedure, all consenting participants were administered a demographic
questionnaire (the “About Me” questionnaire), and a modified version of the Deliberate
Self-Harm Inventory (DSHI; Gratz, 2001; see “Measures” below). Second, participants
were also recruited via scheduled screening sessions in the University of North Dakota
(UND) Department of Psychology, during which time participants came to an advertised
study location, and volunteered to complete the screening measures described above for
extra credit. Data from all screenings were aggregated and analyzed to identify eligible
participants.
The study was also advertised on informational posters displayed throughout
campus, in a variety of locations (e.g., grocery stores, coffee shops) in the surrounding
community, and online on the UND website. These posters and the online posting
contained a phone number to call for the information about the study, as well as
information regarding some basic aspects of the study, including compensation and
approximate duration.
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Potential participants were screened for eligibility through a combination of data
review and telephone interviews. Screening data were reviewed using frequency
analyses of variables that represented study pre-requisites (e.g., NSI history) to identify
potential participants who met study criteria. Participants meeting preliminary eligibility
criteria (n=372) were contacted for brief telephone interviews to determine their full
eligibility. During telephone contact with pre-identified eligible participants, all
participants were re-assessed for current oral contraceptive use and mood, anxiety, and
eating disorder diagnoses. Participants who had initiated contact via telephone or e-mail
in response to an advertisement were also administered the DSHI during the telephone
interview to determine their eligibility (n=9).
During the telephone screening, participants deemed eligible for the study were
given a brief description of the tasks involved in the study, were informed of all
requirements of the study and were told they would be compensated for their time.
Participants were informed that at the time of their participation, they would be given a
choice of being compensated with either four (4) hours of research credit; or $20.
To minimize the effects of extraneous factors known to affect cortisol levels, participants
were specifically instructed to abstain from (1) consuming any stimulants (e.g., caffeine,
methamphetamines, amphetamine) or alcohol, (2) engaging in any strenuous
exercise/physical activity (defined as any activity that leads to an increase in respiration
and/or heart rate) 24 hours prior to the experiment; (3) consuming anything but water two
hours prior to the experiment; and (4) using any tobacco or nicotine products 1 hour prior
to the experiment. Participants were informed that they would be asked about their
consumption of all of these items prior to being allowed to participate in the experimental
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session, and that failure to comply with these instructions would result in their not being
allowed to participate. Participants were also informed that the saliva-hormone assay
would detect if they had adhered to the pre-experiment requirements, and that if they
were not honest about this information, the extra credit they received from participating
in the study would be deducted from their course grade or they would be asked to return
the financial compensation they were given. Participants were provided with a telephone
number they could call to cancel their participation prior to the experiment, or to ask
questions about the experiment or the pre-experiment regimen.
The primary investigator attempted to contact the 372 eligible people for this
study via telephone or e-mail. A voicemail message with brief information about the
purpose of the call and the study, as well as a contact phone number for the primary
investigator, was left for anyone who did not answer their phone and who had a
voicemail box. Eleven additional people who called the study hotline were screened via
telephone. Several (i.e., at minimum of 5) attempts were made to contact participants
who were identified as potentially meeting criteria for the NSI group, whereas only one
attempt was made to contact potential control group participants because of the
substantial disparity in the number of potential control group versus NSI group members.
A total of 135 NSI-eligible participants were contacted (30.3% [n=41] signed up) and 237
controls were contacted (19.4% [n=46] signed up). Of those with whom contact was
attempted via telephone, 64 (17.2%) refused to participate either in the study or the
screening, including 18 (13.3%) participants from the NSI pool, and 46 (19.4%)
participants from the Control pool.
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
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Research suggests that both cortisol reactivity and baseline levels of cortisol
secretion are altered by pregnancy and oral contraceptive ingestion (Kirschbaum &
Hellhammer, 1989). Additionally, a strong body of empirical evidence has documented
abnormal patterns of cortisol secretion and HPAA activity in: (1) individuals with mood
disorders (Birmaher et al., 1996; Board et al., 1956; Young, 2002; 2004) particularly in
individuals with Bipolar Disorder (Young, 2004); (2) individuals with anxiety disorders,
especially Panic Disorder (Bandelow, Sengos, Wedekind, Huther, Broocks, Hajak, &
Ruether, 1997; Stones, Groome, Perry Huckelbridge, & Evans, 1999) and PTSD, in
which cortisol levels may either be higher (Baker et al., 1999; Bremner et al., 1997;
Bremner et al., 2003) or lower (Mason, Giller, Kosten, Ostroff, & Podd, 1986; Yehuda,
Southwick, Nussbaum, Giller, & Mason, 1991; Yehuda, Teicher, Levengood, Trestman,
& Seiver, 1994) than normal depending upon the stressor; and (3) individuals reporting
restrained eating (Anderson, Shapiro, Lundgren, Spataro, & Frye, 2002; McLean, Barr, &
Prior, 2001).
Participants met criteria for the NSI group if they (1) endorsed at least two
episodes of NSI in their lifetime and at least one episode of NSI during the 12-month
period preceding the time of screening. Participants met criteria for the Control group if
they (1) reported no history of any form of NSI. Due to the preceding evidence presented
above and discussed earlier in this paper, participants for both groups were also required
to meet the following criteria: (1) deny current pregnancy; (2) report negatively for
current use of oral contraceptives; (3) deny a diagnosis of any mood disorder within the
past month; (4) deny a history of any anxiety disorder within the past month; (5) deny a
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history o f a diagnosis o f any eating disorder in their lifetime; and (6) deny a history o f

treatment for any eating disorder in their lifetime.
In total, 27 (7.3%) of those who were screened via telephone (n=372) were
disqualified because they reported current oral contraceptive use. This included 13 (9.6%)
otherwise qualified self-injurers, and 14 (5.9%) otherwise qualified healthy controls.
Additionally, two (<1%) of those who were screened via telephone (both from the NSI
participant pool) were disqualified because they reported a history being diagnosed with a
mood disorder within the past month. Another five (1.3%; also from the NSI pool) of
those who were telephone screened were disqualified because they reported a lifetime
history of an eating disorder diagnosis or eating disorder treatment. This resulted in a
potential NSI participant pool of 115 persons.
Five to ten participants were scheduled to participate in each experimental session.
The mean attrition rate (both formal cancellation and no-shows) was 2 participants per
session, with an average of 1.5 cancellations and 0.5 no-shows per session. Of the 20
experiments that were scheduled, 8 (40%) were cancelled due to attrition below the
required number of participants (<4 participants). On two occasions, a decision was
made to use a trained confederate for the group conversational task when a no-show
occurred on days when only four participants were scheduled and confirmed. Of those
who provided a reason for canceling or no-showing, the most frequently provided reasons
were “a family emergency” and schedule conflicts with places of employment. The
number of participants actually participating in each experimental group session ranged
from four to six (M=4.49; SD=. 69). There was not a significant between-groups
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(Rejected vs. Neutral) difference in the number participants participating in the

conversational task groups during each experiment (f(52)= .57; p=.57).
One participant from the NSI group was dismissed from the study because she
had begun taking oral contraceptives between the time she was initially screened and the
date of her participation. Nine participants acknowledged that they had consumed
products likely to contain caffeine (e.g., sodas, chocolate) and two participants
acknowledged alcohol consumption within the 24-hour restricted time period. Two
participants acknowledged that they had eaten less than two hours prior to the study
rather than abstaining for the two preceding hours as instructed.
All of the aforementioned participants, except the one who was dismissed, were
allowed to participate in the experiment to maintain the minimum number of participants
needed to run the experiment (i.e., 4 participants). To account for the potential effects of
participants’ non-adherence to pre-experimental restrictions on factors that can affect
cortisol secretion patterns, follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs were performed using
only those participants who reported adherence to pre-experimental restrictions.
Experimental Procedures
The timeline for the segments of the experimental procedures used in this study
are depicted graphically in Figure 1 at the end of this section below. Research strongly
suggests that one of the most crucial factors to consider in experimental designs
involving measurement of cortisol is the diurnal variation in secretion (Lovallo &
Thomas, 2000), thus all experimental sessions were conducted between 2:00 p.m. and
5:00 p.m. When participants arrived for the experimental session, they were asked to
sign an informed consent form describing the purpose, requirements, benefits, and risks
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involved in the study (see Appendix I). Participants were also instructed to turn off their
pagers and cell phones. After completing the consent form, participants also completed a
health questionnaire inquiring about their activity and use and consumption of specific
substances in the past 24 hours (Blackhart et al., 2007; see Appendix VI; “Short Health
History Form”). Research assistants examined the health form to ensure that all preexperimental guidelines were followed. Research assistants reminded the participant
using specific instructions that they would lose their extra credit or financial
compensation if it was determined that they were not honest in the information they
provided on the Short Health History Form.
After completing the Short Health History Form, participants were asked to
complete a group of questionnaires including the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL90-R), Difficulties in Emotional Regulation Scale (DERS), Social Interaction Anxiety
Scale, and the Borderline Personality Inventory (BPI) to collect data regarding the
participant’s current level of emotional functioning and distress.
The next part of the session consisted of a relaxation segment, lasting
approximately 20 minutes. This segment was incorporated into the study to allow for a
reduction of any sympathetic nervous system activity that may have been induced by (i.e.,
habituation to) (1) the novelty of the environment; (2) the novelty of the situation; or (3)
distress associated with completing psychometric questionnaires. During this segment,
participants were asked to listen to specific selections of classical music chosen for their
relaxing tone, tempo, and rhythm. These selections consisted of Antonio Vivaldi’s
Concerto N° 1 in E Major Largo E Pianissimo Sempre, Allegro Non Molto, Allegro I,
and Adagio Molto. Participants were also provided with two magazines, one related to
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business in Minnesota and one about arts and crafts (e.g., knitting, crocheting), and
instructed to do nothing but read these magazines and listen to the music during this
period. No problems were encountered with participants falling asleep during this period.
At the end of the relaxation segment, the first saliva sample (Tl) was collected and the
first Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; TIP) was administered.
Next, all participants were brought into a main room of the laboratory and given
instructions in a group format. Participants were asked to create a name tag for
themselves to wear during this segment using a marker and a self-adhering label.
Participants were instructed to engage in a group discussion (referred to from this point
forward as the “conversational task”) regarding social activities on and off campus for
approximately 15 minutes. Participants were given a printed list of conversation topics
and related topical questions to use as a means of initiating or generating conversation.
All conversation topics and questions are listed in Appendix VII.
After the 15 minutes had elapsed, the primary investigator or a research assistant
inteijected in the conversation, and informed participants that they would then be asked
to separate into different areas or rooms of the laboratory and select two other people
from the group that they would most like to work with during the next segment of the
experiment (the “selection task”). The participants were informed that they would get to
work with at least one other person, and possibly both that they selected. Once they were
separated into their original laboratory rooms, participants were asked to provide a
second saliva sample (T2), completed a second PANAS (T2P), and make their selections
using a researcher-created form (“Experiment Selection Form”, see Appendix VIII).
Approximately three minutes after the selection task was completed, each of the
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participants was given one of two sets of feedback based on their condition assignment
by the primary investigator or a research assistant. If participants were assigned to the
“Neutral” condition, they were told the following by the primary investigator or a
research assistant:
“I need to talk to you about your participation in the next task o f the experiment.
We accidentally made a mistake and assigned you to the wrong group, so because o f our
mistake, you ’ll have to complete the rest o f the experiment on your own. ”
If participants were assigned to the “Rejected” condition, they were told the following by
the primary investigator or a research assistant:
“I need to talk to you about your participation in the next task o f the experiment.
When people made their selection, no one indicated that they wanted to work with you.
This is kind o f unusual and it's never happened before, but consequently you ’ll have to
complete the rest o f the experiment on your own. ”
Approximately three to five minutes after receiving feedback, participants were asked to
provide the third saliva sample (T3) and to complete the third PANAS (T3P).
After providing the T3 saliva sample, participants were provided with a pen and a
piece of blank white paper and asked to draw a house. Participants were informed that
they would be given 10 minutes to complete this task. After the 10-minute period had
elapsed, participants were asked to provide the fourth saliva sample (T4) and to complete
the fourth PANAS (T4P); five minutes was allotted for this. Participants were
subsequently given 10 minutes each to draw a tree, a person, and a car, with five minutes
allotted after each drawing task for the collection of T5/T5P, T6/T6P, and T7/T7P,
respectively. When participants had provided all saliva samples and completed all
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PANAS questionnaires, they were asked to complete a questionnaire designed to function
as a manipulation-check (see Appendix III; “My Experience”).
Debriefing
Following collection of the final saliva sample and administration of manipulation
check, participants were fully debriefed. The primary investigator, project manager, or a
research assistant read the debriefing statement aloud to all participants (see Appendix II;
“Debriefing Form”). To maintain experimental control, participants were not permitted
to take a copy of the debriefing form with them. An explanation was provided in the
debriefing statement for the use of deception, and a verbal apology was given to all
participants for misleading them.
Following debriefing, participants were asked to complete a self-affirmations
exercise (adapted from Teaster, 2004; see Appendix IV, “Positive Self-Statements”) in
effort to alleviate any negative self-thoughts that may have been activated as a result of
participation. Participants were then screened for current suicidal and self-injurious
ideations using the first five items of the BSS, plus an additional item inquiring about
non-suicidal self-injurious ideations structured in the same format of the BSS items. The
primary investigator or the project manager carefully reviewed the BSS form to
determine the participant’s risk level for suicide or NSI (see “Risk Determination and
Management Procedure” below for a description of the risk determination procedure). If
participants were determined to not be at risk for NSI or suicide, they were provided with
an extra credit slip or financial compensation, and were dismissed from the experiment.
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Figure 1. Timeline for Experiment Segments
2:00 p.m.
| Consent
| Screening
!
| Psychometric Assessment
I
| 20 minute Relaxation

I

| Post-Relaxation Saliva Sample

I

| “Conversation Task”

I

| T1 Sample (baseline)

I

| “Selection Task”
I
| Participant Feedback/Stressor

I

| T2 Sample (3-5 minutes post stressor)

I

| Drawing Task 1

I

| T3 Sample (20 minutes post stressor)

I

| Drawing Task 2

I

| T4 Sample (35 minutes post stressor)
I
| Drawing Task 3

I

| T5 Sample (50 minutes post stressor)
I
| Drawing Task 4

I

| T6 Sample (65 minutes post stressor)

I

| Experimental Manipulation Assessment

I
| Debriefing

I

| R isk A ssessm ent

5:00 p.m.
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E x p erim en ta l M a n ip u la tio n C h eck

As noted in the Procedures section, the “My Experiences” questionnaire was
administered to participants to determine the effect of the deception in the experimental
manipulation. This questionnaire asked three key “Yes/No” questions, and allowed room
for an explanation if the answer was “Yes”:
1. Did you believe, at any time, that the experiment dealt with anything other than
what the experimenter had described to you?
2. Did this affect your behavior in any way?
3. Were you given any information about the experiment by anyone other than the
researchers prior to coming here today?
Across the full sample, 51.9% (n=28) reported that they believed at some point that the
experiment dealt with something other than what they had been told. Qualitatively, main
themes included things such as “The ways people adapt to new situations and new
people” and “How people react when they are stuck in a room for several hours.”
Qualitative review of participant’s free responses to these questions indicated that
some of those who reported disbelief may have correctly guessed what the experiment
was about, or what the deception had been. Furthermore, 22.2% (n=12) of participants
reported that some element of the experiment influenced their behavior in some way.
The statements written by participants are depicted in Table 1. Finally, 100% of
participants reported that they had not been given any information about the experiment
by anyone other than the principal investigator.
Participants assigned to both conditions were deceived in the experiment; however, it
was most important that participants in the Rejected condition were convinced by the
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deception. Examined by condition, 55.2% (n=16) of Rejected participants, and 48%
(n=12) of Neutral participants reported believing that the experiment pertained to
something other than what they had originally been told. The differences in these
proportions were not statistically significant ( x 2 [1,53]= .28; p=.6). Furthermore, only
6.4% (n=9) of those in the Rejected condition, and 5.6% (n=3) of those in the Neutral
condition reported that this had affected their behavior in some way.
In sum, there were some participants in both conditions who believed that they were
being deceived, but this percentage of participants was low in both groups and none
correctly identified what the deception truly was. Although these qualitative data suggest
the deception was not accurately detected, these data suggest that the experimental
manipulation may not have been completely effective or believable. The feedback
participants were given during the manipulation was a necessary, but not sufficient factor
Table 1. Explanations of Experiment-Induced Behavior Changes Given by Participants
‘‘I got really pissed off. I was tired o f spitting in the stupid cup. I d on ’t like to draw.

”

“Increased nervousness and suspicion about the experiment. ”
“Causes headaches probably due to the no caffeine.

”

“Just toward the end it got to be old and repetitive, just got a little warm and bored. ”
“Sure made me hungry... ”
“More anxious to get out o f here. ”
“I became frustrated and bored. ”
“The pre-experiment kept me from eating so as the experiment wore on, I grew hungrier and
therefore less patien t. "
“ /

didn ’/ feel left out or feel lowered self-esteem.

”

“It made me tired and a little lonely, not gonna lie. ”
“I really haven’t thought too much about how to make friends and where to make friends. But
after today's study, I may now start to think more about how friends are made. ”_________________________________
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for the requisite deception. Effective delivery of the feedback in a believable manner by
research personnel was also necessary. However, the only control put in place for this
factor was the training of research assistants in how to deliver the experimental
manipulation. Thus, the results of this study must be considered in this context.
Risk Determination and Management Procedure
The risk determination and management procedure (RDMP) was used to establish
each participant’s risk level based on their responses to the modified BSS, and provide
further assessment and management based on that assessment as needed. First,
participant’s responses to the BSS screening items were reviewed. If a participant’s
responses were “ 1” or “2” on items 3, 4, or 6 of the BSS, or if a participant endorsed a
“ 1” on three out of five of the suicide screening items, then further assessment by the
project manager or primary investigator was initiated. Finally, an a priori decision was
made to initiate further assessment if a participant exhibited any overt behavioral
indications of acute distress (i.e., distress that may be reasonably assumed to impair their
functioning). These indications included tearful affect, clearly unsteady gross or fine
psychomotor behavior, or distress-oriented verbal expression. When participants met any
of these criteria (n=8), the primary investigator took the following steps to ensure the
participant’s safety:
1. The participant was assessed for acute suicidality, acute self-injuriousness, and
risk factors for both of these by the primary investigator, or project manager in
consultation with the primary investigator. This assessment was aimed at
determining their risk level (see Appendix V; “Risk Screening”), current coping
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resources (e.g., social support, currently seeing a trusted psychotherapist) and
potential for carrying out any active ideations.
2. Low Risk Participants. If the participant is determined to be at a low risk for
suicide or non-suicidal self-injury, the primary investigator or project manager
provided the participant with a referral resource handout, and a recommendation
for therapy. Six participants were determined to be at this risk level.
3. Moderate Risk Participants. If the participant is determined to be at a moderate
risk for suicide or non-suicidal self-injury, the primary investigator or project
manager gave the participant the option of contacting a support person (e.g.,
friend, family member) and requesting to get together immediately (preferably the
friend will meet the student at the research lab or at Corwin/Larimore). If a
support person was not immediately available, the student would have been asked
to collaboratively construct a safety plan for remaining safe from self-injury, be
provided with mental health resources, and encouraged to seek treatment. All
participants determined to be at moderate risk were able to create a safety plan,
and contact a support person while in the lab. Two participants were determined
to be at this risk level.
4. High Risk Participants. Although no participants were determined to be at high
risk, if a participant had been determined to be at a high risk for suicide or nonsuicidal self-injury, the primary investigator or project manager would have
determined if the participant had a supportive social contact in their life. If so, the
primary investigator or project manager would have requested that the participant
contact that person. The lab supervisor, Dr. Jennifer Muehlenkamp, would also
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have been contacted while the participant contacted her/his support person and
would have come to the lab to conduct a further assessment and ensure the student
is connected with support services of some type prior to leaving the lab. The
student would not have been permitted to leave the lab alone. Should an
immediate support person not be available, the UND crisis team would have been
contacted. No participants were determined to be at this risk level.
5. Imminent Risk Participants. Although no participants were determined to be at
imminent risk, if a participant had been determined to be at a imminent risk for
suicide or non-suicidal self-injury, the primary investigator or project manager
would have requested that the participant remain in the lab, and asked that a
research assistant contact Dr. Muehlenkamp. During this time the primary
investigator or project manager in consultation with the primary investigator
would have contact the UND crisis team and assist the student in speaking with
the team. The participant would not have been permitted to leave the lab without
speaking with a member of the UND crisis team. No participants were
determined to be at this risk level
Measures
Psychometric Instruments
Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory
The D eliberate Self-H arm Inventory (D SH I; G ratz, 2001) is a 17-item self-report

inventory, which is behaviorally based. It was selected for use in the preset study
because of the specificity of its item content and because of the relatively stable
psychometric properties reported by its developer (see Gratz, 2001). Each item contains
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an initial yes/no question regarding a specific self-damaging behavior, followed by five
follow-up questions. This instrument includes multiple response formats, including
primary items with dichotomous answer choices (e.g., “Have you ever intentionally (i.e.,
on purpose) cut your wrist, arms, or other area(s) of your body (without intending to kill
yourself)?”), and follow-up items with a free response answer format (e.g., “How old
were you when you first did this?”; “How many times have you done this?”). Gratz
(2001) reports a high degree of internal consistency (a = 0.83).
The version of the DSHI used in this study for both screening and experimental
procedures was slightly modified. In this modified version, participants were given
categorical choices for indicating the last time that they engaged in any endorsed NSI
behavior (i.e. l=within the past 2 weeks; 2= 3-4 weeks ago; 3=over 1 month but less than
2 months ago; 4=2 months to less than 3 months ago; 5=3 months to less than 4 months
ago; 6=4 months to less than 5 months ago; 7=5 months to less than 6 months ago; 7=6
months to less than 9 months ago; 8=9 to 12 months ago; 9=More than 12 months ago),
rather than a space for providing a subjectively worded answer. The goal of this
modification was to minimize the number of potentially eligible participants who would
be lost based solely on either an unintelligible response or a failure to respond to the item
altogether. While some screening participants may still have chosen not to respond to
this item, the proposed modification was aimed at minimizing the effort required to
provide a response (i.e., by only having to circle an answer instead of write one out).
The validation study sample for the original version of the instrument consisted of
159 undergraduate students in Psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts,
Boston (Gratz, 2001). Item total correlations for each item in the preliminary validation
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study were as follows: Cutting, rb = 0.63; Burning with a cigarette, rb = 0.34; Burning
with a lighter or match, rb = 0.49; Carving words into skin, rb = 0.47; Carving pictures
into skin, rb = 0.45; severe scratching, rb = 0.51; Biting, rb = 0.54; Rubbing sandpaper on
skin, rb = 0.14; Sticking pins, needles, staples into skin, rb = 0.65; rubbing glass into skin,
rb = 0.35; Breaking bones, rb = 0.12; Banging head, rb = 0.57; Punching self, rb = 0.44;
Interference with wound healing, rb = 0.49; Other forms of NSI, rb = 0.36; Dripping acid
on skin, rb < 0.01; Using bleach or oven cleaner to scrub skin, rb < 0.01.
Product-moment test-retest correlations were based on a sample of 93 participants
who took part in the second administration of the DSHI. Over an intervening period of 24 weeks, the DSHI demonstrated a test-retest reliability of .68 (p < 0.001), with a
concomitant high correlation (r = 0.92; p < 0.001) between the number of NSI behaviors
that were endorsed by participants on the first and second administrations.
With regard to convergent and discriminant validity, the DSHI dichotomous items
demonstrated a correlation of .40 (p < 0.01) with the Borderline Personality Organization
Scale (BPO; Oldham, et al., 1985); the frequency assessment items of the DSHI
correlated at 0.48 (p < 0.001) with the BPO. The DSHI correlated moderately (r = 0.43;
p < .001) with the NSI item of the DIB-R (Zanarini et al., 1989), and moderately (r =
0.35; p < 0.001) with the NSI item of the Suicidal Behaviors Questionnaire (SBQ;
Linehan, 1981). The DSHI also demonstrated a correlation of 0.49 with a history of
mental health service utilization; a history of suicide attempts was correlated 0.20 and
0.21 with the dichotomous and frequency items of the DSHI respectively. Overall, the
DSHI has yielded adequately to excellently stable psychometric properties. Thus, its use
in the present study was determined to be advantageous. For the present study, reliability
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analyses revealed an internal consistency reliability of a= 75, and an inter-item
correlations ranging from r = -.25-.69.
Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation
The Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation (BSS; Beck, Steer, & Ranieri, 1988) is a
commonly used 19-item self-report instrument, with 5 preceding screening questions,
designed to assess presence and severity of suicidal ideation. The screening items are
used to facilitate rapid completion of the scale for nonsuicidal individuals. Items on the
BSS are rated on a three-point scale (0, 1, or 2); hence, total scores may range from 0 to
48. Beck and colleagues (1985, 1988) report no specific cut-off scores for this instrument.
However, recent research (Cochrane-Brink, Lofchy, & Sakinofsky, 2000) has identified
that a cutoff score of 24 may be useful in helping to determine when hospitalization of a
suicidal individual is medically necessary. Beck & Steer (1993) report that the BSS
addresses five primary factors of suicidality: Intensity of Suicidal Ideation, Active
Suicidal Desire, Planning, Passive Suicidal Desire, Concealment. This instrument has
demonstrated adequate to good internal consistency, with values for all scales ranging
from a=0.7 to 0.84 (Beck & Steer, 1993; Holden & DeLisle, 2005). Recent data also
suggest that this instrument has high sensitivity (100%) and specificity (90%) as a
suicidality screening tool (Cochrane-Brink et al., 2000). In the present study, items 1-5,
20, and 21 were administered. The first five items (i.e., the critical items) of the BSS
were employed as a method of assessing imminent suicide and self-injury risk. An
additional item inquiring about non-suicidal self-injurious ideations were added to these
items. Items 20 and 21 were used to collect data regarding history of suicidal behavior.
Symptom Checklist-90-Revised

94

The Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994) is a self-report
instrument originally developed by Derogatis (1977) for clinical and research settings.
As such, it is widely used in both clinical research and clinical practice. This instrument
contains 90 items that pertain to different forms and features of psychological functioning.
Participants rate the degree to which they have experienced each item during the past
seven days, including the current day, on a five-point, Likert-type scale (“0” = Not at all;
“4”= Extremely). The SCL-90-R is comprised of nine subscales that reflect nine
symptom dimensions (Somatization, Obsessive-Compulsion, Interpersonal Sensitivity,
Depression, Anxiety, Hostility, Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, Psychoticism), and
three globall scales (Global Severity Index, Problem Severity Distress Index, Problem
Symptom Total; Derogatis, 1994).
The SCL-90-R has demonstrated sound psychometric properties. Derogatis (1994)
reports test-retest reliability coefficients ranging from .80-.90 based on his validation
study. However, an earlier study by Horrowitz and colleagues (1988) found test-retest
reliability coefficients ranging from .68-.83 over a ten week period. Additionally,
internal consistency coefficients reported in the literature have ranged from a =.77-. 90
(Derogatis, Rickels, and Rock, 1976; Horrowitz, 1988). Furthermore, a wealth of
literature has established the convergent, discriminant, concurrent, and predictive validity
of the SCL-90-R (Asberg, Kragh-Sorensen, Mindham, & Tuck, 1973; Boleolucky &
Horvath, 1974; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis et al., 1976; Koeter, 1992; Peveler & Fairbum,
1990; Wiznitzer, 1992). Internal consistency for individual SCL-90-R subscales in the
present study ranged from moderate to excellent; Depression a =.87; Anxiety a =.79;
Isolation a =.92; Somatization a =.76; Phobia a =.90; Obsessive Compulsion a =.84;
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Hostility a =.73; Psychoticism a =.65; Paranoia a =.59. The SCL-90-R was used in the
present study as a method of determining participants’ global level of level of
psychopathology and distress.
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale
The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) is selfreport measure of social anxiety that specifically addresses anxiety that is related to
interaction in social situations. This instrument contains 20 items pertaining to various
aspects of social interactions in groups. Each item inquires the degree to which a feeling,
behavior, or cognition (e.g., “I have difficulty making eye-contact with others.”)
characterizes the respondent, and is rated on a five-point Likert-type scale (“0” = Not at
all; “4” = Extremely). The total score is calculated by summing the value of each item.
Higher scores reflect higher levels of social anxiety.
The SIAS has sound psychometric properties. Mattick, Peters, & Clarke (1989)
and Mattick & Clarke (1998) reported test retest reliability of .92 for a 4-week interval,
and 0.92 for a 12-week interval in a combined sample of undergraduates, community
participants, and untreated socially phobic, agoraphobic, and simple phobic individuals.
In the same vein, Heimberg, Mueller, Holt, Hope, and Liebowitz (1992) reported good
levels of internal consistency (a=.88-.83) in Australian samples. Similarly, Osman,
Gutierrez, Barrios, Kopper, & Chiros (1998) reported an internal consistency of a=.90 for
their sample of 200 undergraduate university students. Additionally, internal consistency
for the SIAS is excellent (a=.94, total sample; a=.93 for individuals with social phobia).
The strength of internal consistency in the present study was comparably high (a=.92).
This scale has also demonstrated high convergent validity (r=.73; Peters, 2000) with the
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Social Phobia Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998), another measure of social anxiety.
Furthermore, Brown, Turovsky, Heimberg, Juster, Brown, & Barlow (1997) reported a
high level of discriminant validity for the SIAS. In their sample of 165 anxiety
disordered patients, Brown et al. (1997) reported that the SIAS correctly classified 86%
of socially phobic patients (n=50), thus suggesting this instrument is a reliable measure of
social anxiety. In the present study, the SIAS was employed as a method of assessing the
effects of social anxiety on cortisol responses given that the stressor will be based on
social interactions.
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale
The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is a
36-item self-report instrument that assesses multiple facets of emotional regulation. Each
item requires that the participant indicate what percent of the time they experience each
item (e.g., “When I’m upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors.”) using a 1-5
Likert-type scale. Response choices range from 1 (“almost never;” 0-10%) to 5 (“almost
always;” 91-100%). The DERS is comprised of six scales: Nonacceptance of Emotional
Responses, Difficulties Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior, Impulse Control
Difficulties, Lack of Emotional Awareness, Limited Access to Emotion Regulation
Strategies, and Lack of Emotional Clarity. The DERS has demonstrated good
psychometric properties, with 4-8 week test-retest reliability of .88 for the DERS total
score, and coefficients ranging ffom .57 to .89 for individual subscales. Total scale
internal consistency for the DERS is excellent (a=.93), as is individual scale reliability
(as > .80). In the present study, the DERS was included as a method of establishing
convergence between biological and self-report measures of emotion regulation, and an
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internal consistency alpha of a=.95 was obtained for the total scale with the current
sample.
Borderline Personality Inventory
The Borderline Personality Inventory (BPI; Leichsenring, 1999) is a 53-item selfreport instrument that assesses features of Borderline Personality Disorder based on
Kemberg’s (1975) Borderline Perosnality Organization model. This instrument uses a
true/false response format, and is comprised by five subscales: Identity Diffusion,
Primitive Defense, Fear of Closeness, Impaired Reality Testing, and Cut-20. The last
subscale consists of those items that were found to best discriminate between borderline
patients and “neurotic” and schizophrenic patients (Leichsenring, 1999). The BPI yields
excellent overall internal consistency (a=.91) and one-week test-retest (r=.87) reliability.
Additionally, all five subscales yield good to excellent internal consistency (as=.68-.85)
and one-week test-retest (as=.73-.89) reliability. Leichsenring (1999) reports levels of
diagnostic sensitivity ranging from .85-.89, and diagnostic specificity ranging from .78.89, thus suggesting the utility of this instrument in classification. This instrument is
generally recommended for the purpose of screening participants for BPD or prominent
borderline features, and was used for that purpose in the present study. Internal
consistency in this sample was a=.81.
For the present study, the total scale score and the “Cut-20” subscale score were
used as indicators of psychopathology. The Cut-20 is the subset of 20 items that best
discriminates between BPD patients and “neurotic” and schizophrenic patients. Cut-20 is
an atheoretical, empirically derived score comparable to the total score of Diagnostic
interview for Borderlines (Gunderson et al., 1989). Liechsenring’s (1999) validation data
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for the BPI suggests that a score of >10 on Cut-20 reliably discriminates a BPD patient
from a clinical non-BPD individual.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988) is a 20-item self-report instrument that assesses an individual’s current level of
both positive and negative affect by asking the individual to rate, using a five-point
Likert-type scale (1= Not at All; 5= Extremely), the degree to which each item on the
scale describes their current affective state.
The instrument has two subscales: the Positive Affect (PA) subscale and Negative
Affect (NA) subscale. The PA subscale assesses the extent to which a participant is
currently experiencing positive emotion, and is comprised of ten adjectives describing
positive emotional experiences (e.g., enthusiastic, pleasant). Higher scores on the PA
scale are theorized to reflect higher levels of positive affect or emotion. Similarly, the
NA subscale evaluates the degree to which a respondent is experiencing negative emotion.
It is comprised of ten adjectives describing negative emotion (e.g., jittery, afraid). Higher
scores on the NA subscale are theorized to reflect higher levels of negative affect or
emotion. The PANAS has demonstrated excellent internal consistency, with a=.89 for
PA, and a=.85 for NA (Crawford & Henry, 2004).
Biological Measures
Salivary Cortisol
Salivary cortisol is a valid and consistent measure of serum levels of free cortisol
(Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1994). Saliva samples were collected using a two
milliliter-capacity plastic passive-drool Salivette, obtained from Salimetrics, LLC.
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Plastic straws approximately 4 to 5 centimeters in length were used to facilitate
movement of saliva into the vials for sampling. Participants were instructed to either
chew on a piece of straw, or to make a chewing motion with their mouth, as needed if
saliva flow was not readily available; both of these procedures are recommended by the
testing company. All saliva samples were stored in a freezer at a temperature of 20° C.
Cortisol levels in saliva samples were determined through a highly sensitive
enzyme radioimmunoassay (Salimetrics, PA) conducted by Salimetrics, LLC. This assay
uses 25 ul of saliva per determination, has a lower limit of sensitivity of 0.003 ug/dl,
standard curve range from 0.012 to 3.0 ug/dl, and average intra-and inter-assay
coefficients of variation 3.5 % and 5.1 % respectively. Method accuracy, determined by
spike and recovery, and linearity, determined by serial dilution are 100.8 % and
91.7%. Values from matched serum and saliva samples show the expected strong linear
relationship, r (63) = .89, p < 0.0001. As a measure of quality control in the present study,
double assays were extracted from 83.3% of the total number samples. Single assays
were performed on baseline measurement samples, while 100% of post-baseline samples
were double assayed. For those samples that were double assayed, the mean cortisol
value (pg/dL) was used for statistical analyses.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Data Analyses
An alpha-level of .01 was set for all independent samples t-tests and analyses of
variance. An alpha-level of .05 was adopted for all correlational analyses. As suggested
by Stevens (2002), for analyses in which sphericity could not be assumed, GreenhouseGeisser corrected values were employed.
Nonsuicidal Self-Injury Characteristics
Participants in the NSI group reported engaging in a variety of forms of NSI. The
total number of types of NSI that participants endorsed ranged from 1 (30.8%; n=8) to 11
(3.8%; n=l) types (M -3.35 types; S0=2.16). This mean, although slightly higher than
that found in recent samples of adolescents by Lloyd-Richardson, Perrine, Dierker, and
Kelley (2007), is consistent with other prior research indicating a multiplicity of
methodology of NSI (e.g., Favazza, 1992; Favazza & Conterio, 1988; Osuch, Noll, &
Putnam, 1999). Over one-quarter (26.0%; n=7) of the NSI participants endorsed two
types of NSI, and almost half (42.3%; n=l 1) endorsed three or more forms of these
behaviors. The most common types of NSI behaviors were cutting (66.7%; n = 16),
severe scratching (43.5%; n=10), subcutaneous insertion of sharp objects (43.5%; n=10),
punching self or objects (40.9%; n=9), and burning (34.8%; n=8).
NSI group participants reported ages of onset for any NSI behaviors ranging from
11 to 19 years, with a mean age of onset of 14.81 years (SD= 2.25 years). Within

101

individual types of NSI, age of onset ranged from 11-47 (M= 15.58 years; SD= 4.38).
Participants who reported cutting behavior were most likely to report a history of NSI
requiring medical attention (13.6%), although this did not differ significantly from the
proportions of NSI participants reporting other forms of NSI that required medical
treatment. Frequency of NSI across all types ranged from 2 to 54 or more episodes
(M=14.36 episodes; 579=13.4), with a multimodal frequency of 4 and 6 episodes.
Psychological Variables
Independent-samples t-tests were conducted to examine potential between group
differences on the SCL-90-R subscales and the BPI total score and Cut-20 subscale score
(see measures). Subscale scores derived for the SCL-90-R are standardized T-scores
based on norms from population subsets (e.g., clinical outpatients, clinical inpatients,
nonpatients). Given that some participants may have currently been in outpatient
treatment while others may not have been, thus requiring different norms for
such groups, raw scores on the SCL-90-R were used in the aforementioned t-tests.
Analyses of SCL-90-R raw scores revealed no significant between-group differences on
any scales; although a trend toward significance (i.e., .01 < p <.05) was observed for
scores on the Anxiety subscale (t{52)= 2.19; p=.035), with NSI participants scoring
higher (M=3.42; 579=4.29) than control participants (A/=l .43; SD= 1.81).
Independent-samples t-tests of BPI subscale scores revealed a significant
difference for the 20-item cutoff subscale (Cut-20; f(52)=4.05; pc.OO1), with NSI
participants (M= 4.27; 5/9=3.01) outscoring Control participants (M= 1.46; 579=2.01).
Tests of between-groups differences for BPI Total scores were also significant
(/(36)=3.34; p=.002). NSI participants (M= 12.71; 579=5.10) scored significantly higher
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on BPI Total scores than Control participants (M= 7.35; 50=4.69). The means were well
below the Cut-20 cutoff for both groups, even though they were significantly different.
Nonetheless, this finding is consistent with an emotion dysregulation model of NSI
considering the wealth of literature establishing BPD as a pervasive disorder of the
motion regulation system and the high prevalence of NSI in individuals diagnosed with
BPD (e.g., Linehan, 1993; Skodol et al., 2002a; 2002c), although both groups scored well
below clinical cut-off score of 10.
Independent-samples t-tests were also conducted to determine if SIAS scores
differed significantly between groups. These analyses revealed no significant differences
for the SIAS between NSI and control groups, with mean scores of 18.62 and 17.43 for
the NSI and control groups, respectively (/(52)= .37; p =.71). Furthermore, no significant
between-groups difference was found on SIAS scores for participants assigned to
different conditions (r(52)= -.23; p =.82).
Descriptive analyses of the modified version of the BSS revealed that 19.2% (n=5)
of the NSI group endorsed a current “weak desire” to self-injure themselves, with the
remaining 80.8% reporting no desire to self-injure. Broken down by cell, 60% (n=3) of
those endorsing any current urge to engage in NSI on the BSS at the end of the
experiment had been assigned to the Rejected condition, and 40% had been assigned to
the Neutral condition. This difference in proportions was not statistically significant (x2
[1,25] = .094;/ t=.76).
Notes on Cortisol Analyses
Baseline Measurement
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Fehm-Wolsdorf, Groth, Kaiser, and Hahlweg (1999), note that baseline cortisol
samples collected at the beginning of an experiment reflect stressful events occurring
prior to the experiment because of the cortisol response curve, which maximizes at 20-30
minutes following a stressful event. It was possible that cortisol levels in samples
collected earlier could have been affected by pre-experiment stress; or that the levels in
these samples were affected by stress induced before the manipulation (e.g., by
answering questions about psychological distress). Thus, for all cortisol analyses in the
present study, the post-conversational task sample (the second sample collected overall)
was used as the baseline measurement (rather than the post-relaxation baseline) for these
analyses for two reasons. First, cortisol response, as conceptualized in the present study,
was most accurately characterized by the difference in cortisol volume between the post
stressor (i.e., rejection/neutral feedback) measurement points and post-conversation task
measurement point immediately preceding the stressor (i.e. the post-conversational task
sample). Second, use of this particular measurement point was aimed at controlling for
any potential inflationary effects of social interaction on cortisol levels, and was deemed
a better choice than employment of statistical controls, such as including this
measurement point in a multiple analysis of covariance. The use of a second, pre-stress
sample as a baseline measurement has been employed successfully in previous
psychophysiological research involving analyses of cortisol and prolactin responses to
5HT ia and 5HT2A receptor agonists (Leone et al., 1998); heart rate, skin conductance,
and skin temperature in response to alcohol (Newlin & Thomson, 1991); prolactin
response following orgasm (Brody & Kruger, 2006); heart rate and blood pressure
response to medication (van Stegeren, Everaerd, & Gooren, 2002); and oxygen
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consumption and exercise performance during stress tests (Harris, LeMaitre, Mackenzie,
Fox, & Denvir, 2003).
Outliers
It is well established in the statistical literature that extreme scores may inflate (or
deflate) measures of central tendency, thus rendering inferential conclusions based on
these statistics less accurate (Winer, 1971). Box plot analyses conducted for cortisol data
in the current study revealed multiple outliers in each of the four cells for most time
intervals (see Table 2 below for the exact number of outliers by cell, time interval, and
type of outlier [high or low]). Experts have proposed multiple methods for handling such
data anomalies, including (1) leaving outlying data points in the data set; (2) removing
outlying data points from the data set; and (3) replacing outliers with more representative
values derived from the data set. The latter of these (outlier replacement, rather than
removal or inaction) was selected for cortisol analyses for three reasons.
First, the present study was a theory-driven pilot study, with no directly
comparable data from which to conclude that any outlying data points were anomalies
versus representative of the full range of cortisol secretion patterns in self-injurers. Thus
omitting the outliers from this data set had the potential to unnecessarily restrict the range,
possibly leading to a statistical mischaracterization of the actual data. Second, the cell
sizes for the present study were relatively small to begin with, and the potential loss of
the number of outliers that would have been omitted was likely to unnecessarily
compromise power, given that there were options available for transforming the data,
which would preserve cell size and power. Finally, the outlying data points extended far
enough beyond the upper and lower bounds of this data set that the probability that this
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minority of data points had an effect on the measures of central tendency for the majority
of the data was at least moderate. Thus, the principal investigator decided to employ a
Windsorization method of data transformation (Winer, 1971) for cortisol analyses, which
allowed for retention of the high and low outlying data points via replacing these data
with the values of the upper and lower bounds found within the larger sample.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 was tested using a 2 (GROUP) x 2 (CONDITION) x 5 (TIME)
repeated measures ANOVA. Groups in this general linear model included self-injuring
and control; conditions included “neutral” and “rejected;” and time was based on six
measurement points: pre-stressor baseline (Tl), 3-5 minutes post-stressor (T2), 20
minutes post-stressor (T3), 35 minutes post-stressor (T4), 50 minutes post-stressor (T5],
and 65 minutes post-stressor (T6). The factor “TIME” was measured in units of mean
cortisol level differences from baseline (CDbase) measurement, with each value equating
to the difference between the cortisol level at the respective measurement point and the
baseline cortisol level. For example, TIME 1 equals the difference in cortisol level
between Tl and T2; and TIME 2 equals the difference in cortisol level between Tl and
T3.
An initial series of repeated measures ANOVAs (Series 1) was performed on the
full sample. Table 4 (below) depicts mean cortisol levels and standard deviations for NSI
and control group participants separated by condition at each measurement point. Figure
2 (also below) depicts this same data in a graphical format, documenting mean changes
across time for each group in each condition. A test of requisite statistical assumptions
indicated that sphericity had been violated (x2= 94.49; p< .001; 8Greenhouse-Geisser= -494).
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Table 2. Number of Outliers Replaced by Cell, Time Interval, and Outlier Type
T2-T1
Total
(High/Low)

T3-T1
Total
(High/Low)

T4-T1
Total
(High/Low)

T5-T1
Total
(High/Low)

T6-T1
Total
(High/Low)

NSI
Rejected

3
(3/0)

2
(2/0)

1
(1/0)

1
(1/0)

0
(0/0)

Control
Rejected

3
(1/2)

2
(2/0)

2
(2/0)

2
(1/1)

1
(0/1)

NSI
Neutral

2
(1/1)

1
(1/0)

2
(2/0)

0
(0/0)

0
(0/0)

Control
Neutral

1
(1/0)

2
(2/0)

1
(1/0)

1
(1/0)

1
(1/0)

Therefore, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected ^-values were used for significance tests of
within-subjects effects for CDbasc scores.
Results of Series 1 ANOVA revealed no significant between-subjects main effect
for Group (F(l, 50)=.578; p=A5\ ri2=.011). However, as depicted in Table 3, a
significant within-subjects main effect was found for Time (F(2.18, 109.13)=45.179;
/K .001; T|2 = .62). Across both groups and conditions, CDbase scores for T2-T1 were
significantly higher than CDbase T3-T1 (p=.001), CDbaSe T4-T1 (p<.001), CDbase T5-T1
(p<.001), and CDbase T6-T1 (p<.001). CDbase scores for T3-T1 were significantly higher
than CDbase T4-T1 (p<.001), CDbase T5-T1 (p<.001), and CDbase T6-T1 (/X.001).
Additionally, CDbasc scores for T4-T1 were significantly higher than CDbasc T5-T1
(/K.005) and CDbase T6-T1 (/K.001). However, CDbase scores for T5-T1 were not
significantly different from CDbaSe T6-T1 (p=. 173).
In sum, the main effect found for Time suggested that regardless of group or
condition assignment, participants’ change in cortisol levels (CDbase) was, on average,
both positive and significantly higher at the first post-stressor measurement point than at
any of the subsequent measurements points. Results of Series 1 ANOVA also suggested
that the subsequent CDbase scores progressively decreased following the stressor, with
each CDbase being significantly lower than the previous score, with the exception of the
T5-T1/T6-T1 comparison, which indicated a nonsignificant difference in these CDbase
scores. Interestingly, all CDbase scores subsequent to the first post-stressor measurement
point were negative, indicating that the mean cortisol levels at these measurement points
were below the baseline measurement point. This finding is curious and warrants further
exploration.
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Table 3. Series 1 Windsorized Mean Cortisol Difference (CDbase) Scores
for NSI and Control Groups by Time Interval Across Groups and
Condition
Time
Interval

Mean CDbase
Scores (pg/dL )

SE

T2-T1

,01332bcde

.0041

T3-T1

-.00117cde

.0036

T4-T1

-,01721de

.0038

T5-T1

-.02613

.0042

T6-T1

-.03228

.0043

Notes: All differences are significant at p<.001; a=difference is significantly higher than T2-T1;
b= difference is significantly higher than T3-T1; c= difference is significantly higher than T4-T1;
d= difference is significantly higher than T5-T1; e= difference is significantly higher than T6-T1

Results of Series 1 repeated measures ANOVA also revealed a significant betweensubjects main effect for Condition (F( 1, 50)=10.54; p=.002; ti2=. 174).
Across all times and groups, the CDbase score for those participants assigned to the
Neutral condition (M=-.00254 pg/dL; SE= .00459 pg/dL) was significantly greater than
that of Rejection condition participants (A/=-.02285 pg/dL; SE= .00426 pg/dL). Because
both of these means are negative, it may be inferred that the robust effect of each
condition resulted in a decrease in cortisol across time and group; however, the larger
negative mean of the Rejection condition suggests that this group’s cortisol levels
decreased further on average than those participants in the Neutral condition. Although
no formal a priori hypothesis was made regarding this effect, this finding was
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counterintuitive, in that it was expected that cortisol levels would increase in those
participants who were “rejected.”
A significant 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect was also found (F(l .98.
109.13) =7.75; p=.001; rj2=. 13), such that, for participants in the Rejected condition, T2T1 CDbase scores were significantly greater than CDbase T3-T1, CDbase T4-T1, CDbase T5Tl, and CDbase T6-T1. Additionally, participants assigned to the Neutral condition
evidenced significantly greater (F(1.98, 109.13)=7.75; p=,001; r/2=A3) CDbase scores than
participants in the Rejected condition at T6-T1. The a priori hypotheses of the present
study did not directly speak to this comparison; however, this finding is nonetheless
counterintuitive. The cortisol difference scores for both Neutral and Rejection
participants were also negative at the T6-T1 juncture, indicating that both groups tended
to experience decreases in cortisol levels. Consequently, this latter finding suggests that
participants in the Neutral condition tended to have smaller decreases in cortisol than
participants in the Rejection condition.
Furthermore, a significant 2 (Group) x 5 (Time) interaction effect was also found
(F(1.98, 109.13)=5.19; p=.007; tj2=.094), such that, for participants in the NSI group,
T2-T1 CDbase scores were significantly greater than CDbase T5-T1, CDbaSe scores. For
Control participants, T2-T1 CDbase scores were significantly greater than T4-T1, T5-T1,
and T6-T1 CDbase scores.
Of most relevance to Hypothesis 1, Series 1 repeated measures ANOVA revealed
no significant 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect (F(1.98,
109.13) =.86; p=A3\ ?/2=.017). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported by the results of
these analyses.
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It was possible that extraneous variables such as caffeine or alcohol consumption
contributed to a lack of significant findings in these analyses. Therefore, a follow-up
repeated measures ANOVA (Series 2) on a reduced data set in which the 11 participants
who reported having been non-adherent to pre-experimental dietary restrictions (no
participants reported being non-adherent to pre-experimental behavioral restrictions)
were removed. Similar to Series 1 ANOVAs, a violation of the sphericity assumption
was indicated (x2- 90.04; p< .001; fxjreenhouse-Geisscr= .432). Thus, Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected p-values were also used for Series 2 significance tests of within-subjects effects
for CDbase scores.
Consistent with the initial ANOVA, the results of Series 2 ANOVAs revealed no
significant between-subjects main effect for Group (F(l, 39)=.244;p=.62; rj2=.006).
Also in accordance with initial analyses, Series 2 ANOVA revealed a robust, significant
within-subjects main effect for Time (F( 1.94, 75.68)=39.38;p<.001; r/2=.502), with a
pattern of CDbase scores that was identical to that of Series 1 in both proportion and
degree of significance (all /v<.005). As found in Series 1 ANOVA, Series 2 analyses
revealed a significant between-subjects main effect for Condition (F(l, 39)=8.04; p=.007;
T72=.171). Across all times and groups, the CDbase score for those participants assigned to
the Neutral condition (A/=-.00329 pg/dL; SE - .00519 pg/dL) was significantly greater
than that of Rejection condition participants (M=~.02337 pg/dL; SE= .00482 pg/dL).
O nce again, both o f these m eans are negative, indicating that the effect o f each condition

resulted in a decrease in cortisol across time and group.
Also consistent with Series 1 ANOVA, Series 2 ANOVA revealed a significant 2
(Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect (F(1.73, 75.67)=9.88; /X.001; rj2=.202). The
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pattern of CDbase score differences were identical to that of Series 1 ANOVA. Similarly,
“neutral” participants demonstrated significantly greater (p<.01) CDbase scores than
“rejected” participants for T6-T1. However, in contrast to Series 1, no significant 2
(Group) x 5 (Time) interaction effect (F( 1.73, 75.67)=3.94;p=.03; 72=.092) was found.
Finally, tests of within-subjects interaction effects revealed no significant 2 (Group)
x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect (F( 1.73, 75.67)=1.11;p=.33; ?/2=.028).
Thus, even with the potential effects of caffeine and alcohol on cortisol controlled for,
these data were not supportive of Hypothesis 1. It is also important to note that
controlling for these factors involved omitting a subset (n=l 1) equal to about one-fifth of
the total sample (n=54) from statistical analyses, which further lowered the power of this
design.
Due to the potential effects of covariance from external factors on cortisol
responses, a 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) repeated measures ANCOVA for
CDbase scores was also conducted using SCL-90-R Anxiety scores and Gender as
covariates. It was hypothesized that holding both of these factors constant would result
in the significant differences hypothesized in Hypothesis 1. A p -value of .05 was set for
this test.
Results of this ANCOVA indicated that neither SCL-90-R Anxiety scores
(F(2.20, 105.81)=2.34; p=. 11; ti2=.046), nor Gender (F(2.20, 105.81)=1.38; p=.26;
r|2=.028) was significantly related to cortisol responses. This analysis also revealed a
significant between-subjects main effect for Condition (F(l, 48)=10.50; p=.002; r|2=. 18).
Across all times and groups, the CDbase score for those participants assigned to the
Neutral condition (M=-.023 (ig/dL; SE= .00464 pg/dL) was significantly greater than that
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of Rejection condition participants (A/= -.00233 pg/dL; SE= .00431 pg/dL).
Furthermore, a significant 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect was also found
(F(2.20, 105.81 )=9.19; /?<.001; r|2=.16), such that Rejected participants (A/=-.05246
pg/dL; SE= .00585 pg/dL) had significantly lower CDbasc scores at T6-T1 than Neutral
participants (M—.01208 pg/dL; SE= .0063 pg/dL) at T6-T1(F(1, 48)=10.50; p=.002;
p2=.18).
Finally, identical to Series 1 and 2 ANOVAs, repeated measures ANCOVA
revealed no significant 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect (F(2.20,
105.81)=.63; p=.55; ?/=.013). Thus, even when potential covariates were held constant,
Hypothesis 1 was not supported by the results of these analyses.
Hypothesis 2
Between-groups differences in DERS scores were tested using MANOVA with
Bonferroni correction to control for Type I error rates, which are known to be inflated
when between-groups differences are analyzed for multiple potentially related dependent
variables. A p-value criterion of .01 was set for all analyses. NS1 participants scored
significantly higher than control group participants on Nonacceptance of Emotional
Responses (F(l, 52)= 8.63; p =.005), Lack of Emotional Awareness (F(l, 52)= 9.43; p
=.003), Limited Access to Emotion Regulation Strategies (F(l, 52)= 8.75; p =.005), and
Lack of Emotional Clarity (F(l, 52)= 9.82; p =.003). The between-groups difference for
Impulse Control Difficulties indicated a strong trend toward significance (F(l, 52)= 4.21;
p =.045), with NSI participants scoring higher than control group participants. The
between groups difference for the Difficulties Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior
subscale was not significant (F(l, 52)= 1.31; p = 26). Mean scores and standard
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deviations of DERS subscales, and effect sizes for between-groups differences are
displayed in Table 4.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 was contingent on the results of Hypothesis 1. Because there was not a
significant interaction effect between Group, Time, and Condition, Hypothesis 3 could
not be tested as stated. Thus, a post hoc revision of Hypothesis 3 (Hypothesis 3a),
proposing that DERS subscale scores would correlate significantly and positively with
CDbase scores was forwarded. An additional post hoc hypothesis (Hypothesis 3b)
proposed that, because cortisol secretion is an index of HPAA functioning, which is in
turn an index of emotional reguladon/dysregulation, raw cortisol levels would correlate
significantly and positively with DERS in the full sample and sub-samples. Hypotheses
3a and 3b were tested using Pearson bivariate product-moment correlations.
Hypothesis 3a
Results of correlational analyses for the full sample revealed no significant
correlations between any of the DERS subscales and any CDbase scores: CDbase T2-T1
(all/w>.10); CDbase T3-T1 (all ps>M); CDbase T4-T1 (all ps>.39); CDbase T5-T1 (all
ps>.28); and CDbase T6-T1 (all / m > . 13). Similarly, no significant correlations were found
between any of the DERS subscales and any C D t e e scores in the Control group:

C D base

T2-T1 (allps>. 12); C D base T3-T1 (all ps>.\7); C D basc T4-T1 (allps>.28);

T5-T1

(all ps>. 12); and C D base T6-T1 (all ps>.21).
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Table 4. Series 1 Windsorized Mean Cortisol Difference (CDbase) Scores (pg/dL )for NS1 and Control Groups by
Condition
T2-T1

T3-T1

T4-T1

T5-T1

T6-T1

NSI
Rejected
(SD)

.0077
(.0258)

-.0067
(.0215)

-.0276
(.0251)

-.0484
(.0306)

-.0394
(.0240)

Control
Rejected
(SD)

.0229
(.0423)

-.0001
(.0305)

-.0294
(.0339)

-.0407
(.0401)

-.0720
(.0326)

NSI
Neutral
(SD)

.0109
(.0084)

.0060
(.0199)

-.0067
(.0243)

-.0789
(.0295)

-.0036
(.0415)

Control
Neutral
(SD)

.0121
(.0303)

-.0001
(.0294)

-.0092
(.0293)

-.0136
(.0201)

-.0199
(.0267)

Figure 2. Series 1 Windsorized Mean Cortisol Difference Scores ((ig/dL) for NSI and Control Groups by
Condition Across Time

T2-T1 T3-T1 T4-T1 T5-T1 T6-T1

NSI-R
- CON-R
NSI-N
• CON-N

Notes: NSI-R= NSI Rejected; CON-R= Control Rejected; NSI-N= NSI Neutral; CON-N= Control Neutral

Table 5. Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Subscales____________________________________
NSI
(SD)

Control
(SD)

D

NONACCEPTANCE

12.31**
(6.49)

8.43
(2.5)

.79

STRATEGIES

14.58**
(6.47)

10.57
(2.97)

.79

AWARENESS

16.35**
(5.7)

12.18
(4.21)

.83

CLARITY

10.81**
(4.14)

7.96
(2.35)

.85

IMPULSE

9.35*
(4.99)

7.29
(1.76)

.55

GOALS

13.92
(5.37)

12.18
(5.79)

.31

Notes: *p<.05;** p<.01

Correlational analyses of the NSI sample revealed a significant correlation (r=.427;
p=.03) between the DERS Difficulties Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior subscale and
CDbase T3-T1. All other correlations in this subsample analysis were nonsignificant:
CDbasc T2-T1 (all ps>.23); CDbase T4-T1 (all ps>.07); CDtee T5-T1 (all /w>.31); and
C D bas(; T 6 -T 1 (a ll ps~>.2\).

Hypothesis 3b
Correlational analyses of mean raw cortisol levels and mean DERS subscale
scores in the full sample revealed no significant relationships among these variables: T1
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(all ps>.0 7 T2 (all ps>.07); T3 (all /w>.08); T4 (all ps>.23); T5 (allps>.06); and T6 (all
ps>.26). Analyses of Control group participants revealed a significant correlation (r=.394; p<.038) between the DERS Difficulties Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior
subscale and raw cortisol level at T3, suggesting that greater difficulties with goaldirected behavior were associated with lower cortisol levels 35 minutes post-stressor for
Control group participants. All other correlations in this subsample analysis were
nonsignificant: T1 (all /w>.08); T2 (all /«>.10); T4 (all /w>.18); T5 (all /«>.14); and T6
(all ps>. 12). Finally, bivariate analyses of the NSI sample revealed no significant
relationships between raw cortisol data and DERS subscales: T1 (all ps>.06); T2 (all
/v>.14); T3 (all ps>.\ 1); T4 (all ps>.\ 1); T5 (all ps>.22); and T6 (all /«>.15).
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 was tested using a series of Pearson bivariate product-moment
correlations to evaluate the strength of the relationship between mean PANAS positive
affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) scores and respective salivary cortisol level
differences (C D b a se ) at each of the five post-stressor measurement points in both groups
and both conditions. Individual correlational analyses were not significant for NSI
Rejected (all ps>.067); NSI Neutral (all ps>.086); Control Rejected (all /?.?>. 135); or
Control Neutral (all /v>.131). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not supported by these analyses,
suggesting that there was not a unique relationship between post-baseline differences in
cortisol secretion and PA or NA in any of the cells in this study.
Post-hoc Hypotheses and Analyses
In addition to the above hypotheses, two post-hoc hypotheses were tested. First, a
2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) interaction effect for PANAS NA and PA scores
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was hypothesized. Specifically, it was hypothesized that NSI Rejected Participants
would have significantly higher mean differences from baseline in negative affect and
significantly lower mean differences from baseline in positive affect than participants in
other cells at each post-baseline measurement point. Second, a 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition)
x 2 (Gender) x 5 (Time) interaction effect for CDbase scores was hypothesized and tested.
Positive Affect
Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed on the full sample. The results of
these ANOVAs are presented below in text and in Table 5 and Figure 3. Similar to
ANOVAs for cortisol data, a test of requisite statistical assumptions indicated that
sphericity had been violated (x2= 35.51; p< .001; Scireenhouse-Geisser= -732). Therefore,
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values were once again used for significance tests of
within-subjects effects for P A score differences from baseline
Results of A N O V A for P A N A S

P A D b a se

(P A D b a s c

scores).

scores revealed no significant between-

subjects main effect for Group (F( 1, 50)=.64; p=A3; r\2=.013) or Condition (F(l,
50)=1.91;p = .\l t]2=.037). Conversely, a significant within-subjects main effect was
found for Time (F(3.31, 165.82)=5.74; p=.001; q2 = .103). However, none of the inter
interval differences was significant at a priori levels (allps_> .012).
Results of this ANOVA also revealed no significant interaction effects for 2
(Group) x 2 (Condition) (F (l, 50)=.13;p=.72; q2=.003); 2 (Group) x 5 (Time) (F (2.93,
146.40)=.61; p=.60; q 2=.012); 2 (C ondition) x 5 (Tim e) ( F ( 2.93, 146.40)=.38; p= 76;

q2=.008); 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) (F (2.93, 146.40)=.54;p=.65; q2=.011)
comparisons.
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Table 6. Mean PANAS Positive Affect Score Differences (PADbase) for NSI and Control Groups by Condition
T2-T1

T3-T1

T4-T1

T5-T1

T6-T1

NSI
Rejected
(SD)

-2.43
(4.69)

-1.86
(4.11)

-3.57
(4.40)

-3.43
(4.01)

-4.29
(4.56)

Control
Rejected
(SD)

-2.67
(3.20)

-1.87
(5.28)

-3.73
(4.32)

-4.20
(5.97)

-5.13
(6.50)

NSI
Neutral
(SD)

-.25
(1.91)

-1.17
(2.76)

-2.0
(2.63)

-1.75
(2.70)

-2.50
(3.63)

Control
Neutral
(SD)

-2.46
(3.20)

-.62
(3.45)

-3.62
(4.21)

-2.69
(.0201)

-2.69
(4.85)

Figure 3. Mean PANAS Positive Affect Score Differences (PADbase) for NSI and Control Groups by Condition

NSI-R
CON-R
-±-NSI-N
CON-N

Notes: NSI-R= NSI Rejected; CON-R= Control Rejected; NSI-N =N SI Neutral; CON-N= Control Neutral

Negative Affect
Repeated measures ANOVAs were also performed on the full sample for PANAS
NA data. The results of these ANOVAs are presented below in text and in Table 6 and
Figure 4. Here too, the requisite statistical assumptions indicated that sphericity had been
violated (%2= 90.77;p< .001; fioreenhouse-Geisser= .602). Therefore, Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected p-values were used for significance tests of within-subjects effects forNA score
differences from baseline (NADbase scores). Results of the ANOVA for PANAS NADbase
scores revealed no significant between-subjects main effect for Group (F(l, 50)=. 103;
p=. 75; r|2=.033), or Condition (F (l, 50)=19; p=.67; r|2=.004). The test of the withinsubjects main effect of Time was also nonsignificant (F(2.41, 120.38)=3.31; p=.032;
q2=.062). Results of this ANOVA also revealed no significant 2 (Group) x 2 (Condition)
(F(l , 50)=.59;p=.45; r|2=.012); 2 (Group) x 5 (Time) (F(2.41, 120.38)=. 1.69;p=. 18;
r|2= 033); 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) (F(2.41, 120.38)=1.69;p=.18; r ^ . 022); or 2 (Group)
x 2 (Condition) x 5 (Time) (F(2.41, 120.38)=.522;p=.63; q2=.01) interaction effects.
Gender Interactions
A repeated measures ANOVA was also performed on the full sample with gender
included as a between-subjects factor (in addition to Group and Condition) to test for
main and interaction effects of this variable on CDbase scores, which may not have been
detected in the ANCOVA discussed earlier. As with all previously described ANOVAs,
the sphericity assumption was violated (y?= 72.55; p< .001; Soreenhouse-oeisser= -554), and
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values were used for significance tests of within-subjects
effects for CDbase score differences (see Figure 5 below for Gender comparisons).

122

Results of this post hoc ANOVA for CDbaSe scores revealed no significant
between-subjects main effect of Gender (F( 1,46)=2.02; p=.16; r|2=.042). Additionally,
no interaction effects were found for Gender x Condition (F(l, 46)=.22; p=.65; t|2=.006),
or Gender x Time (F(2.22, 101.99)=.73; p=.50; rj2=.016) comparisons. However, a
significant three-way interaction effect was found for Gender x Group x Time (F(2.22,
101.99) =5.43; /7=.004; q2=.l 1). This interaction indicated that: (1) mean CDbase scores
for NSI males were significantly higher at T2-T1 than T4-T1, T5-T1, and T6-T1 CDbase
scores; (2) mean C D baSe scores for Control males were significantly higher at T2-T1 than
T4-T1, T5-T1, and T6-T1

C D base

scores; and (3) mean C D base scores for Control females

were significantly higher T2-T1 than T6-T1. This comparison also indicated that mean
CDbase scores for NSI females were significantly higher than mean CDbase scores for
Control females at T6-T1; and that mean CDbase scores for Control males were
significantly higher at T3-T1 than T6-T1.
Although a three-way Group x Condition x Time was not found (F(2.22,
101.99) = 1.26; p=.29; tj2=.027), a four-way interaction effect was found for the Gender x
Group x Condition x Time comparison (F(2.22, 101.99)=5.61; p=.004; rj2=. 11). This
interaction revealed that: (1) mean CDbase scores for NSI Rejected females were
significantly higher than Control Rejected females at T6-T1; and (2) mean CDbase scores
for Control Neutral males were significantly higher than Control Rejected females at T4T l, T5-T1, and T6-T1.

123

Table 7. Mean l1AN AS Negative Affect Score Differences (NADhase) for NST and Control Groups by Condition
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T2-T1

T3-T1

T4-T1

T5-T1

T6-T1

NSI
Rejected
(SD)

1.36
(2.37)

-.21
(1.97)

-.21
(1.72)

<.0001
(1.88)

-.36
(2.24)

Control
Rejected
(SD)

1.20
(1.90)

-.40
(1.99)

.47
(1.77)

.73
(2.34)

1.07
(3.08)

NSI
Neutral
(SD)

.83
(3.46)

.0833
(3.20)

.50
(3.40)

<.0001
(1.35)

-.0833
(2.68)

Control
Neutral
(SD)

.0769
(.95)

<.0001
(.71)

-.23
(.73)

.23
(.73)

.23
(1.01)

Figure 4. MeanPANAS Negative Affect Score Differences (NADbase) for NSI and Control Groups by Condition

T2-T1 T3-T1 T4-T1 T5-T1 T6-T1

NSI-R
CON-R
NSI-N
CON-N

Notes: N SI-R=N SI Rejected; CON-R= Control Rejected; N S I-N = N SI Neutral; CON-N= Control Neutral

Figure 5. Mean C D baSe Scores (jig/dL) by Gender by Time Across Condition

T2-T1 T3-T1 T4-T1 T5-T1 T6-T1

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Non-suicidal self-injury, in all of its various forms, is a dangerous and poorly
understood behavior. Despite the myriad explanations that have been forwarded, the
exact etiology and functions of NSI remain debatable. The most comprehensive, and
arguably most viable, explanatory theory in the study of this clinical phenomenon has
historically been the biopsychosocial model. Although some peripheral evidence has
been found to support the biological component of this model (e.g., Cassano, Latanzi,
Pini, Osso, Battistini, & Cassano, 2001; Chengappa et al., 1999), this aspect of the
theorem has nonetheless remained without direct and systematic empirical support.
The present study aimed to examine one potential avenue of biological emotional
dysregulation in self-injurers by assessing HPAA functioning using analysis of cortisol
secretion as a proxy measure. The guiding principle of this research was that, if a
biological difference in stress response was observed in individuals who engage in NSI
compared to healthy individuals who do not, this would contribute to a more complete
understanding of NSI by providing evidence of a specific biological factor that may
mitigate this behavioral pathology. This research was aimed at providing evidence of the
convergence of self-report and biological indices of emotional regulation, so that the
relationship between emotional dysregulation and NSI could be better understood.
The data reported in this paper were evidentiary of support for some hypotheses,
but not for others. The primary hypothesis of this study was that, when exposed to an
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uncontrollable, socially evaluative interpersonal situation in which they were rejected,
individuals who engage in NSI would exhibit significantly higher levels of cortisol from
baseline than psychologically healthy individuals experiencing the same rejection. The
ANOVAs conducted to evaluate this hypothesis found no supporting evidence of such an
effect. This remained true even when accounting for the potential effects of alcohol and
caffeine consumption via removal of potentially contaminated samples.
Although none of the hypothesized quantitative differences in cortisol were
significant a number of interesting qualitative patterns were observed in these data. First,
examination of Figure 2 indicates a somewhat contra-hypothetical finding. As
hypothesized, there were initial increases in cortisol levels for participants in each cell
following the stressor. However, the highest increases were found in the Control
Rejected cell, and the lowest increases were found for the NSI Rejected cell. It was
proposed that NSI Rejected participants would exhibit the highest initial cortisol
secretions. Conversely, these results seem to indicate that this cell scored just slightly
lower on average than even those participants in both groups assigned to the Neutral
condition.
Although it was comprised of non-significant between-groups differences, the
above pattern merits exploration. These differences are not likely to be accounted for by
differences in interpersonal sensitivity or social anxiety, as NSI participants actually
reported slightly, but not significantly (p=.7\ ), higher scores on the SIAS. The NSI
Rejected cell evidenced lower CDbase scores at T2-T1 than all other cells, including
Control Rejected participants, however the difference was not significant. Another
intriguing, though not significant, pattern was observable in the data in Figure 2. NSI
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participants (irrespective of condition) tended to exhibit progressive decreases in CDbase
scores across time up to 50 minutes post-baseline, followed by a slight increase in
cortisol response at 65 minutes post-baseline; whereas Control participants (regardless of
condition) exhibited a progressive decrease in CDbase scores that continued for the
duration of the experiment. Furthermore, the largest decreases in CDbase scores were also
in the NSI group, with the NSI Neutral cell evidencing the largest drop at C D haSe T5-T1.
This is a complex pattern of data that does not easily lend itself to a simple explanation.
Examination of the data suggests two primary possibilities for the pattern of
results described above. One possibility is that the normal cortisol response to stress was
inhibited or blunted in these self-injurers. Indeed, HPAA dysfunction may be
characterized by either a hyper- or hypocortisolemic response. Another potential
explanation is that the cortisol response in self-injurers is delayed. This would be
supported by the gradual rise that was observed across NSI participants in both
conditions. In this vein, it’s possible that the measurement simply failed to capture a
difference in cortisol response because the timing of collections ended at 65 minutes
post-stressor and the cortisol response window is far more protracted for self-injurers.
Nonetheless, any inferences in this regard are attenuated by a lack of significance and
remain strictly hypothetical.
The cortisol data in the present study may interface with the emotion regulationbiopsychosocial model in a unique way, and theoretically portend other biological
mechanisms for NSI to function. Although cortisol secretion patterns are proximally
reflective of emotion regulation vis-a-vis HPAA functioning, and theoretically should be
different in self-injurers than psychologically healthy controls, other biological systems
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may be dysregulated in those who engage in NSI. In fact, while the HPAA is a central
mechanism for emotional regulation, it is certainly not the only tract for this process. For
example, emotion regulation also involves the orbital-frontal cortex, anterior cingulate
cortex, and the amygdala; disruption in any of these circuits has been associated with
impulsivity and violence in some prior research (Davidson, Putnam, & Larson, 2000).
Previous pharmacological research has also documented that the mechanism of action of
some anticonvulsant compounds in Bipolar disordered patients operates through
reduction of amygdala reactivity to emotional stimuli (e.g., Drevets et al., 2002; Krystal
et al., 2002) and limitation of electrical activity in the anterior cingulate cortex. At the
molecular level, anticonvulsants appear to work by potentiating the inhibitory
neurotransmitter gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) and stabilizing the neuronal
membrane at the sodium ion channel through inhibiting the release of aspartate and
glutamate (Blumberg et al., 2000; Chengappa et al., 1999; Krystal et al., 2002;
Theoharides, Dessain, & Shuster, 1992). This research suggests that any of these
neurochemicals may offer an alternative to cortisol as biological mechanisms (or
biomarkers) of emotional dysregulation in individuals who self-injure.
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that an association exists between
beginning anticonvulsant treatment and decreases in the frequency of NSI in certain
patient populations (Cassano, Latanzi, Pini, Osso, Battistini, & Cassano, 2001;
Chengappa et al., 1999). For example, in Chengappa and colleagues’ study of
Topiramate (an anticonvulsant) for the treatment of mania, the authors reported an
ancillary finding of “near abolition of self-mutilation” (Chengappa et al., 1999, p.5) in
two of their Bipolar Disordered participants who were diagnosed with comorbid BPD.
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Similarly, Cassano et al. (2001) reported that administration of Topiramate was
associated with three-month cessation of NSI in a BPD/Bipolar Disorder woman after
two weeks of medication, and a subsequent nine-month cessation of NSI following
resumption of this anticonvulsant. Interestingly, the NSI cessation occurred in absence of
any change in depressive symptoms. This is contrasted with work by Colman, Newman,
Schopflocher, Bland, and Dyck (2004) that found depression to be a primary predictor of
“repeat parasuicide,” although this latter study employed an International Classification
of Diseases-9 definition that also includes suicide attempts. Nonetheless, this research
suggests a biological component to emotion dysregulation may be operating in NSI, but it
also suggests that other systems may be more integral to the relationship between this
behavior and emotion regulation than the HPAA. For example, dysregulation (excesses
or deficiencies) of electrical activity in the orbital-frontal or cingulate cortexes during
distress could disrupt executive functioning, and lead to increased impulsive behaviors
and reduced inclinations toward self-preserving behaviors. In this vein, future research
examining activation of these neural regions using either fMRI or PET imaging of NSI
individuals during tasks inducing frustration or negative affect may be useful in
furthering the understanding the neural correlates of emotion regulation/dysregulation in
NSI.
Alternatively, research has also indicated that chemical stimulation of the central
nucleus of the amygdala by glutamate, the secretion of which is inhibited by
anticonvulsant compounds, is associated with pronounced cardiovascular reactivity and
gastroenterological activity (e.g., ulceration, gastric acid production). These effects of
glutaminergic stimulation are associated with poor regulation of (i.e. chronic) anxiety and
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fear. Indeed, the dense array of corticotropin releasing hormone (CRH) receptors and
nerve tracts in the amygdala make this structure vulnerable to influxes of CRH (DeSouza,
Insel, Perrin, Rivier, Vale, & Kuhar, 1985; Uryu, Okumura, Shibasaki, & Sakanaka,
1992). Such influxes are associated with anxiogenic effects. Substantial research
indicates that fear responses are attenuated in many species by the introduction locally of
GABA or GABA agonists, opiatergic agonists, benzodiazepines, and glutamate
antagonists, among others (e.g., Gallagher, Kapp, McNall, & Pascoe, 1981; Gallagher,
Kapp, & Pascoe, 1982; Helmsetter, 1993; Roozendaal, Wiersma, Driscoll, Koolhaas, &
Bohus, 1992; Shibata, Kataoka, Yamashita, & Ueki, 1986; Sullivan, Henke, Ray, Herbert,
and Trimper, 1989; Takao, Nagatani, Kasahara, Hashimoto, 1992). Thus, a failure to
inhibit glutamate may result in hyperstimulation of key areas of the amygdala involved in
emotion regulation, in turn resulting in decreased stability of neuronal activity in this
structure. Decreased stability of neuronal activity may result in decreased overall
regulation of emotional behaviors.
As the above discussion of neurobiology pertains to emotion dysregulation and
NS1 etiology, it is possible that a lower threshold for emotional dysregulation in selfinjurers exists. If this is the case, such a lower threshold may be related to higher
densities of CRH receptors in the amygdala, more frequent pulses of CRH released into
the amygdala, poor inhibition of glutamate, or a combination of these factors. To date,
no known research has addressed any of these questions in self-injurers.
It is also important to note that, while the aim of this study was to provide
evidence of convergence between physiological and self-report modalities of emotional
regulation measurement, there is ample stress-induction literature to suggest that similar
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discrepancies are commonly found in this type of research design. Linden’s (2004)
extensive treatment of the stress research literature accurately notes that it is generally
rare for biomarkers of stress to be synchronous with self-report measures. Indeed, the
majority of studies find a correlation between subjective ratings and physiological
measures of r < .3, with subjective stress ratings accounting only infrequently for over
10% of variance in physiology (Linden, 1987). Earlier work by Pennebaker (1982) found
substantial differences in research participants’ willingness and capacity to identify and
disclose changes in their physiological states. The subjective-objective index
discrepancies are likely related to a combination of such reluctance with people’s reliance
on situational cues for information about their internal state, and the fact that there are
very few connections between consciousness and the functions of the central nervous
system (Linden, 2004). The aggregate findings from the stress response literature fit with
the biopsychosocial model of NSI in that they portend interactive, yet differentially
weighted, effects o f biology/physiology, social dynamics, and psychological processes.
In short, stress research indicates that there are several biological, psychological, and
contextual factors that, in concert with each other, determine an individual’s stress
response; and the relative importance of these factors is likely to be idiographic.
Alternatively, some models of the stress response (Cox & McKay, 1978), or stress
regulation, posit that a stress response to a “demand situation” is mediated by one’s
cognitive appraisal (i.e. perception) of the demand-to-coping resources ratio. This is also
amenable to a biopsychosocial approach in that the same three components are
represented, required, and interactive in such a model. Here, an imbalance in this ratio in
which there are more demands than resources to deal with those demands results in
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stress. Thus, “demand”is comprised of actual demand characteristics of the environment
plus one’s learning history and idiographic differences of the individual; resources for
coping are comprised of a similar combination of factors (i.e. actual resources plus
learning and personal history differences). This model is akin to information-processing
models of stress responses (Hamilton, 1980), where stress is defined based on the
individual’s evaluation of the personal significance of the stress-inducing stimulus and
learning history with available coping strategies (e.g., have the resources been sufficient
in the past?).
Accordingly, the stressor in the present study may have been judged to be
insignificant or meaningless by participants for multiple reasons. First, the stressor was
brief and singular, rather than protracted and chronic. The duration of this stressor may
have thus been insufficient to engender salience for participants, resulting in a cognitive
appraisal of the stressor as non-threatening, or simply not stressful. Additionally, the
stressor may have lacked direct personal relevance because the rejection did not originate
from a personal acquaintance or a friend. Another consideration here is that almost 50%
of the sample suspected that they had been deceived in some way, which had the
potential to impact these participants’ stress response.
Alternatively, this stressor may have been consonant with the expectations of selfinjurers who were rejected for typical outcomes in social scenarios. Essentially, it is
possible that rejected self-injurers have either simply habituated to rejection or have such
low self-esteem that they anticipate such rejection. This possibility is supported
theoretically by Linehan’s (1993a) concept of the invalidating environment (which is
often characterized by rejection) as a spawning pool for self-destructive behaviors. The
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possibility that poor self-regard played a role in the cortisol secretion changes would be
supported peripherally in work by Scarpa and Luscher (2001), which revealed that self
esteem mediated the relationship between depression and cortisol reactivity. In this
study, Scarpa and Luscher found that low self-esteem was associated with decreases in
cortisol response to an uncontrollable laboratory stressor in depressed participants, while
the reverse was found for high self-esteem. Applied to these results, it is possible that
lower self-esteem in NSI participants affected cortisol reactivity by producing decreases
in cortisol secretion in response to stress. However this would not account for the same
pattern being observed in Control participants. Future research involving similar stressinduction may benefit from having a longer-lasting, more personally relevant, and more
effectively deceptive stressor; however, this must be balanced with ethical demands.
Despite the lack of support for Hypothesis 1, partial support was found for other a
priori predictions. Among those hypotheses that were at least partially supported was the
hypothesis that NSI participants would report significantly more difficulties with emotion
regulation. This hypothesis was partially supported in that between-groups differences
were significant for most DERS subscales. Specifically, participants in the NSI group
reported significantly greater difficulties with emotional clarity, accessing emotion
regulation strategies, acceptance of emotional responses, and emotional awareness than
Control participants. These results suggest that self-injuring participants in this study
perceived themselves as struggling with these aspects of emotion regulation more so than
non-self-injurers did, and are accordant with the psychological aspect of the
biopsychosocial model. This feature may suggest a psychological substrate for NSI. If
individuals who engage in NSI believe they have fewer coping skills in general (or that

135

they lack the requisite coping skills for a given situation), then they may be less likely
attempt to use adaptive coping strategies that are not self-destructive. Again, from and
informational processing perspective, if the cognitive appraisal of the demand resources
ratio suggests that one’s skills are insufficient for the situation, then distress and selfdestruction may ensue. Over time, a general lack of self-efficacy for coping with distress
may develop and create a perpetually self-fulfilling prophecy (i.e. “I couldn’t cope with
X before, I still don’t have what it takes to get through X now, so why try anything
different when nothing will change.”).
Conversely, NSI participants did not report significantly more difficulties with
engaging in goal-directed behavior. Given that such behaviors can be instrumental to
emotion regulation, it is unclear why this may be. One potential explanation for a lack of
a significant difference in difficulties with goal-directed behaviors is that NSI may be
viewed by the self-injurer as a goal-directed behavior in and of itself. So, for example,
when someone who self-injurers endorses “When I’m upset, I have difficulty thinking
about anything else,” as applying to them 0-10% of the time, this may be because they
know that they have their self-injury to focus on. This is supported by both emerging
quantitative research (e.g., Himber, 1994; Whitlock, Muehlenkamp, & Eckenrode, in
press) and more qualitative, literary depictions of NSI (Miskec & McGee, 2007; Strong,
1998) suggesting that this behavior may be ritualistic, involving extensive planning for at
least some people who self-injure. From the quantitative perspective, Whitlock et al. (in
press) report that, among college self-injurers, a subset (16.4%) of more severe injurers
reported having a regular self-injury routine. About one-third (31.6%) of this same
subset also reported NSI characterized by multiple phases, further suggesting a
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systematic approach to NSI, even if only inadvertently. However, such an explanation is
only one extrapolation borne out of the behavioral-functional models of NSI (e.g., Nock
& Prinstein, 2004, 2005), and is based on speculation rather than any extant empirical
evidence.
Another possible explanation for a lack of a significant difference in goal-directed
behaviors is that self-injurers may lack acceptance (or even acknowledgement) of their
emotional states and emotional awareness, both of which were significantly more
difficult for NSI participants in this study. In this vein, someone who engages in NSI
may not see themselves as having difficulty with “getting things done” when they are
“upset” because they are not attending to the “upset” emotions in the first place. Thus,
emotional nonacceptance and lack of emotional awareness may theoretically mediate
self-reported difficulties with goal-directed behavior or a perceived lack thereof. This
would also be supported by the recent work of Whitlock et al. (in press) which found that,
at most, less than half of those who engage in NSI may see it as life-interfering behavior.
Further research will be needed to establish the validity of any of these possible
hypotheses.
One interesting aspect of the DERS data presented here is that difficulty with
impulse control was not clearly significantly different (p=.045) in NSI participants, which
is discordant with some models of NSI and consonant with others (Klonsky, 2007).
Some researchers (e.g., Favazza, 1995; New et al., 1995; Welch & Linhan, 2002) have
proposed that NSI is a behavior primarily based on problems with controlling one’s
impulses (i.e. to self-injure), while others have posited that NSI (especially in BPD) is a
“manipulative” strategy, primarily aimed at extracting what is needed/desired from the
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environment and those in it (e.g., Adams et al., 2001). Some empirical support exists for
the former of these positions, although no clear evidence has been found for the latter.
Simeon et al. (1992), for example, found that all participants in their sample of selfinjuring and non-self-injuring personality disordered patients had elevated levels of
impulsivity, with self-injurers reporting more aggression than non-self-injurers. Other
researchers have found that individuals with one impulsivity-based form of
psychopathology (e.g., substance abuse, eating disorders) are more likely to meet criteria
for other forms of psychopathology that have impulsivity features (Evans & Lacey, 1992;
Fitcher et al., 1994). Other work examining clinical correlates of different subtypes of
NSI, has recently emerged to show high levels of impulsivity as a characteristic of selfinjurers (St. Germain & Hooley, 2008). The current data seem to suggest a modest role
at best (d=.55) for difficulties with impulse control in NSI. It is possible that this role is
mediated by other domains of emotion regulation, and further research will be required to
more adequately address this question.
The analyses indicated that Hypotheses 3a and 3b were mostly not supported.
However, a modest significant relationship was found between difficulties engaging in
goal-directed behavior and cortisol level differences from baseline at 35 minutes post
stressor in NSI participants. Although this relationship was only modest (r=.427; p=.03),
this relationship was not found in the Control group. Interestingly, analyses of
correlations between raw cortisol data and DERS scores indicated a modest, but
significant inverse relationship (r=-.394; p=.038) between goal-directed behavior
problems and T3 cortisol levels in the Control group, indicating that as cortisol rose in
Controls, these difficulties decreased, and vice versa. This finding is also ironic in that
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this domain was the only DERS subscale that did not evidence significant between group
differences.
Why the relationship between cortisol differences and goal-directed behaviors
was significant 35 minutes post-stressor, but not at any other point, and not for Controls,
is unclear. Moreover, it is unclear why T3 cortisol levels were significantly related to
this same emotion regulation difficulty but not others, not at other measurement points,
and not in the NS I group. Nonetheless, these data suggest a relationship between
biological and psychological indices of emotion dysregulation in self-injurers that may be
mitigated by time. It is possible that following activation of the HPAA, an absence of
directed or engaging activity (as was part of this study’s design) is associated with further
increases in HPAA activity. If one assumes that being shut in a relatively small (in some
cases windowless) room for two and a half hours is distressing (as is qualitatively
supported by the comments noted earlier), then it is possible that this stress interacted
with a potentially lower threshold for distress in NSI participants, which in turn activated
the HPAA in absence of access to the persons typical method of coping using NSI. The
time at which this occurred may represent a critical juncture at which NSI is more likely
to occur, meaning that there is perhaps a vulnerability window, within which NSI is
more/most likely to occur. Future research must seek to replicate this finding, as doing
so may prove to be valuable in translating a phenomenological understanding of NSI into
treatments for this behavior.
Finally, the lack of support for Hypothesis 4 indicates that no relationship was
present between self-report measures of negative and positive affect (i.e. PANAS scores)
and cortisol responses in any of the cells in this study. Considered in the context of the
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other findings (or lack thereof) in the present study, this finding adds a further complexity
to a pattern of discrepant data. In aggregate, these results suggest that self-injurers in this
study were more likely than Controls to report global difficulties with emotional
regulation; however, these problems were not related to ecological momentary
assessment of affect in either group in either condition. This is consistent with previously
discussed research, which has indicated that such a discrepancy is common for a variety
of reasons. Post-hoc ANOVAs of PANAS PA and NA difference scores nearly mirrored
cortisol level difference ANOVA results, in that no interaction effects were found; NA
initially increased following exposure to the stressor, and subsequently decreased
throughout the rest of the study; and PA progressively decreased across all measurement
intervals. The pattern of results was indeed convergent, i.e. NA changes converged with
cortisol changes, only not in the predicted direction and not to a statistically significant
degree. It is possible that researcher demand effects generated the initial differences in
cortisol and affect, but that these effects were short-lived, thus resulting in an inconsistent
pattern of relationships among physiological and psychological variables. Regardless,
evidence for an unreported extant effect of the stressor was not found, and it seems likely
that no relationship in this regard exists among this sample of self-injurers.
Study Limitations and Strengths
Limitations
Although the results of the present study were not supportive of the main
hypotheses and revealed no significant differences in HPAA functioning between selfinjurers versus controls exposed to psychological stress, several potentially mitigating
limitations of the study must be acknowledged. First, despite designed and purposeful
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efforts to recruit a heterogeneous sample, the sample for the present study was comprised
entirely of college students, many of whom were enrolled in undergraduate psychology
courses, which is a psychosocially idiosyncratic subset of a larger unique subset (i.e.,
college students) of the population (King et al., 2004). There is a strong possibility that
different results may be found in clinical samples of self-injurers (e.g., inpatient or
outpatient), because more severe psychiatric impairment is associated with more distress
(Coyne & Schwenk, 1997) and could hypothetically be associated with a greater degree
of biological emotional dysregulation than evidenced in this study. Thus, these results
will likely not be generalizable to populations outside of a university setting.. As Foot
and Sanford (2004) note, it is questionable at best to assume that college student samples
are representative of the general population.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that college students, regardless of
major, are somewhat higher functioning than individuals of a similar age who have never
been college students. Thus, it is likely that this study examined a relatively higher
functioning population than that which is typically seen in outpatient and inpatient
facilities. Nonetheless, 57.7% (n=15) of the NSI participants reported a history of
■y

“counseling or psychotherapy,” compared to only 7.1% (n=2) of controls (y [1, 53]==
15.97\p < .001). This dynamic of the sample seems to suggest that, although the sample
was likely to be higher functioning in general, self-injurers may be more likely to have
psychological difficulties requiring treatment than psychologically healthy individuals.
Another limitation of this study is that the sample size was relatively small. This
was a pilot study, and a priori power analysis suggested that moderate effect sizes could
be detected if present. It is possible that there were small effects not detected due to the
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power restrictions based on the current sample size. Nonetheless, additional participants
may have strengthened these results by adding further power with which to draw
conclusions. Future studies must seek to extend these findings by employing larger
samples.
Connected to the above sample limitation was this study’s lack of comparably
sized gender group subsamples. While the inclusion of male self-injurers is a strength,
the gender imbalance in the Control group limits the strength of any conclusions
regarding the relationship of gender to NSI and emotion regulation. Although this
imbalance occurred inadvertently, and in a design aimed at randomly sampling the
population from which it was drawn, it is clear that matching Control and NSI groups on
this variable would have strengthened the power of the study’s design. Some of the weak
but significant interaction effects found for gender may have been strengthened by larger
cell sizes.
Also related to the limitations of the sample was the definition of study groups.
Participants met criteria if they had engaged in NSI at least two times in their life with
one episode occurring in the past 12 months. This means that someone could have
reported a single episode of NSI at age 12 and then a second episode 11 months before
the screening and have met criteria for the study just as easily as someone who reported
cutting themselves daily for the past four years would have. Therefore, the heterogeneity
of the severity of NSI in the sample is also a potential limitation. Someone who received
intensive treatment for their NSI and was abstinent for several months could still have
participated in the study as a NSI participant, despite the fact that they may have been
more likely to have developed better emotional regulation skills through treatment than
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others. Qualitatively, four NSI participants reported taking psychotropic medications,
while none of the control participants did. Thus, there may be some indication in these
data that treatment of some form had a mitigating effect on emotional dysregulation.
Additionally, participants were not excluded based on mood or anxiety disorder
history as long as the diagnosis had not occurred in the past month, which allowed for the
possibility that people meeting full mood disorder criteria could have been included and
that people in remission from a mood or anxiety disorder could have been included.
Either of these would be supported by the fact that four participants reported currently
taking either selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors or selective norepinephrine reuptake
inhibitors. Simultaneously, this exclusion criterion also limited some otherwise eligible
participants who had reported a more severe history o f NSI (i.e. more methods, higher
frequency). Thus the inclusion/exclusion criteria may have contributed to a restriction in
the full range of self-injurers available within this population because people in the acute
stages of mood symptomatology were not allowed to participate. Designers of future
research in this area may consider foregoing such restrictions in favor of a better
representative sample, despite the risk of confounds to cortisol data. After all, the
emotion dysregulation model of NSI directly implies impairment in emotion regulation,
which can manifest in a variety of forms of psychopathology.
A further limitation of the study is the inherent variability of cortisol. The
sensitivity of cortisol to stress induction and emotion made it an excellent candidate as a
biomarker of HPAA functioning, but this glucocorticoid is affected by a variety of
factors, including the time of day, physical activity, brain activity, pregnancy, mood,
environmental factors, and even posture (Hennig Friebe, Ryl, Kramer, Bottcher, &
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Netter, 2000). The design of this study was aimed at maintaining as much control of the
quality of the cortisol data as possible through restricting use of certain substances and
participation in activities that are known to affect cortisol secretion. However, these
measures relied almost exclusively on “the honor system” of self-report, and adherence
cannot be determined definitively. Qualitatively, a number of the participants contacted
the principal investigator to inquire about whether certain behaviors or substances would
disqualify them from the study, or to provide notification of a potential lapse in
adherence. Nonetheless, the individual variation in cortisol secretion patterns and the
number of potential confounds for this data limits the tenacity with which conclusions
may be drawn.
This study was also limited by its reliance on self-report NSI data, which is
known to be somewhat unreliable (Klonsky, 2007). While the two week test-retest
reliability data for the DSHI (a=.68; r=.92) are strong, they are also indicative of
variability in reporting the same behaviors across a short period o f time. A variety of
factors can influence whether or not a participant accurately reports their NSI history,
including perceived experimenter demands and prior learning history related to disclosure
of NSI. In the present experiment, for example, the compensation component of the
study design also provided an incentive for participants recruited via advertisements to
embellish or even fabricate their history of NSI to receive financial compensation that
they otherwise could not obtain. While there is neither quantitative nor qualitative data
generated in the present study to support such a contention, this possibility highlights the
concerns inherent in relying on self-reported NSI data, and beckons for more innovative
and accurate approaches to NSI assessment.
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A final limitation of this study was the technique used for the experimental
manipulation. This technique has been previously used effectively in several studies to
experimentally produce a cortisol/stress response (cf. Blackhart et al., 2007), and it is
founded on a large body of literature (see Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Nonetheless, the
effectiveness of this technique is contingent upon several factors in its implementation.
First, the appropriate wording of feedback must be used. This study used feedback that
was based on work by Blackhart et al. (2007) in their study of cortisol response in social
anxiety. One modification was made to the Rejected feedback to increase the harshness
and impact of the wording, which included adding the statement. “This is kind of
unusual, and it’s never happened before.” It is possible that this variation actually
decreased the believability of the feedback. Use of the original, unaltered feedback script
for future research may be advisable to reduce the risk of such iatrogeny.
Second, the delivery of feedback must be effective, involving minimizing
emotive behavior and changes in facial affect (i.e. “keeping a straight face”). Although
some research personnel associated with this project reported and exhibited initial
difficulty with delivery of feedback effectively, delivery improved substantially during
the training process. Nevertheless, it is possible that behavioral drift occurred over the
course of the experiment, resulting in a diluted impact of this stress-induction technique.
It will behoove future researchers employing a similar design to conduct regular ongoing
training of research personnel throughout the duration of the study.
Third, environmental factors within the experiment must be conducive to the
believability of this feedback. Most experiment groups consisted of four participants.
Although participants were told that they would get to work with “at least one of the
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other participants” during “the second half of the experiment” depending on whom
picked whom to work with, it is possible that a group number in which pairs could be
matched up evenly made this less believable (i.e., participants perhaps “did the math” and
disregarded the “at least one other person” statement). Moreover, although all
participants remained in their respective lab rooms before and after the conversational
task and had no other potential opportunities for interaction with other participants, the
only noise of people moving around outside of the lab rooms was likely to be easily
identifiable as the research personnel. Anecdotally, during debriefing one participant
commented, “I knew something was up- everyone went back to the same rooms, and I
never heard anyone else walking around or getting together in a group.” The lab rooms
used in this experiment were also poorly insulated for sound and were close together, in
some cases adjacent. Therefore, it is possible that participants overheard some
interactions between research personnel and other participants, thus contributing to
disbelief (among Rejected participants) that other participants were gathered together
working in a group. Future studies involving social rejection stressors must control such
environmental factors that potentially degrade the believability of experimental
deception.
Finally, the deception used for participants in the Neutral condition may also have
had an iatrogenic effect, especially for the nearly half (48%) who suspected deception.
Instead of having a null effect as anticipated, it is possible that this deception resulted in
annoyance or other negative emotion, which in turn produced a cortisol response
comparable or higher than that of Rejected participants. This is also consistent with
qualitative data from the experimental manipulation check, in which some participants
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appeared not to have believed this deception either, as denoted by one Neutral condition
participant’s response, “You made ‘a mistake?’ Yeah, right.” Future research using this
stressor must be designed to control for this possibility.
Strengths
While the aforementioned limitations must be considered, the present study was
also characterized by several methodological strengths. First, this study was the first
known research to employ both biological and self-report measures of emotional duress
in the study of emotional regulation in NSI. Cortisol is a well-known proxy measure of
HPAA functioning, which in turn is a well-established neurological component of
emotional regulation. However, studies of NSI have typically used only paper-and-pencil
assessments for mood, affect, or emotional state. This study is among the first to employ
biological measures in the study o f NSI, and no known studies have used cortisol as a
measure of emotional dysregulation following stress induction in this population.
A second key strength of this study that merits discussion is the demographic
composition of the sample; specifically, in the NSI group, males were included, and
nearly equally represented. Older individuals were also included in the NSI group. This
feature of the present research is a movement away from the long-held, and misconceived
stereotype of the mid- to late adolescent (or very young adult) female self-injurer (e.g.,
Strong, 1998). Recent work by Gratz (2001) and a variety of others (e.g., Nijman,
Dautzeberg, Merckelbach, Juang, Wessel, & Campo, 1999; Nock & Prinstein, 2005;
Stanley et al., 2001) indicates that NSI is a problem in males, but that this behavior may
develop for different reasons and may have different manifestations (e.g., different
methods, different body parts; Whitlock et al. [ in press]). Such work has established that
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the aforementioned stereotype is passe, has resulted primarily from sampling bias, and
has served mainly to hinder progress in the study of NSI. While NSI is becoming more
widely recognized and documented as an equivalent problem in males (Gratz, 2001;
Klonsky, 2007), self-injuring men remain an understudied population. This study makes
a purposeful step forward in this regard, especially by its inclusion of males.
The setting for this study is also one of its strengths. Research in both Europe
(Lehtinen et al., 2003) and North America (Mueser, Essock, Drake, Wolfe, & Frisman,
2001) suggests that there may be differences in the prevalence of psychopathology across
different types of national regions. Clearly, there are differing sociocultural caveats and
dynamics in different regions of North America that potentially alter reporting rates and
manifestations of behaviors such as NSI. Whereas prior research on NSI in college
students has been primarily conducted at larger, urban-based universities in western or
eastern North America, the present study examined a sample drawn from a medium
sized, rurally based university in the North American Midwest. Thus, the present
research provides NSI data on an understudied subset of the general North American
population. Thus, the generalizability of these results to similar populations may have
been higher than prior research in different regions.
Some aspects of the experimental design employed in this study may also be
considered strengths. First, the stressor that was used in this research was based on
decades of research examining the biology of stress responses in human. The
characteristics of this stressor (uncontrollability and social evaluation) have been
demonstrated to produce the strongest cortisol response in research participants when
combined together as they were in this experiment. Thus, there is strong research support
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to indicate that this method was highly likely to produce a strong cortisol response
(Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Additionally, the stressor used was social in nature, and
relied on social exclusion to produce stress. It is likely that this stressor presented a more
realistic context than an abstract stressor task (e.g., performing mental calculations out
loud for a mock or real audience) because actual or perceived social exclusion is
something that people, self-injurers included, are likely to experience. This stressor was
also designed to appear as a non-routine and unexpected part of the participant’s
experience during the study, thus making it more difficult for participants to actively cope
with any resulting stress by attributing the manipulation to meaningless or arbitrary
research demands.
Future Directions
This research represents an important initial step toward examination of potential
underlying biological components of NSI. While the limitations of this study do not
inherently portend invalidity of the results, and must be balanced with the strengths of
this research, they do merit some caution when extrapolating these findings. Future
research must seek to replicate these results before any firm conclusions may be drawn or
applied from them. It is incumbent upon future researchers to examine other facets of
emotion regulation in self-injurers.
The lack of significant findings in the present study both furthers and frustrates
the advancement of our understanding of NSI etiology. The pattern of results points
toward some potentially fruitful lines of inquiry that may be addressed in future studies.
First, other indices of emotion regulation in the brain must be evaluated in self-injurers
under stressed and non-stressed conditions. Investigations of receptor density in the

149

amygdala may provide support for a hypo-threshold model of emotion dysregulation in
NSI, whereby higher densities of CRH in the central nucleus of the amygdala could
theoretically (1) lower the threshold for emotional reactivity; (2) increase the amount of
stimulation of the amygdala; and/or (3) protract the chronicity of negatively valenced
emotional responses in self-injurers, such as fear.
Second, subsequent investigations in this area must evaluate the role of other
potential mitigating factors such as severity of NSI pathology (e.g., frequency, duration).
Regardless of the model that is used to explain NSI, higher frequency, higher
dangerousness, and chronicity are likely to suggest disruption in the person’s life at some
level. It is possible that these factors bare some unique relationship to the function of
NSI in a self-injurer’s life. As suggested by Klonsky (2007), it is possible that the
function of NSI changes over time for people, and these changes may be associated with
lesser or greater levels of risk for other forms of psychopathology, as well as greater or
lesser applicability of psychotherapeutic interventions. For example, evaluation of
different durations of NSI history, ages of onset, and different severities of NSI as
predictors of initial readiness-to-change may facilitate a better understanding of the
chronic nature of much NSI. However, it is the determination of the role of these factors
that is the first step in this direction.
Third, in lieu of the null results of this study, future research must turn attention
toward the expansion of alternative extant models of NSI. The behavioral model
proposed by Nock and Prinstein (2004) was indicative of emotion or affect regulation as
a function of NSI in adolescent self-injurers. However, it is also quite possible that NSI
develops primarily through a process of chaining, paired association, and contingencies
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of reinforcement inadvertently initiated by either the individual who engages in NSI or
his/her environment. Although self-damaging behavior would seem to be a “failed
mutation” in an evolutionary sense, it is possible that behavioral principles combined
with a conducive environment make this behavior more functional for the self-injurer
than is commonly assumed by either the pedestrian general public or the seasoned
clinician.
Fourth and finally, it is clear from this study that the relationship between gender
and NSI has yet to be elucidated. Clarification of the way in which one’s interpersonal
and intrapersonal experience of gender is needed. It is imperative for future research
designs to incorporate balanced gender subsamples, in an effort to better understand this
relationship. Future research examining emotion regulation and NSI especially must seek
to address questions pertaining to the role of gender in these psychological phenomena.
Doing so will ideally develop an empirical background against which new, targeted
treatments for NSI may be developed.
These proposed directions are but a few of the myriad avenues yet to be pursued
in NSI research, many of which are beyond the scope of this discussion. In general,
research on this behavior remains relatively nascent at this time, given our limited
understanding of it. Substantially more work is required for a useful and comprehensive
model of NSI to be advanced. The findings of this study are merely a small step in a long
road of empirical discovery yet to be traveled by behavioral science.
The pattern of differences presented in this paper is important and amenable to a
biopsychosocial understanding of NSI. The primary hypothesis regarding cortisol was
not supported, but self-injurers in this study essentially stated that they have significant
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problems with emotional regulation, thus supporting the psychological component of this
model. Although it appeared that NSI participants’ bodies told a different story
biologically, it is possible that what was uncovered in this experiment is a unique
neurobiology requiring further exploration with more sophisticated techniques in future
research. As Carl Sagan (1994) once noted, “Absence of evidence, is not evidence of
absence.” Indeed, the discrepancy between biological and psychological measures of
emotional regulation seems to point toward some important, yet unexplored, avenues of
empirical inquiry. It is imperative for future researchers in this area to continue to
advance our understanding of the biological component of the biopsychosocial model of
NSI, in an effort to provide a more complete understanding of and more effective
treatments for this behavior.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I
Inform ed C onsent Form
This study is being conducted by Patrick Kerr. I am a graduate student in the psychology departm ent and
am coordinating this research project. M y advisors for this project, are Dr. Jennifer M uehlenkam p, and
assistant professor in the D epartm ent o f Psychology, and Dr. A lan King, an associate professor in the
D epartm ent o f Psychology, both o f w hom are supervising this research. The psychology departm ent
supports the practice o f the protection for this project o f human subjects in experim ental research, in
accordance with the Ethical Principles for Psychologists put forth by the A m erican Psychological
A ssociation.
The purpose o f this research is to study certain biological factors associated with non-suicidal self-injury
(N SSI). B oth individuals w ith and w ithout a history o f N SSI have been invited to participate in this study.
The experim enter conducting the study with you today has not been informed about w hich group you are in
This experim ent has been approved by the U niversity o f N orth D akota Institutional R eview Board. Y our
participation in this research is entirely voluntary. Y ou w ere invited to participate in this study based on
your responses on the questionnaires adm inistered in the group testing session at the beginning o f this
sem ester, in w hich you participated. The follow ing inform ation is provided so that you may decide w hether
o r not you w ish to participate in this study. Y ou are free at any tim e during the experim ent to withdraw
your participation fo r any reason. A lso, if you decide not to participate in this study, your decision w ill not
affect your course grade or your relationships w ith psychology faculty m em bers. Y ou will receive four (4)
hours o f extra credit to be used tow ard a psychology course, o r $20 for participating today. I f you
discontinue your participation early, you w ill be com pensated at a rate o f 0.5 hours o f extra credit and $2
for every half-hour or part th ereo f th at you participate.
In this study, you w ill be asked to engage in conversational tasks w ith other participants. These other
participants are also unaw are o f w hat group you are in. These tasks w ill require you to discuss certain
topics indicated by the experim enter. The tim e required for any conversational task that y o u participate in
will not exceed 15 m inutes. P rior to the conversational tasks, you w ill be asked to com plete a questionnaire
pertaining to your recent activities. The questions on this questionnaire w ill determ ine your eligibility to
participate, and will inquire about the follow ing activities:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Caffeine intake
D rug use
Prescription m edication use
Food consum ption
Physical activity and exercise

Prior to the conversational tasks, the experim enter will ask you to engage in a relaxation activity involving
listening to m usic and reading through som e m agazines. This w ill last for 20 m inutes. Following this, the
experim enter w ill ask that yo u provide sam ples o f saliva at designated tim es. The experim enter w ill
provide you w ith the necessary m aterials to do this. Y ou w ill then engage in a second task involving
draw ing w ith selected m em bers o f the group. A fter all conversational tasks have been com pleted, the
experim enter will ask that you provide additional sam ples o f saliva at designated tim es. The experim enter
w ill provide you w ith the necessary m aterials to do this at this time as well. E ach tim e you provide a
sam ple o f saliva, you w ill be asked to com plete a b rie f questionnaire. A t the conclusion o f the experim ent,
you will be asked to com plete tw o m ore questionnaires. O ne questionnaire will inquire about your
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thoughts on this experim ent, and the other w ill inquire about thoughts related to self-injury. Finally, you
will be asked to copy som e statem ents on a page provided by the experim enter.

T he criteria for participating in this study a re th a t you are a t least 18 years o f age, th a t you a re not
currently pregnant, th a t you are not currently taking oral contraceptives, th a t you have complied
w ith the requirem ents for pre-experim ental food and d ru g intake an d physical activity, th a t you have
not been diagnosed w ith any form of mood d iso rd er (i.e., M ajo r Depressive D isorder/C linical
D epression, B ipolar D isorder, Dysthymia, Cycolthym ia) or anxiety d iso rd er (i.e., G eneralized
Anxiety D isorder, obsessive-Compulsive D isorder, P osttraum atic Stress D isorder, Panic D isorder)
within the past m onth, and th a t you have not been diagnosed with an eating d iso rd er at any tim e in
your lifetime. V erification o f this com pliance will be m ade when the sam ples a re analyzed.
Y our course grade w ill not be affected by a decision not to answ er any item on these questionnaires. I f you
have not com plied w ith the pre-experim ent instructions regarding food and drug intake, and physical
activity, you m ay not participate in this study research today; how ever, you m ay elect to reschedule your
participation in this study for another day, with no consequence to you.

This experim ent should last no m ore than tw o and a h a lf hours, for w hich y o u w ill receive a total o f four
hours o f extra course credit, or $20. If you discontinue your participation prior to com pletion o f the
experim ental session, you w ill still be com pensated based on the tim e you have contributed. Specifically,
you w ill be provided w ith ten dollars or tw o hours o f research participation credit for every full hour that
you have participated (e.g., for 1 o r 1 'A hours o f tim e spent, you w ould receive $ 10 o r 2 hours o f extra
credit participation).
All data collected in all experim ental testing sessions w ill rem ain confidential and w ill be used for research
purposes only. R andom identification num bers w ill be assigned to each participant so that your responses
and data (including salivary sam ple data) w ill not be identified by either your nam e or your student number.
T his random num ber will not be your social security num ber or your student num ber, but rather an
unassociated random num ber. All biological sam ples w ill be analyzed by Salim etrics, Inc.; how ever, your
identity w ill n o t be linked w ith your individual sam ples in any way or at any tim e. This consent form will
be stored separately from the data collected in the experim ental sessions, m eaning that yo u r data will not be
connected w ith any identifying inform ation at any tim e. H ow ever, w e w ill include your random num ber on
this consent form in case you have questions about this research or w ould like to discuss your responses
with us. The data from this experim ent, w hich includes the questionnaires you com plete and the biological
analysis reports generated by Salim etrics, Inc., as w ell as the consent form s will be stored in locked
cabinets for a period o f three years follow ing the com pletion o f this study. A fter three years, all data will be
destroyed using a paper shredder.
There may be no benefits for participating in this study beyond gaining experience in scientific research.
O n a larger scale, it is expected that this study w ill benefit th e larger field o f clinical psychology because it
will yield data that w ill be im portant in understanding new aspects o f certain behaviors in hum ans. It is
expected that the tasks used in this procedure will provide useful inform ation that can one day be used to
develop new psychological treatm ent approaches for certain behaviors.
P o te n tia l ris k s to in d iv id u a ls w h o p a rticip a te in th is stu d y m ay in c lu d e e m o tio n a l d is c o m fo rt o r distress due
to certain com ponents o f the experim ental procedure, and discom fort in rating behaviors pertaining to
situations that m ay elicit fear o r w orry in som e individuals. I f you experience such discom fort, please feel
free to contact m e to discuss your experience in the study. A t the conclusion o f your participation in this
study, you m ay be provided with, o r may request, a list o f com m unity and cam pus resources w here you can
receive psychological services either at no cost (e.g., U niversity C ounseling C enter) o r on a sliding fee
scale (e.g., Psychological Services Center).
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A nother potential risk in this study is providing data that m ight be linked w ith your nam e. A s stated above,
a num ber o f steps w ill be taken to m aintain confidentiality. M oreover, all o f the personnel associated with
this study have gone through a confidentiality w orkshop, w hich includes a review o f the ethical principles
published by the A m erican Psychological A ssociation. O nly the researcher (Patrick K err), the research
advisors (Jennifer M uehlenkam p, Ph.D . and A lan K ing, Ph.D .), and people w ho audit IR B procedures will
have access to the data. H owever, please be aw are that if at any time during the experim ent you express any
desire or intent to harm y o u rself in any way, the experim enter will be obligated to breach your
confidentiality as a research participant and take appropriate measures to ensure your safety. This may
include contacting one o f the clinical psychologists supervising this study (Jennifer M uehlenkam p, Ph.D.
and A lan King, Ph.D .), the U niversity o f N orth D akota C risis R esponse Team, or other em ergency
personnel.
Y ou w ill be given a thorough debriefing o f the rationale behind the study, expected results, and the m anner
in w hich this study m ight benefit individuals w ith certain behavioral tendencies at the end o f the
experim ental session. It is expected that results from this study w ill be presented at conferences and
published in a peer-review ed journal. A ll data w ill be presented as m eans and standard deviations, and no
individual data set w ill be published.
If you have any questions o r concerns about this research, please do not hesitate to call m e at (701) 7774348. Y ou can also contact Dr. Jennifer M uehlenkam p at (701) 777-4496 or Dr. Alan K ing at (701) 7773644. I f you have other questions or concerns, you may call U N D ’s O ffice o f R esearch and Program
D evelopm ent at 777-4279. The experim enter will provide you w ith a copy o f this form to keep for your
ow n records. Y our signature below indicates that you have thoroughly read this consent form and
voluntarily agree to participate. Thank you.

P a rtic ip an t S ig n atu re

D ate

APPENDIX II

Debriefing Statement
Now that you have completed your participation in this study, we would like to explain
its purpose. The main purpose of this study is to study the biological responses of individuals
who engage in non-suicidal self-injury to emotional distress. It is theorized that individuals who
engage in non-suicidal self-injury do so for a variety of reasons, one of which may be to help
moderate negative feelings and emotions. The feedback that you were given by the researcher
today was pre-selected prior to the experiment based on your random assignment to either the
“neutral group” (if you were told we made a mistake and were assigned to the wrong group) or
the “stressed group” (if you were told that no one chose to work with you). Therefore, any
feedback you were given by the experimenter regarding whether or not you were selected by
someone else to work with during the second part of the experiment was fictional. In fact, it is
likely that some of the other participants in today’s study were given the same feedback that you
were. This is referred to as a “social rejection technique.” It was part of the experiment, and was
aimed at eliciting an emotional response from you which could be measured using biological
indicators in your saliva. This was a deceptive technique and we sincerely apologize for using it.
Unfortunately, this is one of the most consistent techniques used in research for eliciting
emotional responses in research participants. By studying the way in which self-injurers and
those who do not engage in self-injury respond biologically to stress, we can better understand
both the reasons that people engage in self-injury and how to treat this behavior more effectively.
It is possible and may even be expected that you felt uncomfortable while engaging in the
conversational task, and when given feedback about who had supposedly selected to work with
you. The feelings that you felt curing this experiment may have ranged from completely neutral
to sad, angry, anxious, or disturbed. Any and all of the feelings you experienced are normal
reactions to this procedure and are shared by many others who go through this experiment.
Moreover, there is ample research suggesting that these are very typical responses to this
procedure. The discomfort associated with this experiment is expected to be temporary; however,
the exact duration is unknown. If, for any reason, you would like to discuss these feelings with
the primary investigator of this experiment or my supervisors, we will be available to speak with
you. All office numbers, telephone numbers, and email are listed below. If these feelings persist,
it is also strongly suggested that you speak to a mental health professional.
As mentioned at the beginning of this study, all of your responses and all of your data
will be kept strictly and completely confidential. None of the data that you have personally
submitted will be used on an individual basis in any way, and all of the results gathered from this
study will be compiled, presented, and reported as group statistical averages. Likewise, while it
is understandable and appropriate that you may want to discuss your experiences today with a
mental health professional or other supportive person, we request that you do not discuss this
experiment with other undergraduate students so as to avoid biasing responses obtained from
future participants.
We sincerely appreciate your participation and cooperation with our study!
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Patrick Kerr, Primaiy Investigator
Office: 113 Corwin-Larimore
Phone: 701.777.4348
patrick.kerr@und.nodak.edu
Jennifer Muehlenkamp, Ph.D., Research Supervisor
Office: 337 Corwin-Larimore
Phone: 701.777.4496
iennifer.muehlenkamp@und.nodak.edu
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Alan King, Ph.D., Research Supervisor
Office: 339 Corwin-Larimore
Phone: 701.777.3644
alan king@und.nodak.edu

APPENDIX III
My E xp erien ces

In your own words, what was the present study about?

Did you believe, at any time, that the experiment dealt with anything other than
what the experimenter had described to you (circle one)?
Yes

No

If yes, what?

Did this affect your behavior in any way (circle one)? Yes

No

If yes, how?

Were you given any information about the experiment by anyone other than the
researchers prior to coming here today (circle one)?
If yes, what?
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Yes

No

APPENDIX IV
Positive S elf-S ta tem en ts

Directions: Please read each o f th e following statem ents to yourself now, and copy
each statem ent on th e line below it. This page is yours to keep, so you may take it
w ith you if you choose and use it as o fte n as necessary.

"I am an intelligent person"

”1 can succeed at anything I s e t my mind to"

"I have special talents and abilities"

"It's okay to just be me"

"My opinion is ju st as important as the next person’s"

"I am not stupid"

"I am smart and can figure things out just as easily as others"

"It's okay not to be perfect"

“I am competent at many things"

"I am a strong person"
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"I can achieve anything I s e t my mind to"

”1 have many strengths"

”1 have much potential"

”1 am worthy of a happy and fulfilling life"

"I am a person of value"

”1 am a likeable person"

"It’s okay to take care of myself"

"I am important"

"I am just as important as the next person"

"I am worthy of being loved"

“I am okay"
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APPENDIX V
Risk Screening
A.

Express concern regarding some of the responses. Let the participant know you just
want to speak briefly to see how they are doing. Briefly establish some rapport.

B.

Assess risk for risk factors:
i. Recent loss or frustration/failure
ii. Mood state or current distress (depression, anxiety, agitation); have them
rate depressed mood on a scale from 0-10.
iii. Assess degree of hopelessness
iv. Review BSS for history of suicide attempts and level of desire to die

C.

Assess suicide and NSSI factors (PIMP)
i. Plan: “Have you thought about what you might do (to self-injure, end
your life)?”
ii. Intent: “How upset would you say you are right now?”
“How strong is your desire to hurt yourself right now?”
iii. Means: “Do you have what you would need to______ (plan)?”
“Are you thinking about how to get what you need?”
iv. Past:

D.

“Have you attempted suicide/self-injured in the past?”
a. “When was that?” (if within past month consider HIGH
RISK.

Assess resources
i. Treatment: “Are you seeing anyone for treatment or therapy?”
a. If yes, “Do they know how you’ve been feeling?”
ii. Supports: “Do you live with anyone?”
“What are you doing next?”
“Is there someone you can go hang out with?”
iii. RFL: “What keeps you going right now”

E.

Determine Level of Risk and Required Action
i. LOW: No past attempt or recent/current SIB, low ideation w/o plan.
1. Required Action: validate participant’s feelings and provide
referral/recommendation for therapy
ii. MODERATE: Past attempt OR recent/current SIB, low ideation w/o plan
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1. Required Action: help participant articulate a brief safety plan
(i.e., what to do if thoughts/urges increase, distraction, call
friends); If the client is unable to identify a plan to remain safe,
contact the UND crisis response team.
iii. HIGH: Recent attempt, current suicidal or SIB ideation w/ plan and no
intent or access to lethal or injurious method
1. Required Action: encourage participant to immediately contact
support system via telephone while you’re in the room; request
that another RA contact Dr. Muehlenkamp while participant
does this
iv. IMMINENT: Current suicidal or SIB ideation, access to method, some
intent
1. Required Action: Call/find/track down Dr. Muehlenkamp
a. ask participant to remain in lab, send another RA to get
Dr. Muehlenkamp
b. help participant contact support system to inform of risk;
enlist help of support system in getting participant to a
clinician
c. DO NOT let participant leave lab alone; have friend,
family member meet them OR walk participant to
counseling center or PSC.
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APPENDIX VI
Short Health History Form
At what time did you last eat/drink?____ a.m./p.m.
What did you eat/drink?________________________________________________
Have you consumed any alcohol and/or caffeine within the last 24 hours?

Yes

No

If yes, please list below day and time, what was consumed, and how much:

Have you engaged in any physical activity/exercise that made your heart beat faster and/or your
breathing rate increase for 20 minutes or more within the last 24 hours?
Yes
No
If yes, please list below day and time, what physical activity you engaged in, and duration:

Do you smoke cigarettes or regularly use other tobacco/nicotine products?
Yes
No
If yes, at what time did you last smoke or use another tobacco product?____ a.m./p.m.
Have you experienced any illness within the last 48 hours?
Yes
No
If yes, what were your symptoms?________________________________________
Please list any prescription medications or over-the-counter medications you routinely take or
have taken in the last 5 days (including birth control, cold or allergy medication,
migraine/headache medications, antibiotics, etc.).
Have you been diagnosed with any of the following within the past month (please check all that
apply)?
_Major Depressive Disorder
_Bipolar Disorder _Cyclothymia
_Dysthymia
_Generalized Anxiety Disorder _Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
__Panic
Disorder
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
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Have you been diagnosed with or received treatment for any of the following in vour lifetime
(please check all that apply)?
Anorexia Nervosa _Bulimia Nervosa _Binge Eating Disorder
Females Only:
Are you currently taking birth control?
Are you currently pregnant?

Yes
Yes
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No
No

APPENDIX VII
Conversation Task Topics

The best ways that people meet new people and
new friends on campus
1. H o w d o stu dents at U N D m ee t n e w p e o p le on cam p u s and m ake n e w
friends?
2. W hat are so m e o f th e w a y s that y o u h a v e m et n e w p e o p le on cam p us
and/or m ad e n e w friends?
3. W hat is th e b est w a v to m e e t n e w p e o p le and m ake n e w friends at
UND?

The best places in town to spend free time
1. W hat are so m e p la c e s in to w n to sp en d leisu re/free tim e?
2. W hat are the b est p la c es in to w n to sp en d leisu re/free tim e?
3. W hat is th e b est p la ce in to w n to sp en d leisu re/free tim e?

The most interesting classes available on campus
1. W hat are so m e in terestin g c la s s e s that are a v a ila b le to stu dents at
UND?
2 . W hat c la s s e s at U N D d o m o st stu d en ts se e m to lik e m ore than others?
3. W hat is the m o st interestin g c la s s that any stu dent can take here at
UND?
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APPENDIX VIII

Experiment Selection Form
In the sp a c e s b e lo w , p le a se list th e tw o in d ivid u als that y o u w o u ld m o st lik e
to w ork w ith during the se co n d part o f the exp erim en t. R em em b er that th e se
are n ot rankings (e .g ., “I w an t to w ork w ith S a lly m o st, so I w ill list her
first!”), so it d o e s not m atter w h o y o u list first or seco n d .

P erson 1.

P erso n 2.
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